House Armed Services Subcommittee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee Testimony
General Kevin P. ChiltonWashington, D.C.
2/27/2008
TAUSCHER:
Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will
come to order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the United States strategic
posture and the Fiscal Year 2009 budget request for strategic programs,
including nuclear weapons, missile defense, intelligence, and military
space assets.
Our committee has jurisdiction over each of these areas, tracking
closely with the reach of the U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM.
Therefore, I want to thank General Kevin Chilton, commander of STRATCOM,
for being here today.
The Committee also
charges the National Nuclear Security Administration with developing and
maintaining the nuclear warheads that support our strategic deterrents
For that reason, I want to thank Mr. Tom D'Agostino, the undersecretary
of energy for nuclear security and administrator of the NNSA, for
appearing here today.
Finally, I want to welcome Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael
Vickers, whose portfolio -- Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict,
and Interdependent Capabilities -- includes establishing the strategic
policies that General Chilton is charged with executing.
We asked each of you to
be here today because your interconnected roles are very important to
this committee. I believe that, to examine the strategic posture of the
United States, each of you are needed to help paint a full picture.
Highlighted through an op-ed authored by former Defense Secretary Bill
Perry, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz,
and former Senator Sam Nunn, there is a growing bipartisan chorus of
statesmen and experts calling for the U.S. to adopt a policy designed to
achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
In response, this subcommittee has called for a larger national
discussion of this issue, and the Congress has acted. The National
Defense Authorization Act establishes a bipartisan commission to examine
U.S. strategic posture and recommend an appropriate policy for the 21st
century. The goal of the commission will be to determine the proper
balance between our nuclear and conventional forces and review the roles
of our nation's nonproliferation and Missile Defense Program.
I hope that each of you here today can assure the subcommittee that the administration will fully support this bipartisan commission.
We would also like your
input on what key questions the commission should consider. What do you
think has changed in our security environment since the last Nuclear
Posture Review, NPR, that should be explored? And how has the concept of
strategic deterrence shifted since the end of the Cold War?
Since we have both the head of STRATCOM and the NNSA with us, I would
ask that both parties give us a sense of how the administration is
looking at RRW this year as well as complex transformation from both a
programmatic and strategic perspective.
During the past year, we've had vigorous discussions here and abroad over the U.S. proposal to install missile defense interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. I have traveled to Europe several times over the past year to show our European allies how seriously we take our shared security interests.
I have urged the administration to work through NATO to establish a
joint U.S.-European missile defense capability. I have urged them to
"NATO-ize" the shield and focus on the threat posed by short- and
medium-range missiles pointed at Europe and our forward-deployed troops.
Our key concern about missile defense is that the Bush administration's budget request appears to delay the use of a very important system for defeating short- and medium-range missiles -- THAAD. In that regard, we are particularly interested in the warfighter's perspective on the requirements for these and other systems designed to defeat the threat posed by short- and medium-range missiles.
Finally, one year ago, we dealt with an ill-advised and dangerous Chinese anti-satellite test. Just last week, we witnessed the U.S. successfully intercept a failed satellite on the verge of reentering the atmosphere and threatening populated areas with 1,000 pounds of hydrazine fuel. The missile we used to intercept this satellite was part of our Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System.
I applaud the open manner in which our military has explained and
executed this mission. As I see it, our nation took responsibility for
eliminating a risk we created ourselves.
General Chilton, you and General Cartwright, as well as your whole team,
should be commended for a job well done. We used a defensive system to
defend life, limb, and property. The commanding officer and the crew of
the Lake Erie deserve our congratulations and thanks for a very tough
job.
I also see this event as a sign that the U.S. must establish more
thoughtful international protocols for spacefaring nations. As a nation
critically dependent on space assets, such steps are vital to our
national security interests.
Today, I would ask you to address the following concerns about our space
assets: What is our national and military policy if our space assets are
attacked? Do we have contingency plans for closing the intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps that our warfighters would
experience? And, finally, what are the merits and drawbacks of
establishing rules for the road in space?
While we are all acutely aware of the stress six-and-a-half years of war
have placed on our military, I want to be clear: The United States faces
pressing strategic challenges beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. This
subcommittee takes these issues seriously, and we intend to advance the
discussion and chart the right path for the United States.
Now let me turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Everett, for any comments he
might have.
But, before I do, I just want to take note that, as we kick off the FY
2009 authorization cycle, we do so mindful that our ranking member will
be retiring at the end of the year.
Mr. Everett, you have been a great asset to Congress and to the American
people and a credit to your constituents and to this committee and
subcommittee. I am grateful to you for your good work and your
partnership and your friendship, and I want you and our audience to know
that I'll be working with Chairman Skelton to honor your service in the
FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. Everett, the floor is yours.
EVERETT:
Madam Chairman, I don't know how to follow that. Thank you very much.
You're most kind to make that statement, and I do appreciate -- very
much appreciate -- our friendship, and I appreciate the work that I'm
going to mention that you've done in this committee. I'm going to
mention it in my opening statement.
And I also want to join you in recognizing our witnesses today for
appearing before us.
We welcome you back, General, in your new position.
CHILTON:
Thank you, sir.
EVERETT:
I will say you have my congratulations or condolences, whichever you
prefer. But, no, we appreciate the expertise that you bring to that
position.
And I also want to join the chairman in congratulating our witnesses for
their efforts in successfully intercepting a disabled NRO satellite last
week. This challenging mission was not one you had envisioned or one you
had a lot of time to prepare for, yet you did the job well and
safeguarded the public from potential harm. I commend the transparent
manner in which your plans and intent were communicated to Congress, to
the American people, and to the international community.
At a hearing two weeks ago, the deputy director of national
intelligence, Dr. Fingar, testified on the broad global threat and
challenges facing the United States. Chief among these include the
continuing terrorist threat, WMD-related proliferation, Iran and North
Korea's WMD and missile programs, increasing cyberattacks on the U.S.
networks, Pakistan nuclear security, growing counterspace threats, and
China PLA modernization. These are the security challenges that will
continue to shape our strategic forces posture and policy well beyond
traditional nuclear deterrence.
I would like to hear from our witnesses their thoughts on the change in
strategic environment and its implications for our defense policy and
capability needs. I remain concerned about our space protection posture
and how our military operates in a space threat environment. Do military
contingency plans and exercises consider satellite attacks? I am told
that we have workarounds and alternatives, but I have found that when I
pull a thread, there's very little detail.
And perhaps, Madam Chairman, we could have a classified briefing on this
later on.
The Chinese ASAT test remains a stark reminder to me of what we're up
against. The Chinese and others must know that attacks against our
satellites are simply unacceptable.
I appreciate your thoughts on policy options, Mr. Vickers, to deter
others from holding our space assets at risk and how we can develop a
more robust space architecture.
We have similar challenges in the cyberdomain. I will be the first to
say this is an even less understood security risk than space. Your
observations are valued as we examine the National Cyber Initiative and
get our arms around the cyberelements spread across the federal
government. Last year, commanders from STRATCOM, PACOM, and U.S. Forces
Korea testified to the need for more missile defense inventory to keep
pace with growing missile threats.
