1 00:00:00,019 --> 00:00:02,640 The subcommittee meets today to receive 2 00:00:02,640 --> 00:00:04,920 testimony on the posture of the United 3 00:00:04,920 --> 00:00:07,760 States Strategic Command and the United 4 00:00:07,760 --> 00:00:10,319 States Space Command . I want to begin 5 00:00:10,319 --> 00:00:12,319 by thanking our witnesses , General 6 00:00:12,319 --> 00:00:14,152 Cotton from Stratcom and General 7 00:00:14,152 --> 00:00:17,159 Whiting from SpaceCom . General Cotton , 8 00:00:17,200 --> 00:00:19,399 this is likely one of the last times 9 00:00:19,399 --> 00:00:21,732 you'll be speaking before our committee . 10 00:00:21,920 --> 00:00:24,719 You have always been open and 11 00:00:24,719 --> 00:00:27,280 forthright with this committee , and I 12 00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:29,600 wanna thank you for your service and 13 00:00:29,600 --> 00:00:31,979 dedication as you approach your final 14 00:00:31,979 --> 00:00:35,759 year as commander of Stratcom . Today 15 00:00:35,759 --> 00:00:37,909 we face a threat environment more 16 00:00:37,909 --> 00:00:39,909 dangerous than we've seen since the 17 00:00:39,909 --> 00:00:42,389 Second World War . For the first time 18 00:00:42,389 --> 00:00:45,310 in history , the United States faces 19 00:00:45,310 --> 00:00:48,389 two adversary nuclear powers in Russia 20 00:00:48,389 --> 00:00:51,790 and China . Russia has nearly completed 21 00:00:51,790 --> 00:00:54,919 modernizing its nuclear triad and 22 00:00:54,919 --> 00:00:57,169 continues to expand and improve their 23 00:00:57,169 --> 00:01:00,159 tactical nuclear forces . China 24 00:01:00,159 --> 00:01:02,830 meanwhile , which used to be considered 25 00:01:03,040 --> 00:01:05,720 a lesser included case , is expanding 26 00:01:05,720 --> 00:01:09,040 its own arsenal at a breathtaking pace . 27 00:01:09,739 --> 00:01:12,849 China now has more ICBM launchers than 28 00:01:12,849 --> 00:01:15,660 the United States and is expected at 29 00:01:15,660 --> 00:01:18,489 least to triple its stockpile by 30 00:01:18,489 --> 00:01:22,480 2035 . I would also note that 31 00:01:22,480 --> 00:01:25,830 China has outpaced every previous 32 00:01:25,830 --> 00:01:29,480 estimate that we've made . General 33 00:01:29,480 --> 00:01:31,879 Cotton , as you well know , this is an 34 00:01:31,879 --> 00:01:34,101 extremely important time for Stratcom . 35 00:01:34,599 --> 00:01:37,720 Each leg of our triad is undergoing a 36 00:01:37,720 --> 00:01:40,599 generational modernization . This 37 00:01:40,610 --> 00:01:42,839 includes the Columbia class submarine 38 00:01:42,839 --> 00:01:46,199 to replace the Ohio class , the B21 39 00:01:46,199 --> 00:01:49,160 bomber to replace the B1 and B-2 40 00:01:49,160 --> 00:01:52,839 bombers , and the Sentinel ICBM to 41 00:01:52,839 --> 00:01:55,790 replace the Minuteman 3 . Given the 42 00:01:55,790 --> 00:01:58,750 ages of the legacy programs , it is 43 00:01:58,750 --> 00:02:00,790 essential that these modernization 44 00:02:00,790 --> 00:02:04,550 efforts be prioritized and properly 45 00:02:04,550 --> 00:02:06,269 resourced to ensure we have 46 00:02:06,269 --> 00:02:09,710 capabilities fielded in time to meet 47 00:02:09,710 --> 00:02:12,759 the growing threat . While it is the 48 00:02:12,759 --> 00:02:15,309 responsibility of the services to get 49 00:02:15,309 --> 00:02:18,520 these programs back on schedule , it is 50 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:21,190 Stratcom who must mitigate risk 51 00:02:21,190 --> 00:02:24,440 associated with any delays . I look 52 00:02:24,440 --> 00:02:26,551 forward to hearing more in the closed 53 00:02:26,551 --> 00:02:29,119 session about your plans to do so . 54 00:02:30,009 --> 00:02:32,199 Additionally , the nuclear armed Sea 55 00:02:32,199 --> 00:02:35,559 launch cruise missile or Slicke remains 56 00:02:35,559 --> 00:02:37,610 a critical program to deter our 57 00:02:37,610 --> 00:02:40,149 adversaries from believing they can use 58 00:02:40,149 --> 00:02:42,880 tactical nuclear weapons . I look 59 00:02:42,880 --> 00:02:44,991 forward to hearing from you , General 60 00:02:44,991 --> 00:02:47,158 Cotton , on your work with the Navy on 61 00:02:47,158 --> 00:02:49,919 Slick em . I would be remiss if I did 62 00:02:49,919 --> 00:02:52,399 not also underscore the importance of 63 00:02:52,399 --> 00:02:55,960 NC3 , what Senator King and I refer to 64 00:02:55,960 --> 00:02:59,740 as the fourth leg of the triad . NC3 65 00:02:59,740 --> 00:03:02,619 underpins all aspects of nuclear 66 00:03:02,619 --> 00:03:05,419 deterrence . General Cotton , I 67 00:03:05,419 --> 00:03:07,363 appreciate the focus that you have 68 00:03:07,363 --> 00:03:10,300 given NC3 modernization during your 69 00:03:10,300 --> 00:03:13,059 time in command , and I will be eager 70 00:03:13,059 --> 00:03:14,899 to receive an update on the 71 00:03:14,899 --> 00:03:18,339 implementation of the NC-3 road map . 