General Chilton, I would like to ask you to discuss the warfighters
missile defense force structure requirements. I would also like your
assessment on the missile defense test program and when you would have
confidence in the operational effectiveness of the Missile Defense
System.
President Bush has met with Prime Minister Topolanek earlier today and
discussed the importance of missile defense and collective security.
Polish Prime Minister Tusk visits the U.S. next month.
I understand teams of Czech, Polish, and U.S. negotiators have worked
incredibly hard to obtain missile defense agreements. I want to publicly
thank them for their efforts and encourage a speedy conclusion.
I would also publicly like to thank our chairman for the efforts that
she has made, which have been tremendous, in this endeavor. She has done
it in a very diplomatic way, and yet she, in my estimation, has moved
the process forward.
These efforts reflect a shared commitment to our relationships with our
collective security. I hope our witnesses will expand upon these
negotiations.
I also understand we are making progress in NATO integration. There
again, I'd like to thank the chairman for what she's done in that
regard.
I was recently briefed on the joint missile defense scenarios being run
between MDA and C2BMC System and NATO's Prototype Command and Control
System. Building upon the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the secretaries
of defense, state, and energy released a statement last summer on U.S.
national security and nuclear weapons and stated their intent to provide
a detailed strategy later this year.
With the witnesses assembled today, we have an opportunity to discuss
policy issues associated with strategic deterrence, the military's
nuclear requirements, their assessment of the current nuclear stockpile
and Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, and the viability, long-term
risk, and force structure implications of the future with life-extension
weapons and RRW.
Before I close, I'd like to acknowledge NNSA and the administration and
credit them with implementing the largest nuclear stockpile reduction
since the end of the Cold War. NNSA's dismantlement rates are at an
all-time high. The Moscow Treaty deductions for operational deployed
strategic warheads are on track. The stockpile reduction directed by the
president in 2004 to cut the 2001 nuclear weapons stockpile by 50
percent by 2012 has already been accomplished, and an additional 15
percent reduction was announced last September, and the nonproliferation
program has expanded to reflect the evolving proliferation threats.
Again, I want to pay tribute to our chairman. Much of what we have done
in this committee, particularly on (inaudible), has been through her
leadership, and I'm really proud to be associated with this committee
under her leadership.
Thank you very much.
TAUSCHER:
Thank you very much, Mr.
Everett.
I will note for our witnesses that we have received your prepared
statements and are very appreciative that you've provided them to the
committee ahead of this afternoon's hearing, and if you would like to
summarize your prepared testimony, we'll be able to move more quickly to
questions.
General Chilton, we'll start with you. The floor is yours.
CHILTON:
All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman and Representative Everett both, for your
leadership, and members of the committee, thank you very much for this
opportunity to be here and share my thoughts with you and answer the
questions that you have with regard to where we are in STRATCOM and
where we're headed.
I also want to thank not only the members personally, but also your
staffs for the great support and open dialogue we have had between
myself and your staffs and my staff and your staffs. I think it's one of
the healthiest relationships we have, and I'm committed to continuing
that open dialogue between STRATCOM and the members of this committee
and their staffs.
And I'd be remiss if I didn't thank you for your support of our men and
women in uniform.
I've been before this committee before in other hats. This is my first
time as the STRATCOM commander and as a joint commander of Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marines, and it's a proud opportunity that I have.
So it is congratulations, not condolences, Mr. Everett, and I thank you
for that that.
To have this job as the STRATCOM commander is both humbling, but also
incredibly rewarding considering the quality of people that I work with,
and the dedicated men and women we have serving STRATCOM, which not only
wear a uniform -- we have a tremendous number of civil servants in
STRATCOM that support our operations day in and day out, just as
dedicated as our men and women in uniform. I've become very proud of
them and very humbled that I can lead them.
If I could, I'd appreciate if my statement could be submitted for the
record, ma'am.
TAUSCHER:
Without objection.
CHILTON:
Thank you.
I'll just to summarize just at the new commander briefly my observations
on the command and where I'm taking the command.
First of all, I spent the first month immersing myself in the command
and going out and visiting all my component commanders and also taking
the advice of Senator Nelson who in my preparations for confirmation
hearings commended that I go out and immerse myself also in the nuclear
enterprise, and so I have been out and visited all of our laboratories
in the Department of Energy. I have the Pantex Plant on my schedule, as
well as a visit to Y-12 yet to come, and so I have taken that advice to
heart.
As I look at the missions assigned to STRATCOM, we have a lot of
missions, a diverse set of missions, but what I found is there's a
thread that runs through all of our mission areas, and that is they are
global in nature. So STRATCOM truly has a global focus. In fact, it may
be better named a global command. But that is our focus, and those are
our mission areas.
But with eight mission areas, if all are important, the feeling is that
nothing is important, if they're all equally important. So I had to
focus myself on energy, and I have looked at these mission areas very
closely, and I divided them into two major groups.
One group is where I have forces assigned to STRATCOM, which are
conducting daily operations, 24-7, in mission areas, where I have
subordinate commanders who can do planning and who can pass my orders on
to tactical-level commanders and execute things day in and day out.
These are the mission areas that require 24-7 attention by the command.
They are mission areas that operate daily across global boundaries and
are totally agnostic to lines drawn on a map. Regional, state
boundaries, indeed continents don't matter to these mission areas, and
these mission areas are strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace.
And so I've made the effort to increase the staff at the headquarters'
focus and the command's focus -- daily focus -- on not only executing
the missions we're assigned in these areas every day, but making sure
we're doing it in an integrated fashion.
The other mission areas we have are no less important, but in these
mission areas, I found we do not have forces assigned from the services
to conduct operations, and rather than having a focus of operating
across boundaries, these mission areas require STRATCOM to lead in
knitting together the seams between boundaries in the regional combatant
commands.
And this would be in the areas of integrating missile defense, combating
weapons of mass restructure, information operations, not to include
network operations, and ISR.
I don't own a single ISR platform. I don't own any WMD forces to go out
and carry out that mission. I do not own IO forces that conduct
psychological operations or military detection, nor do I have my finger
on the trigger of our Missile Defense Program, but our job is a very
important one, is to make sure that these global capabilities that have
global concerns, cross-cutting concerns, are knitted together
appropriately, and we take that mission set very seriously, equally
seriously.
I guess I'd close by saying that's the focus I've tried to bring. I've
also made some adjustments in the headquarters to refocus on these
areas, to bring the integration function up to the headquarters, to
reemphasize our leadership role and responsibility particularly in the
nuclear mission area, and we've made some changes there that I think are
moving the ball forward for the future.
And you know what? It's pretty easy when you've got the kind of people I
have working for me to make these kind of changes and to move forward.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to be with you today.
TAUSCHER:
Thank you, General Chilton.
Undersecretary D'Agostino, the floor is yours.
D'AGOSTINO:
Certainly. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify here today before the committee.