72 00:03:19,449 --> 00:03:22,089 General Whiting , the space domain is 73 00:03:22,089 --> 00:03:24,529 now , as you point out in your opening 74 00:03:24,529 --> 00:03:26,770 statement , a highly contested 75 00:03:26,770 --> 00:03:29,809 strategic environment . China and 76 00:03:29,809 --> 00:03:32,850 Russia possess growing counter space 77 00:03:32,850 --> 00:03:36,729 capabilities that hold US space assets 78 00:03:36,729 --> 00:03:39,729 at risk . Russia is developing the 79 00:03:39,729 --> 00:03:42,649 capability to place a nuclear weapon on 80 00:03:42,649 --> 00:03:45,720 orbit . While China is investing in 81 00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:48,570 maneuverable satellites that could 82 00:03:48,570 --> 00:03:51,410 target our satellites , and these are 83 00:03:51,410 --> 00:03:53,770 just the threats that we can discuss in 84 00:03:53,770 --> 00:03:57,009 this open setting . Well , I look 85 00:03:57,009 --> 00:03:59,210 forward to a more robust discussion on 86 00:03:59,210 --> 00:04:01,449 how we need to address these threats in 87 00:04:01,449 --> 00:04:04,169 a classified session . I'm eager to 88 00:04:04,169 --> 00:04:07,039 hear from you during this open session 89 00:04:07,039 --> 00:04:10,050 on your priority years for your 90 00:04:10,050 --> 00:04:13,970 priorities for fiscal year 2026 and 91 00:04:13,970 --> 00:04:15,850 how we can leverage emerging 92 00:04:15,850 --> 00:04:19,130 technologies to field more dynamic 93 00:04:19,130 --> 00:04:22,269 space-based systems . I am also eager 94 00:04:22,269 --> 00:04:24,989 to hear an update on how SpaceCom is 95 00:04:24,989 --> 00:04:26,822 working with the other combatant 96 00:04:26,822 --> 00:04:29,269 commands , the services , and the 97 00:04:29,269 --> 00:04:32,260 intelligence community to ensure that 98 00:04:32,260 --> 00:04:34,390 we are developing the right 99 00:04:34,390 --> 00:04:37,549 capabilities , sharing information with 100 00:04:37,549 --> 00:04:40,630 war fighters in real time , and that 101 00:04:40,630 --> 00:04:43,950 the services and inter agency partners 102 00:04:43,950 --> 00:04:46,959 are integrated appropriately . I will 103 00:04:46,959 --> 00:04:49,079 make one final point before I turn it 104 00:04:49,079 --> 00:04:51,440 over to Senator King for his opening 105 00:04:51,440 --> 00:04:54,369 statement . Both of your combatant 106 00:04:54,369 --> 00:04:57,369 commands rely on access to critical 107 00:04:57,369 --> 00:05:00,690 electromagnetic spectrum to carry out 108 00:05:00,690 --> 00:05:03,850 your missions . As we know , there are 109 00:05:03,850 --> 00:05:07,609 efforts underway to force DOD to vacate 110 00:05:07,609 --> 00:05:11,130 portions of those spectrum bands . Such 111 00:05:11,130 --> 00:05:14,630 an outcome would be detrimental to US 112 00:05:14,630 --> 00:05:17,839 national security and result in 113 00:05:17,839 --> 00:05:20,929 significant costs as various DOD 114 00:05:20,929 --> 00:05:24,130 equities are forced to invest the 115 00:05:24,130 --> 00:05:26,470 resources to redesign . 116 00:05:27,130 --> 00:05:30,769 Procure and field new systems to 117 00:05:30,769 --> 00:05:34,769 operate in different spectrum bands if 118 00:05:34,769 --> 00:05:38,220 that is even feasible . General Whiting 119 00:05:38,220 --> 00:05:40,489 and General Cotton , I look forward to 120 00:05:40,489 --> 00:05:42,369 hearing from both of you on the 121 00:05:42,369 --> 00:05:45,239 importance of spectrum to your missions 122 00:05:45,809 --> 00:05:47,642 before any decisions are made on 123 00:05:47,642 --> 00:05:50,649 whether to auction off DOD spectrum . 124 00:05:50,950 --> 00:05:53,899 The American people deserve to 125 00:05:53,899 --> 00:05:56,369 understand the risks there would be to 126 00:05:56,369 --> 00:05:59,640 national security . Again , thank you 127 00:05:59,640 --> 00:06:02,290 both for appearing before us today . I 128 00:06:02,290 --> 00:06:04,568 look forward to hearing your testimony . 129 00:06:04,760 --> 00:06:06,760 Senator King , you are recognized . 130 00:06:07,579 --> 00:06:10,250 Thank you Senator Fisher . I wanna 131 00:06:10,250 --> 00:06:12,083 first thank both of you for your 132 00:06:12,083 --> 00:06:14,160 service and for the incredible work 133 00:06:14,160 --> 00:06:16,760 that you've done both in uh managing 134 00:06:16,760 --> 00:06:19,850 the assets that are in your purview but 135 00:06:19,850 --> 00:06:22,209 also in thinking about how to move 136 00:06:22,209 --> 00:06:24,489 forward . This is a posture hearing 137 00:06:24,489 --> 00:06:27,570 it's really a status report it's a a 138 00:06:27,570 --> 00:06:29,626 combination of a status report where 139 00:06:29,626 --> 00:06:31,737 are we now but where do we need to be 140 00:06:31,737 --> 00:06:33,626 and what do we need in the way of 141 00:06:33,626 --> 00:06:36,070 resources in order to get there , uh , 142 00:06:36,209 --> 00:06:38,640 General Cotton . Deterrence is the 143 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:41,010 keystone of our entire defense strategy . 144 00:06:41,079 --> 00:06:43,190 We often forget that . We get lost in 145 00:06:43,190 --> 00:06:45,519 counting tanks or airplanes or navy 146 00:06:45,519 --> 00:06:47,575 ships , but the whole idea of all of 147 00:06:47,575 --> 00:06:49,686 these resources is that they never be 148 00:06:49,686 --> 00:06:51,908 used , that they'd be such a terrifying 149 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:55,200 prospect for a potential adversary that 150 00:06:55,200 --> 00:06:57,311 they will never be used . And in fact 151 00:06:57,311 --> 00:06:59,144 the deterrence has worked in the 152 00:06:59,144 --> 00:07:01,799 nuclear area for 75 , 80 years , so 153 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:04,144 that's really what we need to talk 154 00:07:04,144 --> 00:07:06,739 about today and . Modernizing the triad , 155 00:07:06,779 --> 00:07:08,946 which we're in the middle of right now 156 00:07:08,946 --> 00:07:11,410 is , is an expensive proposition , but 157 00:07:11,410 --> 00:07:14,170 to shortchange that process in my view 158 00:07:14,170 --> 00:07:17,179 would be disastrously shortsighted . So 159 00:07:17,179 --> 00:07:18,901 I hope to hear where we are on 160 00:07:18,901 --> 00:07:21,290 modernization with the various , uh , 161 00:07:21,299 --> 00:07:24,369 with , with the parts of the triad . Uh , 162 00:07:24,450 --> 00:07:26,890 but also where we need to be , what 163 00:07:26,890 --> 00:07:29,112 necessary authorities there are that we 164 00:07:29,112 --> 00:07:31,609 need to be , uh , talking about and 165 00:07:31,609 --> 00:07:33,790 also necessary funding . I refer to 166 00:07:33,970 --> 00:07:36,192 nuclear modernization as the pig in the 167 00:07:36,192 --> 00:07:38,519 budgetary python . It is a , 168 00:07:39,010 --> 00:07:42,010 unfortunately just by history , we're 169 00:07:42,010 --> 00:07:44,121 having to do all three legs at once , 170 00:07:44,290 --> 00:07:45,901 and that is a very expensive 171 00:07:45,901 --> 00:07:48,012 proposition , but it's something that 172 00:07:48,012 --> 00:07:50,179 we have to do in order to maintain the 173 00:07:50,179 --> 00:07:52,179 deterrent strategy that's protected 174 00:07:52,179 --> 00:07:54,401 this country for so long . Uh , in , in 175 00:07:54,401 --> 00:07:57,619 terms of the space assets , of course 176 00:07:57,619 --> 00:08:00,029 it , it's no news to anybody that space 177 00:08:00,029 --> 00:08:02,500 was an uncontested domain 20 years ago , 178 00:08:03,109 --> 00:08:05,331 10 years ago it began to be contested , 179 00:08:05,331 --> 00:08:07,609 and today it's highly contested . So 180 00:08:07,609 --> 00:08:09,500 general , we've really got to be 181 00:08:09,500 --> 00:08:12,299 understanding the status where we are , 182 00:08:12,859 --> 00:08:15,081 particularly when we're talking about a 183 00:08:15,081 --> 00:08:17,081 potential conflict with China which 184 00:08:17,081 --> 00:08:19,192 would involve the vast expanse of the 185 00:08:19,192 --> 00:08:21,415 Pacific Ocean . And naval power and how 186 00:08:21,415 --> 00:08:23,739 that would be subject to space assets 187 00:08:24,049 --> 00:08:27,529 and how we can protect ourselves in in 188 00:08:27,529 --> 00:08:29,696 a time of potential conflict of course 189 00:08:29,696 --> 00:08:31,529 we all hope that conflict can be 190 00:08:31,529 --> 00:08:33,251 avoided that brings me back to 191 00:08:33,251 --> 00:08:36,289 deterrence . So I think the important 192 00:08:36,289 --> 00:08:38,400 message that I have is that decisions 193 00:08:38,400 --> 00:08:41,869 we make here today and over the next 6 194 00:08:41,869 --> 00:08:44,690 months will have profound impacts in 195 00:08:44,690 --> 00:08:46,890 the future . And that's what's so 196 00:08:46,890 --> 00:08:48,834 important about what we're talking 197 00:08:48,834 --> 00:08:50,890 about today . I can think of , of no 198 00:08:50,890 --> 00:08:53,112 two more important people right now and 199 00:08:53,112 --> 00:08:55,057 thinking about how to posture this 200 00:08:55,057 --> 00:08:57,279 country in order to maintain deterrence 201 00:08:57,279 --> 00:08:59,612 and the security of the American people . 202 00:08:59,612 --> 00:09:01,668 So I thank you for being here . Look 203 00:09:01,668 --> 00:09:03,779 forward to your questions , and now I 204 00:09:03,779 --> 00:09:05,946 think , uh , it's time to turn it over 205 00:09:05,946 --> 00:09:08,289 to to the chair . Thank you , Senator 206 00:09:08,289 --> 00:09:11,070 King . We are joined today by Chairman 207 00:09:11,070 --> 00:09:13,289 Wicker and Ranking Member Reed , and I 208 00:09:13,289 --> 00:09:15,340 would ask each of them to give an 209 00:09:15,340 --> 00:09:17,507 opening statement if they so desire at 210 00:09:17,507 --> 00:09:19,989 this time . Chairman Wicker , thank you , 211 00:09:20,059 --> 00:09:22,226 Madam Chair , and I wanna thank , uh , 212 00:09:22,226 --> 00:09:24,337 I want to thank the chair and Senator 213 00:09:24,337 --> 00:09:27,020 King for working together as a team , 214 00:09:27,650 --> 00:09:31,200 uh , for years . Uh , on this 215 00:09:31,890 --> 00:09:33,779 topic , and , and I think it , it 216 00:09:33,779 --> 00:09:35,779 should be clear to people listening 217 00:09:35,779 --> 00:09:38,409 that there's no space between them . Uh , 218 00:09:38,909 --> 00:09:41,020 they are , uh , approaching this in a 219 00:09:41,020 --> 00:09:43,369 bipartisan manner . They understand how 220 00:09:43,369 --> 00:09:45,849 important it is and yes , Senator King 221 00:09:45,849 --> 00:09:47,571 is correct we're talking about 222 00:09:47,571 --> 00:09:49,690 preventing we're talking about being 223 00:09:49,690 --> 00:09:52,599 strong enough to prevent a nuclear war 224 00:09:52,929 --> 00:09:55,151 and nothing could be more important and 225 00:09:55,151 --> 00:09:58,000 yes uh it is going to be expensive , 226 00:09:58,409 --> 00:10:00,687 but there there's no question about it . 