I also appreciate the time you took this morning and the committee took
this morning with Chairman Skelton to talk to Deputy Administrator Will
Tobey. He was pleased to be able to talk about the programs on the
nonproliferation side.
I'd also like to point out we have a few of our future leaders, I
believe, sitting in the back, as we've done in the past, give them an
opportunity to see this country at work, and so I'm always pleased to
have them with me.
Mr. Everett, I appreciate your comments on the changes and the
improvements we've made in the stockpile, particularly our work in
dismantlement. We're very proud of that record, and we have a lot more
work to do, and we plan on continuing to focus.
The work done at the Pantex Plant, of course, is a key part of that, as
it is at Y-12. So we're going to keep the attention on that particular
element because it not only helps us with dismantlement, but it helps
hone our skills that we need in order to deliver products to the Defense
Department.
I feel the nuclear weapons complex is at a crossroads. Maintaining the
status quo and just keeping our complex kind of doing what we did last
year is not really an option, and I think delay and inaction will only
increase the costs and elevate the risks associated with manufacturing
and maintaining an aging stockpile.
Regardless of stockpile transformation plans and while we're shrinking
the total size, facilities need to be upgraded, and the challenge for us
will be to move from an aging Nuclear Weapons Complex designed for the
Cold War and move that and shift that towards a 21st century national
security enterprise that's integrated, that's cost effective, and that
eliminates unnecessary redundancy, but also is at the forefront of
science and technology.
In addition, our 21st century enterprise will continue to leverage the
scientific underpinnings of the historic nuclear weapons mission to
respond to a full range of national security challenges that we have
and, beyond nuclear weapons sustainment, shift those more towards
nuclear counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation activities. And,
as an example, we provide technical support to the Defense Department
and the FBI and emergency-render safe and post- event nuclear technical
forensics activities, and a lot more needs to be done in that area, and
we're going to be looking to shift more towards that area.
Infrastructure improvements are a major part of the complex
transformation plan that we have, and we've made important progress, but
we have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that we have date back
to World War II and cannot readily meet today's safety and security
requirements. Let me give you just two quick examples, if I could.
A sufficient capability to work with plutonium is an essential part of a
national security enterprise and is required for as long as we retain a
nuclear deterrent, and most likely even longer. Currently, we have a
very small production capacity at Los Alamos, about 10 pits per year, at
our TA-55 area. Our building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Facility, is well over 50 years old and is insufficient to
support the national security requirements for the stockpile and for
future national security mission areas.
So, whether we continue on our existing path or move towards a
replacement modern warhead-type stockpile, we sill need the capacity to
produce about 50 to 80 pits per year, which is less than one-tenth of
our Cold War level, as well as the ability to carry out pit
surveillance, which is an essential part of maintaining our stockpile.
The second example is uranium component production. Every warhead,
whether it's refurbished or replaced, will need uranium components. Our
current facilities date back to the Manhattan Project. Securing these
facilities from terrorist threats in a post- 9/11 environment is
increasingly difficult and increasingly costly, particularly, also,
operating them with modern safety requirements and standards that we
expect.
So the construction of our highly enriched uranium materials facility at
Y-12 is going to allow us to consolidate our uranium storage with a
significantly reduced security footprint and more work will be needed in
that area.
I'd like to turn briefly to the stockpile. The stockpile has not
required nuclear testing to date, but keeping this stockpile healthy has
become an increasingly difficult challenge. Periodically, we identify
problems with the warheads that in the past would have been resolved
with nuclear tests. Our Stockpile Stewardship Program has worked well so
far to help us avoid that prospect.
And the considered judgment of the National Weapons Laboratory
directors, however, is that maintaining certification of finely-tuned
designs of an aging Cold War stockpile through life-extension programs
without underground testing involves increasing risk. An alternative
path could be a stockpile based on replacement warheads that, unlike
Cold War warheads, would be designed for certification without
additional testing.
Indeed, our experts from our laboratories -- again, their best technical
judgment today is that it will be less likely that that we would need to
conduct nuclear testing to maintain safety, security, and reliability
into the future if we pursue this modern replacement path than if we
continued on working on our legacy warheads.
In December, I provided Congress classified information giving further
details on these matters, and I'm aware also that we had our lab
directors talk to the committee a few weeks back to talk about these
matters.
We're often asked why do we believe it's so important to study reliable
replacement concepts now, and there are a number of reasons. First, the
study will provide critical information to ensure that the next
administration, as well as the bipartisan commission that this committee
has established, can complete the timely review of the nuclear posture.
Providing information to the committee, I think, is very important for
that committee to understand all the implications of modern replacement
concepts, that those things can provide.
Second, we have concerns about our ability under life-extension only
strategy to ensure the long-term safety and reliability of today's
stockpile, absent testing, and what that might mean for our stockpile
makeup.
Third, we have warheads that have 1960s' to 1980s' safety, security, and
antiterrorism features. It doesn't mean that these warheads are not
currently safe and secure, but we can and should do better, and I
believe that these reliable replacement concepts provide opportunities
to incorporate the latest technological advances for precluding
unauthorized use in a post-9/11 environment. It would be very difficult
to back fit these into existing Cold War warheads.
Fourth, nuclear skills are absolutely vital to the nation, not just for
sustaining our deterrent, but also in such areas as nuclear forensics,
nuclear counterterrorism, and in solutions for the intelligence
community. In a few years, nearly all of the older generation will have
retired.
Finally, the Department of Energy continues to believe that these
concepts make sense and are worth studying due to its enabling features
for the future stockpile.
The foundation for future reductions, in my view, are the ability to
transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex into a responsive infrastructure
and responsive enterprise, ongoing efforts to understand the challenges
to the stockpile and modern means of addressing these challenges, and
efforts between future administrations and Congress to restore a
consensus on the future nuclear deterrent force posture and the
resulting stockpile that results from all this.
I recognize that the completion of the reliable replacement study was
not funded in the 2008 Omnibus Appropriations Act, in part due to
concerns that the administration had not fully communicated its policies
which guide nuclear forces posture and programs.
The administration will shortly provide to Congress a second paper to
accompany its white paper on nuclear policy that was transmitted last
year. This second paper will outline in detail the strategy which guides
our programs, including the size of the stockpile.
Our goal is to complete the study as a means to assure that the next
administration, as mandated by Congress, can complete its nuclear
policy.
Thank you very much for the time to make these statements, and I look
forward to your questions.
TAUSCHER:
Thank you, Undersecretary.
Assistant Secretary Vickers, welcome to the subcommittee.
VICKERS:
Thank you very much.
TAUSCHER:
Thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.
VICKERS:
Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking Member Everett, thank you for your
leadership and the support you provide to our strategic forces.
Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you as well.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with you to report on the
progress we're making in transforming our strategic capabilities to meet
21st century challenges. Indeed, as both you, Chairwoman Tauscher, and
you, Ranking Member Everett, noted in your opening remarks, the
strategic environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold
War, and I'd be happy to talk about that in greater detail in the
question-and-answer session.
To summarize, we've made considerable progress in the area of missile
defense, substantially less progress in the areas of strategic strike,
and we are working very, very hard to develop appropriate policies and
capabilities in the rapidly evolving areas of space and information
operations.
Our nuclear forces remain our ultimate deterrent, and we look forward to
supporting the efforts of the bipartisan commission on nuclear policy
and strategy in the 21st century.
We believe at some point, as Undersecretary D'Agostino said, our nation
will require modernized nuclear warheads. We believe those warheads
would provide similar capabilities to the warheads we currently have,
but would be less sensitive to manufacturing tolerances, aging of
materials, hopefully be certifiable without nuclear testing, and very
importantly have advanced safety and security features.
As Undersecretary D'Agostino noted, we believe modernization of the
infrastructure is even more important.
I want to thank members of the subcommittee for your support of Prompt
Global Strike. The funds that have been appropriated allow us to conduct
research and development on a wide range of technologies that hopefully
will lead to an important capability in the near to mid term.
In missile defense, we now have a multilayered initial system that is
available today to protect the U.S. homeland as well as our deployed
forces and our friends and allies. The U.S. remains committed to working
with our allies in the field of missile defense.
Japan reached a very important milestone this December when its Kongo
surface combatant successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target
with an SM-3 interceptor.
We are concluding our negotiations on basing our long-range missile
defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic. We are cautiously
optimistic that we will be able to complete an agreement with the Czechs
imminently and with the Poles soon thereafter.
It is our hope that at the upcoming Bucharest summit in April that NATO
will be in a position to recognize the growing missile threat to Europe
and support territorial defense as a means of addressing that threat and
welcome the U.S. contribution to European missile defense, while
recognizing that the Europeans have important work to do themselves.
Because we wish to allay Russian concerns, we have met a number of times
over the past year to share intelligence information, discuss
transparency and confidence-building measures, and seek ways in which we
could work jointly with them to address ballistic missile threats. We
remain committed to working with them to address this common threat,
while demonstrating that our Missile Defense Program poses no threat to
their strategic forces.
We face a widening range of threats to our space capabilities, such as
radio frequency jamming, laser blinding, and anti-satellite systems. The
maturation of these threats requires a broad range of capabilities and
options from diplomatic to military to assure our space capabilities and
to protect our vital interest in space.
The department's investment strategy in space seeks to balance a number
of requirements. We need to modernize Space Situational Awareness
capabilities, improve protection plans for space assets, develop
architectural solutions, including operationally responsive space
concepts, and then establish an operations posture to be able to respond
to attack and maintain the ability to deny adversaries the use of space
capabilities that could harm our forces or our homeland.
In implementing our National Space Policy, we support U.S. government
efforts to promote safe and responsible use of space and support
voluntary guidelines for safe space operations.
Finally, in the area of cyberspace, both nation states and non- state
actors continue to seek ways and means to counter the advantages we
obtain from our use of information and to turn those same advantages
against us in both conventional and unconventional ways. We're working
very closely with our interagency partners to scope the missions that we
will be asked to conduct, address our respective roles, both active and
supporting, and determine how best to address potential adversaries'
attempts to counter our information advantages. We are making progress,
but much remains to be done.
In conclusion, transformation of our nation's strategic capabilities to
meet the uncertainties and challenges ahead depends critically on a
sustained partnership between the Department of Defense and Congress. I
look forward to working with you to achieve our shared goals for
developing and deploying the strategic capabilities our nation requires.
Thank you.
TAUSCHER:
Thank you.
General Chilton, and probably for also Assistant Secretary Vickers, I'm
deeply concerned that the START Treaty is going to expire in 2009, and I
believe that the United States should begin negotiating now on a binding
verifiable agreement that would lead to further reductions in deployed
nuclear forces.
In your view, what are the risks and benefits to the United States of
reducing the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads below the
Moscow Treaty's range of 1,700 to 2,200?
CHILTON:
Ma'am, I'll take your question with regard to comfortability of the
combatant commander below those numbers, given our current
infrastructure, and then I'd ask Secretary Vickers to comment on
prospects of a follow-on for the treaty in his lane (ph)?
Having looked at the nuclear infrastructure that Secretary D'Agostino
just reviewed for us and the condition that it is in today -- the fact
that we do not have a production capability, which means we don't have
the flexible infrastructure required to deal with an uncertain strategic
future, which I think was another line of questioning I'm looking
forward to talk about, given the age of our warheads and that we're not
yet closed on whether we're going to go down a life extension or a
modernized weapon program, but the distinct need that I feel as the
combatant commanders, that as I look to the future, I will not have the
tools to conduct my strategic deterrent mission if we do not move out in
directions appropriately -- given that construct, I'm comfortable with
1,700 to 2,200 today, but I'm not comfortable with considerations below
that until we have that flexible capability, as a combatant commander.
TAUSCHER; And before we go to Assistant Secretary Vickers, I just
want to pull that string just a little bit because it seems to me that
it would not only be the question of flexibility, but is it also about
responsiveness of the complex?
CHILTON:
It is. Yes, ma'am. And I assume that word when I say flexibility and I
shouldn't.
When you have a responsive complex that has the capacity to flex to
production as you may need it or adjust your deployed force posture in
the future, should you need it -- in other words, if we go to a lower
number, you need to be certain that you can come back up, should the
strategic environment change, and you can't necessarily without that
flexible or responsive infrastructure behind it, and that's probably one
of my great concerns.
And then how you posture both the portion of your stockpile that you
hold in reserve and your confidence in the weapons that you have
deployed is very much a function of modernizing, in my view, the weapons
systems that we have available today, which are, as the secretary
described, of Cold War legacy design, and the associated issues with
them.
TAUSCHER:
One more quick one before we go to Assistant Secretary Vickers. I don't
want to put words in your mouth, but am I hearing you say that the more
confidence you have in the existing responsive complex and in the
weapons themselves, the more likely it would be that hedge weapons, so
to speak, the reserve weapons, would be less important to maintain?
CHILTON:
Yes. You're not putting words in my mouth. I mean, that is what I've
said before, and I believe firmly that if we can build a modern weapon
that has increased reliability, the safety and security that we need for
the threats that we face today, and is maintainable, and we have the
responsive infrastructure that allows us to maintain them and also
account for strategic uncertainty in the future, then the need for the
large number of hedge weapons that we have on the shelf, that part of
the on-the-shelf stockpile, part of the stockpile that's on the shelf, I
believe can be dramatically reduced.
TAUSCHER:
Assistant Secretary Vickers?
VICKERS:
I concur fully with General Chilton's assessment of where we are and
what would enable us to go forward. The administration is committed to
pursuing a post-START agreement with the Russians. We are in the early
stages of that, however.
TAUSCHER:
We would, I think, like to know more about that. So perhaps we can get
together and you can inform us as to where we are in that because I
think that we don't want this just to begin to lapse as the
administration moves out the door and find ourselves in a gap period...