227 00:10:00,780 --> 00:10:02,840 Uh , we're , we're going to have to 228 00:10:02,840 --> 00:10:04,559 spend the money as wisely and 229 00:10:04,559 --> 00:10:06,615 efficiently as we can to get the job 230 00:10:06,615 --> 00:10:08,726 done . I want to thank Senator Cotton 231 00:10:08,726 --> 00:10:11,003 for his service and wish him well , uh , 232 00:10:11,003 --> 00:10:13,630 as he prepares to transition , uh , 233 00:10:13,650 --> 00:10:15,650 into private life , and thank you , 234 00:10:15,650 --> 00:10:17,928 General Whiting , for being here . I'm , 235 00:10:17,928 --> 00:10:19,840 I'm gonna , uh , I'm gonna put my 236 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:23,299 statement in the record , uh , and , 237 00:10:23,330 --> 00:10:26,919 and just say that , uh , today I hope . 238 00:10:27,489 --> 00:10:30,059 To understand how you're managing the 239 00:10:30,059 --> 00:10:32,809 risk for critical military capabilities 240 00:10:33,299 --> 00:10:36,299 that are both too old and too few to 241 00:10:36,299 --> 00:10:38,466 truly meet the threats of today , much 242 00:10:38,466 --> 00:10:41,179 less those of tomorrow . Secondly , how 243 00:10:41,179 --> 00:10:43,979 to understand better , uh , the roles 244 00:10:43,979 --> 00:10:46,099 of your commands evolving as the new 245 00:10:46,099 --> 00:10:47,877 administration develops updated 246 00:10:47,877 --> 00:10:50,940 strategies and guidance . And then hear 247 00:10:50,940 --> 00:10:52,773 your thoughts on areas where you 248 00:10:52,773 --> 00:10:55,659 believe this committee can help improve 249 00:10:55,659 --> 00:10:57,650 the effectiveness of our strategic 250 00:10:57,979 --> 00:11:00,450 deterrent and space posture . With that , 251 00:11:00,500 --> 00:11:03,450 I will , uh , ask unanimous consent to 252 00:11:03,450 --> 00:11:05,617 include my statement in the record and 253 00:11:05,617 --> 00:11:07,561 you back . Thank you , gentlemen . 254 00:11:07,561 --> 00:11:09,672 Thank you , Madam Chair . Thank you , 255 00:11:09,672 --> 00:11:11,783 Mr . Chairman . Ranking member Reid . 256 00:11:11,783 --> 00:11:13,950 Thank you very much , Madam Chairman . 257 00:11:14,140 --> 00:11:16,307 Uh , welcome , gentlemen , and we look 258 00:11:16,307 --> 00:11:18,529 forward to your testimony . I want to , 259 00:11:18,529 --> 00:11:20,696 uh , commend , uh , General Cotton for 260 00:11:20,696 --> 00:11:23,309 his 39 years of service to the country 261 00:11:23,309 --> 00:11:25,420 and to the Air Force , and I wish you 262 00:11:25,420 --> 00:11:28,080 and your wife Marsha the very best in 263 00:11:28,080 --> 00:11:30,679 your , uh , retirement . General 264 00:11:30,679 --> 00:11:32,846 Whiting , thank you , uh , for joining 265 00:11:32,846 --> 00:11:35,080 us this morning also . Uh , General 266 00:11:35,080 --> 00:11:36,858 Cotton , there are reports that 267 00:11:36,858 --> 00:11:38,858 indicate that the administration is 268 00:11:38,858 --> 00:11:41,200 considering removing the dual-hatted 269 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:43,789 role the commander of US European 270 00:11:43,799 --> 00:11:46,359 Command currently holds as the NATO 271 00:11:46,359 --> 00:11:48,760 Supreme Allied Commander Europe of SACU . 272 00:11:49,419 --> 00:11:51,849 The secure position was created in part 273 00:11:51,849 --> 00:11:54,169 to ensure that our nuclear weapons and 274 00:11:54,169 --> 00:11:56,336 hence our nuclear umbrella provided to 275 00:11:56,336 --> 00:11:59,090 our NATO allies under Article 5 was 276 00:11:59,090 --> 00:12:01,169 always kept under the control of the 277 00:12:01,169 --> 00:12:03,260 United States . Indeed , the release 278 00:12:03,260 --> 00:12:05,371 codes for our nuclear weapons , which 279 00:12:05,371 --> 00:12:07,427 are carried by NATO planes come from 280 00:12:07,427 --> 00:12:10,090 the president through saccu to unlock 281 00:12:10,090 --> 00:12:12,409 the weapons . If the US walks away from 282 00:12:12,409 --> 00:12:14,465 this position , we are lessening the 283 00:12:14,465 --> 00:12:16,450 protection of our extended nuclear 284 00:12:16,450 --> 00:12:18,609 determinant to our allies . And I 285 00:12:18,609 --> 00:12:20,498 believe we're harming US national 286 00:12:20,498 --> 00:12:22,859 security and global security . For over 287 00:12:22,859 --> 00:12:25,789 6 decades , the US nuclear umbrella has 288 00:12:25,789 --> 00:12:28,640 provided an ironclad guarantee to deter 289 00:12:28,640 --> 00:12:31,669 the Soviet Union and now Russia , and 290 00:12:31,669 --> 00:12:33,950 it has been successful . I'm also 291 00:12:33,950 --> 00:12:36,117 concerned about the signal it may send 292 00:12:36,117 --> 00:12:38,283 to our Asian allies , especially South 293 00:12:38,283 --> 00:12:40,006 Korea , who also relies on the 294 00:12:40,006 --> 00:12:42,789 credibility of our nuclear umbrella . 295 00:12:43,219 --> 00:12:45,441 Uh , these are difficult issues , and I 296 00:12:45,441 --> 00:12:47,552 hope in the course of the questioning 297 00:12:47,552 --> 00:12:49,775 we can get , uh , more details from you 298 00:12:49,775 --> 00:12:51,941 about that and again thank you ma'am . 