VICKERS:
Yes, ma'am.
TAUSCHER:
... especially with the change of administration in Russia. It's
important that we keep those lines open.
Well, General Chilton and Assistant Secretary Vickers, in many ways, are
the client or the users of these weapons under Secretary D'Agostino. I
guess I'm moving over to you to talk about the fact that in Fiscal Year
'08, we made funds available for advanced certification, and the
resources proposed in the Fiscal '09 budget request -- how will you
advance the process of answering the questions raised about the proposal
to certify a reliable replacement warhead without testing, considering
the questions posed by many people, including the JASON Panel?
D'AGOSTINO:
OK. Thank you, Madam Chair.
In fact, just today, this morning, I don't know if it was coincidence or
not, there's a requirement in the appropriations to provide a report
within 60 days on our plans for advanced certification. I signed out
that report this morning. It addresses a couple of key areas, and so
we're going to focus on experiments in this particular funding line in
order to deal with questions on common failure modes that could happen,
whether they're for existing warheads or for potential future systems. I
mean, the focus is to address the JASON's report on RRWs, so we're going
to kind of start there first.
The second area has to do with our ability to do surety, take a look at
physical features of surety and how they might impact certification. If
you put a piece of surety technology into an existing warhead, how does
that impact the certification piece? That was the second concern that
JASON's had, and we've got a plan to address that.
The third pieced had to do with material changes. If we use a material
that's a little bit different than what we had in the Cold War stockpile
-- and there are cases where we have to do that because, in many cases,
we're talking about materials that were manufactured 40, 50 years ago.
In many cases, the manufacturing processes just do not exist anymore.
We're not allowed to use certain chemicals that we've used in the past
-- and so these subtle little changes -- how do those things rack up and
stack up on top of each other and impact assessment as a whole? So
that's going to be a huge part of that study.
And the final area is peer review, establishing not just peer review
between lab to lab, which we currently have and I feel is quite good,
but peer review that involves bringing in potentially another body and
potentially how we would kind of bring all of those peer review elements
together to ensure that the stacking up of small changes on our existing
Cold War stockpile or potential changes into a modern warhead and modern
replacement warhead and how those things impact.
Right now, $15 million was appropriated in '08. We've requested $20
million, a little bit more, in '09 because we think this is an area
that's very important, to get to the bottom of the answers to those four
particular questions that have come up. I feel good about that program.
I think it's the right type of activity to do, and so we're marching
down that path.
Thank you.
TAUSCHER:
I'm happy to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Everett, for his time.
EVERETT:
Thank you, Chairman.
And I thank all of you for your service.
To pick up on the chairman's comment about your comfort level for the
1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads, how would Prompt Global Strike figure
into that, or would it, because we're talking conventional as opposed to
nuclear?
Chilton: You know, we think back on the new triad. The tip of
that triad is where we paid attention to strike, and the three areas --
as you know, sir, kinetic nuclear, kinetic convention, and then
non-kinetic strike opportunities are the three areas where we're focused
on.
In the area of kinetic conventional, I think we have started to look at
already how we can use some of the technologies that we have today to
address some of the issues with regard to deterrents. I would say, for
example, there are folks in the world today who I think are deterred in
certain areas by the fact that we have the J-Series Weapons that we have
developed and delivery platforms that just could show up overhead at
some moment at the United States' choosing, and that in and of itself,
even with the conventional capability, can be a deterrent in certain
areas. Sometimes those are not adequate and, hence, we have nuclear
weapons for a large number of target sets.
Prompt Global Strike I put in kind of two categories. One, it can also
provide some strategic deterrent capability in line with maybe relieving
some of the target sets that we would normally cover with nuclear, but
that's not its greatest strength, in my view. I think the greatest
strength of a Prompt Global Conventional Strike weapon is its ability to
control escalation in some scenarios, but also to provide an additional
arrow in the quiver, if you will, of the country to address emerging
threats, that we might find a nuclear weapon application to be
self-deterring to address that threat.
And I'll give you an example. Let's hypothesize there's a nation that
were to field a robust anti-satellite capability, akin to the capability
we saw demonstrated by the Chinese, and let's say that nation were to
attack our satellites. With a robust capability, you could essentially
deny a lot of the benefits and most of the satellites that we rely on in
low earth orbit in very short order. I'm talking not a week. I'm not
talking days. I'm talking hours.
And so when the phone rings on the STRATCOM commander's desk on that
scenario, because he is in charge of defending space, and the president
says, "General Chilton, make them stop," today, I can offer him a
nuclear option. A county has attacked our space assets, but no American
has died in this scenario, and there's an element -- I'm not saying that
that wouldn't be the option chosen, but wouldn't it be also nice to have
a Prompt Global Conventional Strike capability in the quiver to be able
to offer that to the president to make them stop? And that's where I
think this concept has its greatest strength.
EVERETT:
It's obvious we can't accept the Chinese continuing to dazzle with
lasers our satellites. So, from a posture standpoint, when do we call on
that Prompt Global Strike to help us, and can we call on the Prompt --
but how do you make that decision? Do we let them continue to dazzle our
satellites?
VICKERS:
Well, are you talking about the decision to deploy a capability?
EVERETT:
Yes.
VICKERS:
We believe the requirement exists for that capability today for the
reasons that General Chilton outlined, that it will enhance deterrents
against some situations, and it will also provide future presidents with
an expanded array of options in some important scenarios besides the
ASAT scenario that General Chilton described. It could be terrorists
with WMD, which is one of our gravest threats. It could be terrorists
plotting other attacks in the homeland, and the only way to strike that
might be with a rapid Prompt Global Strike weapon. It also may achieve
deterrent effects against those who would be plotting by causing them to
worry about such a capability.
So we believe we need that capability now. We are pursuing a wide range
of technologies in the R&D program that we've been authorized to do, and
we welcome Congress's support to move forward on this as soon as
appropriate.
EVERETT:
General Keller said this morning that in regards to protecting our
assets in space, that if we lose these assets that as far as the
military was concerned that that would be a reverse time machine. We're
told that we have redundancy. As I said in my opening statement, when
you pull that string, though, we don't see much there.
And perhaps that's the reason, Madam Chairman, that we might have a
classified briefing later on.
But we currently spend less than 4 percent of the entire defense space
budget on SSA and space protection. Is that enough?
CHILTON:
Congressman, I share your concern. I've been a champion of SSA and
improving investment of SSA for several years now, and it was one of the
things I tried to emphasize as the commander of Air Force Space Command,
and now that they're supporting me, I continue to encourage that
investment. And I'm happy that we have gone from now investments in
those programs to increased investments by a substantial amount. So I
think we're headed on the right path here.
But I think you bring up a broader point that's -- because Space
Situational Awareness is one element of what we need for space
protection. The broader point that you bring up, I think, is right on
the mark with regard to our dependence on these capabilities and the way
we conduct military operations, and are we adequately exercising and
preparing for the case where someone might counter those dependencies or
try to deny us those dependencies.
And we have a way to go in that area, I believe, particularly in the way
we exercise, the way we're able to exercise, and the way we plan in the
regions for our various war plans, to make sure that we do have the
alternative paths to provide us with the capabilities that we'll need to
ultimately be victorious in whatever the scenario.
But what I always caution here is that although we need a robust space
element here and we need to look at protection as well, we also need to
make sure we're not putting all our eggs in one basket because we know
we cannot have ever the perfect defenses, and so we need to consider in
the case of communications, for example, robust terrestrial
communications, robust space communications, and air-to- air
communications that can back that up and integrate that, and we have
work to do there.
EVERETT:
Well, how do you look at the fact that we've pretty much devastated
TSAT? In the outyears, we're cutting $4 billion from TSAT. What's that
going to do to STRATCOM...
CHILTON:
Two things.
EVERETT:
... or our Future Combat Systems which can't go forward without TSAT.
CHILTON:
I have two concerns with regard to the way ahead in global satellite
communications.
One, as the STRATCOM commander, for my needs as the commander of
STRATCOM, I need uninterrupted, which means I can't stand a gap in a
capability for being able to do nuclear command and control, which means
I need a secure survivable command and control system, and a part of
that system -- I depend on today the Milstar satellite, in the near
future the AEHF satellite, and TSAT would be the next part of that, and
I'm concerned that out in the 2018 and '20 time period that we don't
develop a gap there in this constellation. Now that's my parochial
concern.
From a broader concern, which I am chartered to advocate for for all the
regional combatant commanders and services, you're right on with your
remarks with regard to how TSAT is a critical element of the Army's
Future Combat System. When we look at the growth in ISR that is
programmed in and our needs and dependencies and the warfighter demands
and the investments we're making in Global Hawks and other platforms,
not to mention the need for a space radar system, and you look at how
you're going to get that data moved around the planet and available to
the warfighter on the edge of the battlefield, we need to increase
bandwidth in that space-based capability.
It's not just space. We need to look at terrestrial, but, again, I
caution putting all our eggs in one basket. We learned what a very
inexpensive anchor can do to terrestrial communications, and so I think
we need to continue to move forward, increase the bandwidth that we
provide to the warfighter, both in the terrestrial air-breathing and
space element.
EVERETT:
Thank you for that.
The final point on that -- am I correct in saying on the new AEHF that
the terminals are not synchronized with it, or do you know...
CHILTON:
Let me take that for the record, and I'll go back and check, but my
understanding was that that was resynchronized, that they are, in fact,
synchronized, but let me make sure I have that exactly right.
EVERETT:
OK. Finally, I have some questions for the record concerning Prompt
Global Strike that I would appreciate a prompt -- hopefully -- response
to.
CHILTON:
Absolutely. Happy to do that.
EVERETT:
Thank you, Chairman.
TAUSCHER:
Thank you, Mr. Everett.
The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen?
LARSEN:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Vickers, in your testimony, you note on page 11 that "DOD
further implements our National Space Policy by supporting efforts to
promote safe and responsible use of space. We seek mutually beneficial
international cooperation on space activities, and support commercial
and foreign space surveillance needs to ensure safe space operations,"
and you go on to say -- and this is where my question comes -- "DOD
seeks to promote compliance with existing legal regimes, acceptance of
international debris mitigation guidelines, and development of
additional voluntary guidelines for safe and responsible space
operations."
The first two seem to be fairly clear. Perhaps you can speak to that.
But in particular, can you help us understand specifically what you mean
by "additional voluntary guidelines for safe and responsible space
operations," and do you think it would be useful to establish
international rules of the road for space operations?
VICKERS:
Well, I believe we have pretty substantial rules of the road now in
terms -- some legal obligations, some shared understandings, but as
space becomes a more cluttered environment, then the need for new
measures, you know, as we found in -- as we went through the Cold War,
for example, to take an analogy, where we developed procedures for naval
peacetime interaction that was instrumental in providing some stability
during the Cold War would be analogous to space.
Specifically, what those might be, I think, will depend on as the
situation evolves, but, you know, we took our obligations -- General
Chilton can speak to this much more expertly than I can, but in terms of
the recent shootdown, we had obligations that we took very seriously
depending on how things evolved that we knew we were legally obligated
to do.
LARSEN:
Sure. Well, I appreciate that. Your testimony does say DOD seeks to
promote and so on. The way it's written, it just says -- it would seem
to me, it says DOD also seeks to promote the development of additional
voluntary guidelines. My curiosity is...
VICKERS:
I...
LARSEN:
Is that what DOD is doing, or are you tossing it out there for our
consideration or...
VICKERS:
No, I think it's...
LARSEN:
How should I read that?
VICKERS:
Right. I think it's a general goal at this point to ensure as space
becomes a more complex environment that where we should have additional
measures for safe operations that we pursue those commensurate with the
rest of our national space policy which is to ensure freedom of action.
LARSEN:
And that's my next set of questions, and perhaps General Chilton can
start with the answers. It is on page 10 of Secretary Vickers'
testimony, but I presume this is applicable to anybody sitting before
me. "The U.S. rejects claims of sovereignty by any nation over space;
rejects limitations on the fundamental right to operate in or acquire
data from space; and retains the right of free passage through and
operations in space without interference," the National Space Policy.
Let's, for the sake of this argument right now, assume China doesn't
cause us any problems. Let's remove that from the table because I've
heard enough China scenarios. Let's assume it's Russia and Europe and
Japan with its commercial program and so on. What do their national
space policies say, and are they consistent with ours, and what do we do
to sand off the rough edges that we might have with other countries? For
instance, if we retain the right of free passage through operations in
space without interference, do the Europeans have a problem with that,
or do they have the same one, and what happens if we conflict, not
militarily, of course, but in terms of operationally, you know, what
happens?
CHILTON:
Sure.
LARSEN:
How are we thinking about that? And you can understand why I want to get
away from China.
CHILTON:
I think...
LARSEN:
I want to have a rational conversation about it.
CHILTON:
Sure. I think I understand.
I'm reminded of a story I heard once when -- I think it was in the State
of Ohio when they had the first automobile accident, when automobiles
were first invented, and at the time, there were only two automobiles in
the entire State of Ohio, and they managed to run into each other. So,
you know, probably shortly after that, somebody sat down and said,
"Well, maybe when we pass, we'll do right to right," or, you know, "If
you're coming head on, I'll go right, you go right, and we'll miss," you
know, those rules, those kinds of things, or the concept in seafaring
where nations demand the right of free passage on the ocean. Somehow we
figured out, you know, you put the green light on the right side of your
ship and the red light on the left and there are certain rules for
passing from the rear, et cetera.
Now Keplerian dynamics in space takes care of a lot of that stuff for
you automatically, but simple, open dialogue, I think, is what's most
important. You know, we all do station keeping with our satellites up
there, particular a geosynchronous orbit, and so some satellites move --
and we're watching that -- and starting to be on a path that's getting
close to ours. So then we have to decide are we going to move or what's
going to happen or we'll watch it for a while, and so if we have open
dialogue and understanding and communication, like, "Hey, I'm getting
ready to do station keeping on this, so that you'll know, and here are
my parameters, and here's where I am, and here's where I'm going, don't
worry, as opposed -- it relieves some of that.