299 00:12:52,729 --> 00:12:54,896 Thank you , Senator Reid . And now I'd 300 00:12:54,896 --> 00:12:56,896 like to have our opening statements 301 00:12:56,896 --> 00:12:59,118 from the panel . General Cotton , would 302 00:12:59,118 --> 00:13:01,580 you go first , please ? Good morning , 303 00:13:01,659 --> 00:13:04,010 Chairwoman Fisher , Ranking Member King , 304 00:13:04,500 --> 00:13:06,556 Chairman Wicker , and Ranking Member 305 00:13:06,556 --> 00:13:08,556 Reed , and distinguished members of 306 00:13:08,556 --> 00:13:11,020 this committee . It is an honor for 307 00:13:11,020 --> 00:13:13,187 Sergeant Major Kramer and I to be here 308 00:13:13,187 --> 00:13:15,187 alongside General Whiting and Chief 309 00:13:15,187 --> 00:13:17,820 Master Sergeant Simmons and a privilege 310 00:13:17,820 --> 00:13:19,876 to continue representing the service 311 00:13:19,876 --> 00:13:22,429 members , civilians and families of 312 00:13:22,429 --> 00:13:24,799 United States Strategic Command . I 313 00:13:24,799 --> 00:13:26,910 would like to thank this committee in 314 00:13:26,910 --> 00:13:29,021 Congress for its continued support in 315 00:13:29,021 --> 00:13:30,799 providing us with the resources 316 00:13:30,799 --> 00:13:32,632 required to execute our assigned 317 00:13:32,632 --> 00:13:35,330 missions . Above all else , I extend my 318 00:13:35,330 --> 00:13:37,386 gratitude to the American people for 319 00:13:37,386 --> 00:13:39,719 their endurance support of the military . 320 00:13:40,400 --> 00:13:43,020 In my 3rd and final year serving as 321 00:13:43,020 --> 00:13:45,820 Stratcom commander . It has been the 322 00:13:45,820 --> 00:13:48,400 most rewarding experience of my 39 year 323 00:13:48,400 --> 00:13:51,650 career . I have submitted my 2025 324 00:13:51,650 --> 00:13:54,090 posture statement for the record . I'll 325 00:13:54,090 --> 00:13:56,312 begin by assuring you that the nation's 326 00:13:56,312 --> 00:13:58,534 nuclear forces , which are foundational 327 00:13:58,534 --> 00:14:00,646 to our national security , are safe , 328 00:14:00,650 --> 00:14:03,210 secure , effective and credible as I 329 00:14:03,210 --> 00:14:05,690 speak , Stratcom and its components are 330 00:14:05,690 --> 00:14:08,099 deterring our adversaries and stand 331 00:14:08,099 --> 00:14:10,650 ready to respond decisively whether 332 00:14:10,650 --> 00:14:12,849 underground , in the air , or beneath 333 00:14:12,849 --> 00:14:15,450 the seas should deterrence fail . 334 00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:19,440 And our mission has never been more 335 00:14:19,440 --> 00:14:21,662 important . Today , the United States , 336 00:14:21,662 --> 00:14:23,829 its allies and partners are confronted 337 00:14:23,829 --> 00:14:25,496 with a deteriorating security 338 00:14:25,496 --> 00:14:27,496 environment . The Chinese Communist 339 00:14:27,496 --> 00:14:29,662 Party is rapidly expanding its nuclear 340 00:14:29,662 --> 00:14:31,718 forces into a fully functional triad 341 00:14:31,718 --> 00:14:34,229 with more than 600 nuclear warheads and 342 00:14:34,229 --> 00:14:36,619 counting . Russia has modernized the 343 00:14:36,619 --> 00:14:39,580 majority of its nuclear arsenal . North 344 00:14:39,580 --> 00:14:42,859 Korea continues to unlawful with its 345 00:14:42,859 --> 00:14:45,260 unlawful and destabilizing programs in 346 00:14:45,260 --> 00:14:47,427 pursuit of weapons of mass destruction 347 00:14:47,427 --> 00:14:49,700 and ballistic missiles . And Iran 348 00:14:49,700 --> 00:14:52,460 continues to pursue uranium enrichment . 349 00:14:53,289 --> 00:14:55,289 Additionally , the tools of war are 350 00:14:55,289 --> 00:14:58,270 changing . From novel missile systems 351 00:14:58,270 --> 00:15:01,869 to counter space to counter US space 352 00:15:01,869 --> 00:15:04,669 capabilities from cyber attacks against 353 00:15:04,669 --> 00:15:07,020 critical infrastructure to competition 354 00:15:07,020 --> 00:15:09,750 in the electromagnetic spectrum , these 355 00:15:09,750 --> 00:15:11,989 are rapidly developing threat vectors 356 00:15:11,989 --> 00:15:14,989 across multiple domains and regions to 357 00:15:14,989 --> 00:15:17,659 include the Arctic . To effectively 358 00:15:17,659 --> 00:15:19,770 deter adversaries across the spectrum 359 00:15:19,770 --> 00:15:22,619 of threats requires sustained legacy 360 00:15:22,619 --> 00:15:26,000 triad systems . And urgently completing 361 00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:29,099 the multi-generational decades-long 362 00:15:29,099 --> 00:15:32,179 modernization of all three legs of the 363 00:15:32,179 --> 00:15:35,260 nuclear deterrent and its critical NC3 364 00:15:35,260 --> 00:15:35,820 systems . 365 00:15:40,599 --> 00:15:43,080 No portfolio is in need of 366 00:15:43,080 --> 00:15:45,760 recapitalization . More than a nuclear 367 00:15:45,760 --> 00:15:47,760 portfolio , and a modernization I'm 368 00:15:47,760 --> 00:15:49,989 advocating for requires continued 369 00:15:50,280 --> 00:15:52,760 uninterrupted funding and an industrial 370 00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:55,989 base capable of steady and continuous 371 00:15:55,989 --> 00:15:58,409 production . Commitment to modern 372 00:15:58,409 --> 00:16:01,020 modernization will ensure that US 373 00:16:01,020 --> 00:16:03,760 strategic weapons continue to deter 374 00:16:03,760 --> 00:16:06,099 aggression , assure our allies and 375 00:16:06,099 --> 00:16:08,409 partners , and allow us to achieve 376 00:16:08,739 --> 00:16:11,072 national objectives if deterrence fails . 377 00:16:11,929 --> 00:16:13,985 Thank you again for your support and 378 00:16:13,985 --> 00:16:15,873 focus on our mission , and I look 379 00:16:15,873 --> 00:16:17,985 forward to answering your questions . 380 00:16:17,985 --> 00:16:20,040 Thank you , General Cotton . General 381 00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:23,159 Whiting . Chairwoman Fisher and Ranking 382 00:16:23,159 --> 00:16:25,119 Member King , Chairman Wicker and 383 00:16:25,119 --> 00:16:27,175 Ranking Member Reed , and members of 384 00:16:27,175 --> 00:16:29,286 the subcommittee , thank you for your 385 00:16:29,286 --> 00:16:31,008 support and the opportunity to 386 00:16:31,008 --> 00:16:33,175 represent the war fighters of US Space 387 00:16:33,175 --> 00:16:35,008 Command . It's truly an honor to 388 00:16:35,008 --> 00:16:37,008 testify alongside my friend General 389 00:16:37,008 --> 00:16:39,063 Cotton once again and to discuss our 390 00:16:39,063 --> 00:16:41,175 vital role in achieving peace through 391 00:16:41,175 --> 00:16:43,230 strength . At US Space Command , our 392 00:16:43,230 --> 00:16:45,286 guiding principle is clear to secure 393 00:16:45,286 --> 00:16:47,341 peace , we must be well prepared for 394 00:16:47,341 --> 00:16:49,341 conflict in space and if deterrence 395 00:16:49,341 --> 00:16:51,349 fails , we will fight and win . US 396 00:16:51,349 --> 00:16:53,127 Space Command is upholding this 397 00:16:53,127 --> 00:16:55,182 principle in the face of operational 398 00:16:55,182 --> 00:16:57,293 threats which continue to expand at a 399 00:16:57,293 --> 00:16:59,405 breathtaking pace and which are being 400 00:16:59,405 --> 00:17:01,516 fielded deliberately to challenge the 401 00:17:01,516 --> 00:17:03,516 United States , the American way of 402 00:17:03,516 --> 00:17:05,890 life , and hold the joint force at risk . 403 00:17:06,420 --> 00:17:08,339 These novel and unprecedented 404 00:17:08,339 --> 00:17:10,420 developments include China's robust 405 00:17:10,420 --> 00:17:12,642 counter space weapons and space enabled 406 00:17:12,642 --> 00:17:15,609 kill chains , Russia's reported pursuit 407 00:17:15,609 --> 00:17:17,780 of an on orbit nuclear anti-satellite 408 00:17:17,780 --> 00:17:20,329 weapon . And wide ranging ballistic 409 00:17:20,329 --> 00:17:22,530 crews and hypersonic missile threats . 410 00:17:23,390 --> 00:17:25,279 Despite the growing threats , the 411 00:17:25,279 --> 00:17:27,390 United States maintains advantages in 412 00:17:27,390 --> 00:17:29,589 space thanks to the unified mission 413 00:17:29,589 --> 00:17:32,500 focus of our superb joint war fighters , 414 00:17:32,829 --> 00:17:35,199 our unmatched commercial space sector , 415 00:17:35,469 --> 00:17:37,910 and our expansive and more empowered 416 00:17:37,910 --> 00:17:40,359 alliances and partnerships , our 417 00:17:40,359 --> 00:17:42,526 foremost advantage and the cornerstone 418 00:17:42,526 --> 00:17:45,829 of US Space Command . Are our officer 419 00:17:45,829 --> 00:17:48,739 enlisted and civilian personnel . No 420 00:17:48,739 --> 00:17:50,979 other nation can match our team's 421 00:17:50,979 --> 00:17:53,035 understanding of the complexities of 422 00:17:53,035 --> 00:17:54,701 space and the requirements to 423 00:17:54,701 --> 00:17:56,479 effectively operate in the most 424 00:17:56,479 --> 00:17:58,535 challenging area of responsibility . 425 00:17:58,535 --> 00:18:00,535 Our military has the best trained , 426 00:18:00,535 --> 00:18:02,646 most capable space war fighting force 427 00:18:02,646 --> 00:18:04,868 in the world , and they stand dedicated 428 00:18:04,868 --> 00:18:07,010 to fight for America . Since my last 429 00:18:07,010 --> 00:18:09,209 testimony , US Space Command published 430 00:18:09,209 --> 00:18:11,650 our new campaign plan integrating and 431 00:18:11,650 --> 00:18:13,928 synchronizing the command's operations , 432 00:18:13,928 --> 00:18:16,050 activities and investments with the 433 00:18:16,050 --> 00:18:17,939 Joint Force and the interagency , 434 00:18:18,170 --> 00:18:20,530 leaving no doubts to our opponents that 435 00:18:20,530 --> 00:18:22,586 we are stronger , more capable , and 436 00:18:22,586 --> 00:18:24,849 ready to counter any threat . Over the 437 00:18:24,849 --> 00:18:26,770 past year , US Space Command's 438 00:18:26,770 --> 00:18:29,650 commercial integration cell grew to 17 439 00:18:29,650 --> 00:18:31,872 commercial mission partners , enhancing 440 00:18:31,872 --> 00:18:33,761 our threat information sharing at 441 00:18:33,761 --> 00:18:35,770 classified levels and improving our 442 00:18:35,770 --> 00:18:38,599 crisis action planning . We also 443 00:18:38,599 --> 00:18:41,040 expanded multinational force Operation 444 00:18:41,040 --> 00:18:43,920 Olympic Defender to 7 nations with the 445 00:18:43,920 --> 00:18:46,087 addition of Germany , France , and New 446 00:18:46,087 --> 00:18:48,280 Zealand . This growth further 447 00:18:48,280 --> 00:18:50,400 strengthens partnerships and enables 448 00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:52,319 our allies to share the burden of 449 00:18:52,319 --> 00:18:55,119 collective space security . That said , 450 00:18:55,260 --> 00:18:57,380 these advantages and our ability to 451 00:18:57,380 --> 00:18:59,800 deter potential adversaries cannot be 452 00:18:59,800 --> 00:19:02,250 taken for granted . Deterrence in space 453 00:19:02,250 --> 00:19:04,739 is consistent with other domains . It 454 00:19:04,739 --> 00:19:07,140 requires a keen understanding and clear 455 00:19:07,140 --> 00:19:09,307 communication of what we are deterring 456 00:19:09,307 --> 00:19:11,619 against credible , acknowledged 457 00:19:11,619 --> 00:19:13,760 capabilities to impose costs on those 458 00:19:13,760 --> 00:19:15,579 who attack us and resilient 459 00:19:15,579 --> 00:19:17,619 architectures to dissuade attack by 460 00:19:17,619 --> 00:19:20,530 making any effort futile . Accordingly , 461 00:19:20,729 --> 00:19:22,920 US Space Command is fully integrated 462 00:19:23,209 --> 00:19:25,431 into and contributing to the Department 463 00:19:25,431 --> 00:19:27,489 of Defense's implementation of the 464 00:19:27,489 --> 00:19:29,211 president's executive order to 465 00:19:29,211 --> 00:19:31,540 establish a golden dome for American 466 00:19:31,540 --> 00:19:33,596 missile or pardon me , a golden dome 467 00:19:33,596 --> 00:19:35,707 for American missile defense shield . 468 00:19:35,707 --> 00:19:38,319 US Space Command appreciates Congress's 469 00:19:38,319 --> 00:19:40,209 significant support of numerous 470 00:19:40,209 --> 00:19:42,619 critical space superiority programs in 471 00:19:42,619 --> 00:19:45,579 the recent FY25 appropriations law . 472 00:19:45,910 --> 00:19:48,790 Looking forward to FY26 and beyond , US 473 00:19:48,790 --> 00:19:51,020 Space Command requires stable funding 474 00:19:51,020 --> 00:19:52,964 as well as effective and efficient 475 00:19:52,964 --> 00:19:55,189 acquisition programs delivering 476 00:19:55,189 --> 00:19:57,869 advanced space capabilities to enable a 477 00:19:57,869 --> 00:20:00,202 balanced space deterrence for structure . 478 00:20:00,750 --> 00:20:02,639 Most pressing are the delivery of 479 00:20:02,639 --> 00:20:04,550 integrated space fires , enhanced 480 00:20:04,550 --> 00:20:06,772 battle space awareness , and integrated 481 00:20:06,772 --> 00:20:08,949 command and control capabilities to 482 00:20:08,949 --> 00:20:11,390 achieve space superiority , to defend 483 00:20:11,390 --> 00:20:13,612 the homeland and protect and enable the 484 00:20:13,612 --> 00:20:15,779 joint force . The unified command plan 485 00:20:15,779 --> 00:20:18,001 directs US Space Command to protect and 486 00:20:18,001 --> 00:20:20,430 defend US and as directed , allied and 487 00:20:20,430 --> 00:20:22,869 commercial space capabilities through 488 00:20:22,869 --> 00:20:25,091 necessary offensive and defensive space 489 00:20:25,091 --> 00:20:26,980 operations . Like other combatant 490 00:20:26,980 --> 00:20:29,170 commands , we require combat credible 491 00:20:29,170 --> 00:20:31,670 kinetic and non-kinetic means to deter 492 00:20:31,670 --> 00:20:34,469 and counter adversary actions by 493 00:20:34,469 --> 00:20:36,025 investing in space security 494 00:20:36,025 --> 00:20:38,302 capabilities , we send a clear message . 495 00:20:38,302 --> 00:20:40,413 The United States has the advantage , 496 00:20:40,413 --> 00:20:42,636 and we remain committed that space will 497 00:20:42,636 --> 00:20:44,869 be safe , secure , and stable . We are 498 00:20:44,869 --> 00:20:46,925 ready to repel all challengers , and 499 00:20:46,925 --> 00:20:48,758 any attempt to turn space into a 500 00:20:48,758 --> 00:20:50,939 battlefield will fail . Although many 501 00:20:50,939 --> 00:20:52,995 challenges lie ahead , the future of 502 00:20:52,995 --> 00:20:54,939 space holds tremendous promise for 503 00:20:54,939 --> 00:20:57,161 America if we actively and thoughtfully 504 00:20:57,161 --> 00:20:58,883 protect it . I am grateful for 505 00:20:58,883 --> 00:21:01,050 Congress's support to US Space Command 506 00:21:01,050 --> 00:21:03,050 and continued investment to advance 507 00:21:03,050 --> 00:21:04,995 America's strength in space . Your 508 00:21:04,995 --> 00:21:07,217 continued backing not only ensures that 509 00:21:07,217 --> 00:21:09,439 US Space Command protects our interests 510 00:21:09,439 --> 00:21:11,661 in space today , but also protects that 511 00:21:11,661 --> 00:21:13,383 future which is coming . Madam 512 00:21:13,383 --> 00:21:15,550 Chairwoman , I've submitted my posture 513 00:21:15,550 --> 00:21:17,661 statement for the record , and I look 514 00:21:17,661 --> 00:21:17,660 forward to your and the subcommittee's 515 00:21:17,660 --> 00:21:20,540 questions . Thank you , General Whiting . 516 00:21:20,680 --> 00:21:23,359 We'll begin with a 5 minute rounds of 517 00:21:23,359 --> 00:21:26,729 questions . I strongly believe that the 518 00:21:26,729 --> 00:21:28,849 bipartisan Strategic Posture 519 00:21:28,849 --> 00:21:32,089 Commission's 2023 report should be 520 00:21:32,089 --> 00:21:34,969 required reading for everybody in the 521 00:21:34,969 --> 00:21:37,290 Department of Defense . It clearly 522 00:21:37,290 --> 00:21:39,699 articulates the threats that we face , 523 00:21:39,770 --> 00:21:42,729 and it concludes rightfully concludes 524 00:21:43,050 --> 00:21:45,319 that we are woefully underprepared . 525 00:21:45,770 --> 00:21:47,930 Based on the recommendations of that 526 00:21:47,930 --> 00:21:50,209 report , last year's NDAA directed . 527 00:21:50,359 --> 00:21:52,969 The department to develop a deterrent 528 00:21:52,969 --> 00:21:55,949 strategy that would pace this projected 529 00:21:55,949 --> 00:21:58,390 threat . The strategy must also include 530 00:21:58,390 --> 00:22:01,469 an assessment of the amount and type of 531 00:22:01,469 --> 00:22:04,349 nuclear weapons and delivery systems 532 00:22:04,349 --> 00:22:06,516 necessary to implement that strategy . 533 00:22:07,030 --> 00:22:09,209 General Cotton , can you tell me how 534 00:22:09,420 --> 00:22:11,510 the development of this strategy is 535 00:22:11,510 --> 00:22:15,089 coming along ? Thank you , madam chair 536 00:22:15,140 --> 00:22:18,109 chairwoman , um , if , if you recall 537 00:22:18,540 --> 00:22:20,780 when I first took over as a commander 538 00:22:20,780 --> 00:22:23,260 of of US uh strategic Command , one of 539 00:22:23,260 --> 00:22:25,300 the first things we did was we 540 00:22:25,300 --> 00:22:27,411 instituted a nuclear recapitalization 541 00:22:27,411 --> 00:22:29,633 and transition cross functional team to 542 00:22:29,633 --> 00:22:31,578 do exactly that because one of the 543 00:22:31,578 --> 00:22:33,633 things we wanted to assure ourselves 544 00:22:33,633 --> 00:22:35,522 was that we have the capacity and 545 00:22:35,522 --> 00:22:37,633 capability and posture correct . That 546 00:22:37,633 --> 00:22:39,800 was in alignment with uh the study and 547 00:22:39,800 --> 00:22:41,967 and the commission's report um and and 548 00:22:41,967 --> 00:22:44,133 and it pretty much mirrored everything 549 00:22:44,133 --> 00:22:46,270 that was said in the commission since 550 00:22:46,270 --> 00:22:49,310 that time , uh , what we have done is 551 00:22:49,310 --> 00:22:51,032 looked at the options that are 552 00:22:51,032 --> 00:22:53,030 available on all three legs of the 553 00:22:53,030 --> 00:22:55,290 triad . We're currently sufficient 554 00:22:55,589 --> 00:22:58,010 currently . Um , but in order to 555 00:22:58,010 --> 00:23:01,729 maintain sufficiency , um , um , as we 556 00:23:01,729 --> 00:23:04,280 continue to have legacy systems online 557 00:23:04,280 --> 00:23:06,447 before the new systems come on board , 558 00:23:06,447 --> 00:23:08,502 there are some options , um , within 559 00:23:08,502 --> 00:23:11,390 all three legs of the triad to increase , 560 00:23:11,420 --> 00:23:14,040 uh , capacity and capability . Uh , 561 00:23:14,060 --> 00:23:16,282 General Cotton , you recently said that 562 00:23:16,282 --> 00:23:18,393 the Air Force should procure at least 563 00:23:18,393 --> 00:23:22,170 145 B-21 bombers . From your 564 00:23:22,170 --> 00:23:25,099 position as Stratcom commander , can 565 00:23:25,099 --> 00:23:27,329 you share with us why you assessed that 566 00:23:27,339 --> 00:23:29,699 that should be the new procurement 567 00:23:29,699 --> 00:23:33,219 floor ? Yes , um , Senator . 568 00:23:34,390 --> 00:23:38,349 When we first looked at the numbers of 569 00:23:38,349 --> 00:23:41,300 what would be required for the the next 570 00:23:41,300 --> 00:23:43,910 generation of bombers to replace the B1 571 00:23:43,910 --> 00:23:46,260 and the B-2 , um , that was a different 572 00:23:46,260 --> 00:23:48,550 geopolitical environment . Um , we 573 00:23:48,550 --> 00:23:52,109 actually started a a study in 2020 to 574 00:23:52,109 --> 00:23:54,331 ensure that our numbers were correct in 575 00:23:54,331 --> 00:23:56,387 regards to what we wanted to see the 576 00:23:56,387 --> 00:23:59,420 B-21 fleet look like . Um , at that 577 00:23:59,420 --> 00:24:01,689 point , um , the , the conversation 578 00:24:01,689 --> 00:24:04,010 from the department would be a minimum 579 00:24:04,010 --> 00:24:07,900 of 100 B-21s should be procured as we 580 00:24:07,900 --> 00:24:09,844 looked to see what the environment 581 00:24:09,844 --> 00:24:12,067 brought to bear . Um , the other number 582 00:24:12,067 --> 00:24:14,178 that we would always talk about would 583 00:24:14,178 --> 00:24:16,819 be the 145 number which would bring the 584 00:24:16,819 --> 00:24:20,060 total of the bomber force for the 585 00:24:20,060 --> 00:24:22,116 United States and allies because the 586 00:24:22,116 --> 00:24:24,338 bomber force represents all the bombers 587 00:24:24,338 --> 00:24:26,449 for the Western world . Um , would be 588 00:24:26,449 --> 00:24:29,719 about 220 and that would include um the 589 00:24:29,719 --> 00:24:32,800 Bs or excuse me , the B2 ones as well 590 00:24:32,800 --> 00:24:35,479 as the modified B52J models that would 591 00:24:35,479 --> 00:24:38,800 come out . Thank you . General , as you 592 00:24:38,800 --> 00:24:41,619 know , um . This this committee on a 593 00:24:41,619 --> 00:24:44,750 bipartisan basis strongly supports 594 00:24:44,750 --> 00:24:48,079 Slickum , the nuclear armed sea launch 595 00:24:48,079 --> 00:24:50,709 cruise missile , and it was included a 596 00:24:50,709 --> 00:24:53,219 program of record was included in our 597 00:24:53,219 --> 00:24:56,859 FY24 NDAA . In your 