Those are kind of the open dialogue kind of discussions I think we can
have. We're not at the red light, green light phase in this domain yet,
but I think -- and I don't want to put words in the secretary's mouth,
so I'll let him respond as well. As we look to the future, what are
those kind of dialogues and what discussions should we have?
LARSEN:
That's exactly it. In your testimony, in previous testimonies last year,
and from other folks, there is this concern about increasing use, and
we've looked at it through Chairman Everett's leadership at the time,
getting it started, talking about how we use space and trying to educate
people on how we use space, why it's important that we're there and what
we do to protect our assets up there.
But that can be said for many other countries, too. They want to protect
their assets. We want to protect what we have. And there's a lot of
space in space, obviously, but it still seems that with everybody
wanting to use it perhaps at the same orbits, are we getting to a point
where we need to have more thoughtful discussions than just having, you
know, the open dialogue, more structured discussions, I guess?
CHILTON:
I'm not sure yet, but, I mean, we're past the point of not having any
dialogue. We certainly need to have that, and...
LARSEN:
No, no, no. I understand.
CHILTON:
I think we have to be careful about thinking about making rules and
restrictions that are unenforceable, too.
LARSEN:
Sure.
CHILTON:
With regard to space debris, for example, I think that's a good one. So
we came to a conclusion a few years ago that the way the United States
and Russia mostly, at the time the Soviet Union, were launching things
in orbit, we weren't paying much attention to the fact that our upper
stages after a few months in orbit sometimes exploded because the tanks
overpressurized, you know, because we weren't worried about it.
But, you know, then we started keeping track of the stuff up there and
said, you know, "This is heading in the wrong direction. Ultimately,
we're going to create so much debris up there," and so we kind of agreed
as spacefaring nations that we were going to mutually try to reduce the
amount of debris generated in just normal launch and orbit operations.
Russia does that, and we do that to the best we can, and those are the
kind of open dialogues that responsible spacefaring nations ought to
have and encourage folks to adopt and do it.
But to say, "OK. I'm going to say you must design this into your
rocket," you this other country, "to operate in space," that's an
unenforceable rule, so better to have the dialogue and get reasonable
response and behavior to include sharing information and sharing best
practices and adopting those, I think, at this stage of where we are in
space.
LARSEN:
Did you have anything else to share?
VICKERS:
No. I mean I would agree on the debris. The point is we do have a number
of standing instruments already that we adhere to, and we are in
discussions, you know, to try to further develop some. You know, on the
other hand, it has to be consistent with the rest of our space policy
where General Chilton, as combatant commander, has responsibility as a
warfighter that we don't unduly restrict his, you know, options as well.
LARSEN:
Thank you.
TAUSCHER:
I'd like to notify members we've been told that we may have votes, a
series of two or three, between 3:00 and 3:15. So I want to go to Mr.
Franks from Arizona, and then we'd like to get to Mr. Thornberry, if we
could. So, if you guys could restrict to five or six minutes, I'd
appreciate it. And then, hopefully, we'll get a second round.
Mr. Franks from Arizona?
FRANKS:
Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
And I thank all of you for being here. You know, you guys are the ones
that keep watch for all of us, and I appreciate it very, very much.
And, General Chilton, I just want to say a special word of
congratulations to you. It was a good day for America when you became
the commander of Strategic Command. I say that, I think, on behalf of
the entire committee.
CHILTON:
Thank you, sir.
FRANKS:
I had the privilege of meeting this morning with General Keller, and he
emphasized not only the interdependency, but the critical importance of
America being dominant, not only in air, but in space and in cyberspace,
because of the way that they all work together, and in his 21st century
white paper, General Mosley says essentially the same thing, and he
expounded on that in the committee this morning.
And I just think that your successful test here sort of reflects all of
that. When you knocked down this satellite, you proved that the Aegis is
now a working system and that the connection between those three areas
is vitally important, and I'm wondering if you think, General Chilton,
that it's time to move some of these missile defense assets out of the
MDA research and development budget lines and into the procurement
budget lines for services like the Air Force and others to begin to take
over and to operate.
CHILTON:
Well, thank you, Congressman.
And thank you for the compliment, particularly over the activities last
week. I would just add for the record, from my perspective, it was a
tremendous joint effort and interagency effort, all of government. So
many departments and agencies participated in that, not only in the
execution, but in the preparations we were making for the contingency
where we might be unsuccessful in destroying the tank, and offering U.S.
assistance to the nations of the world, as Madam Chair said, because we
were responsible and we took that responsibility seriously. So thank you
for recognizing that.
You asked a great question with regard to the balance between R&D,
procurement and 0&M of systems, and I've thought about this a bit, and,
of course, we work very closely with MDA. I'm familiar with how they
spend their budgets, and I know that the services are under a lot of
stress today for not only ongoing operations, but in particular, in my
parent service, the Air Force, for the urgent recapitalization needs
they have, the Army for the needs that they will have in the future, not
only building systems like FCS, but in reconstituting after this tough
fight they've been in. So there's going to be this tension here on where
best to take the money from.
I would just caution that we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater
with regard to the Missile Defense Agency. I've been in the test
business before in my career and a little bit in acquisition when I was
at NASA for the Space Station Program. I am absolutely amazed how far
and how fast we have come in the last five years in fielding a
capability with the construct we have set up in the Missile Defense
Agency, and so, as we look to the future -- and there will be challenges
on finding the monies to field these systems and the inventories that we
need, whether they be THAAD or PAC-3 or Aegis or the new systems that
are coming on board, like ABL, et cetera. There will be tensions there,
but we've got to be careful not to break something that's working pretty
darn good at getting new capabilities out there.
It's a tough problem, Congressman. I wish I had an answer. You know, the
easy one is more TOA, but I know the challenges that presents as well to
the country.
FRANKS:
Well, listen, I want to, Madam Chair, give Mr. Thornberry a chance here.
So I just want you to know that I think this missile interception of the
satellite showed that you have a missile defense asset to performing a
space mission, and it really, in my mind, demonstrates that there's
really more of a psychological or artificial line between national
security, space, and missile defense, and it's important, I think, that
the two be emphasized and work together. I know that that's against kind
of the perspective of the service.
So congratulations again. I'd like to ask more questions, but I want to
make sure Mr. Thornberry has time.
CHILTON:
Thank you, sir.
TAUSCHER:
I appreciate that, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Thornberry of Texas?
THORNBERRY:
Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate my colleague from Arizona.
Although I think these people have been too easy on you all...
(LAUGHTER)
THORNBERRY:
And let me play devil's advocate just a little bit. Both General Chilton
and Secretary Vickers have a tremendous number of things in your area of
responsibility. A lot of things I'm very interested in.
There is a lot of intellectual energy going on right now about how the
nation faces the threat in cyberspace. Mr. Everett's been pushing, and
there is, I think, a lot of intellectual energy in planning and thought
into space for the future.
I don't see any of that intellectual energy on what nuclear deterrence
means in the future. I don't hear anybody talking about, OK, "The
characteristics of a nuclear weapon that would effectively deter
whoever, everybody, whoever in the 21st century would be this, and we
can't really test that. We can only do this, and here's the difference
between the ideal weapon that would deter and what we can produce."
I don't see any of that, particularly in the Department of Defense, and
some people would even argue that nuclear deterrence has atrophied to
some extent in the Defense Department, and so Secretary D'Agostino --
you know, his folks are just kind of left to keep on doing what they're
doing.
Now what am I missing?
CHILTON:
Well, I think your concerns are well-founded. What you're missing, I
would say, Congressman, recently, is the comments I made at the
Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century Conference two or three weeks ago
at the Reagan Building and a speech I gave at AFA last week where I
stood up and addressed those things, those very concerns that you
mentioned.
And here's kind of the crux of my message. Nuclear deterrence will be
every bit as important for the remainder of this century. My children
and grandchildren will need a nuclear deterrent. I do not think that's
in conflict at all with the desire to reduce nuclear weapons. It's just
a reality.
I think in the Cold War, my parent service in particular, I would argue
there was none better at knowing and understanding what it meant to
provide strategic nuclear deterrents for this nation. When the Cold War
ended, we found ourselves as a nation in a lot of shooting wars,
conventional shooting wars, and the Air Force will tell you they've been
in a shooting war, they've had people in harm's way since 1991 with our
part in Southern Watch and Northern Watch going throughout all the 1990s
right on into our current conflicts.
For sure, since 2001, we have been focused on conventional warfare and
unconventional warfare in this nation, and I would say perhaps we have
lost some focus on that area that you just described that I believe is
so important for the future as well, and I would put the focus in this
regard: We must continually remind ourselves that in a world of
strategic nuclear deterrence, readiness is a mission.
It's not bomb-found targets. It's being able to show the world that you
are able to do that, and that takes trained people, it takes adequate
delivery systems, and in the end, it takes a warhead that is designed
for the 21st century, not for the 20th century, and what we have today
in our inventory are warheads that are designed for the 20th century
where the principle design requirement was, because of the size, the
numbers we needed, and the limited number of delivery vehicles and the
size of those delivery vehicles that we had, maximize the bang and
minimize the volume.
And we were able to take risks in reliability because we had a robust
test program and we had a robust manufacturing program, and we designed
and planned to replace those weapons every 20 years, and we could take
risks in safety and security and we could take risks in maintainability
because safety and security weren't as high on the list as getting the
numbers up there in that Cold War and maintainability was not as
required if you planned to replace them every 20 years and you had a
robust production capability.
The world has changed. Tomorrow, we worry because of the terrorist
threat more about safety and security. We have zero production capacity
in this country. I would argue that for Mr. D'Agostino that being able
to produce eight to 10 a year as a production capability -- I've been to
that facility. It's a laboratory. It's not a production facility. And we
no longer want to test.
So, in that environment, I would say our number one requirement for the
modern warhead is reliability. Our numbers two and three are safety and
security. And maintainability is on that list as well. That's what I
need as a combatant commander to provide strategic deterrents for this
country, nuclear deterrents, in the coming century.
VICKERS:
I think there is a lot of thinking going on on strategic deterrence.
We're still working our way through it. I think it is fair to say the
problem has gotten a lot more complicated in the sense we face a wider
range of actors, including now non-state as well as state, that require
more tailored deterrent concepts against a wider array of actions we're
trying to deter and with a wider range of instruments, integrating that
with Prompt Global Conventional Strike, non-kinetic attack, and
particularly in the area of non-kinetic, that area of deterrence is
really challenging, and we're putting a lot of effort into that.
In general, I think cutting across those areas complicating the
deterrence problem is the growing challenge of attribution which cuts
across a number of potential threats where our ability to positively
attribute an attack is central to our ability to deter it or adequately
respond. So we're working hard. I think it's fair to say that there are
a number of these areas where we're not as far along as we were in the
Cold War, but we're working on it.
THORNBERRY:
It just seems clear to me -- and I know to you all too -- that if we
don't take ourselves seriously, the bad guys aren't going to take it
seriously either when it comes to nuclear deterrence.
And I know we're out of time. We've got to vote. Mr. D'Agostino, one of
the things I'd like to ask you to do for the record, since we've got to
go, is can you give us the potential disadvantages or concern of the
Stockpile Stewardship life-extension program only approach without RRW?
I'd like those listed if you can send something up to us, you know, one
through five or 10 or whatever it is. I think that helps us to make the
balance.
And I yield back, Madam Chair.
TAUSCHER:
I think maybe we can just have a briefing on that. I think we'd like
to sit around the table and kick that around.
D'AGOSTINO:
I'd be glad to do that. Thank you.
TAUSCHER:
General Chilton and Undersecretary D'Agostino and Assistant Secretary
Vickers, we're faced with about 40 minutes of votes. WE want to thank
you. The committee wants to thank you very much for being here today.
Your testimony was very comprehensive that you sent up to us. We
obviously see you all the time. We're very happy to do this. We like to
do it in public.
We want to recognize the people setting behind you and the people
sitting around us. Your staff -- obviously, all of your staffs have
worked very, very hard. They serve the American people sometimes very
quietly, certainly anonymously. Our staff -- we want to thank our
subcommittee staff for their hard work, too.
And we thank you very much for appearing before us today, and we look
forward to the continued relationship. We, obviously, have a long list
of things we're going to do. Thank you very much.
VICKERS:
Thank you.
CHILTON:
Thank you.
D'AGOSTINO:
Thank you.
TAUSCHER:
The hearing is adjourned.
CQ Transcriptions, Feb. 27, 2008
________________________________________
List of Panel Members and Witnesses
PANEL MEMBERS:
REP. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, D-CALIF. CHAIRWOMAN
REP. JOHN M. SPRATT JR., D-S.C.
REP. SILVESTRE REYES, D-TEXAS
REP. RICK LARSEN, D-WASH.
REP. JIM COOPER, D-TENN.
REP. HANK JOHNSON, D-GA.
REP. DAVE LOEBSACK, D-IOWA
REP. NIKI TSONGAS, D-MASS.
REP. IKE SKELTON, D-MO. EX OFFICIO
REP. TERRY EVERETT, R-ALA. RANKING MEMBER
REP. TRENT FRANKS, R-ARIZ.
REP. WILLIAM M. "MAC" THORNBERRY, R-TEXAS
REP. MICHAEL R. TURNER, R-OHIO
REP. MIKE D. ROGERS, R-ALA.
REP. DUNCAN HUNTER, R-CALIF. EX OFFICIO
WITNESSES:
GENERAL KEVIN CHILTON (USAF), COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
THOMAS D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY,
MICHAEL VICKERS ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, LOW INTENSITY
CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE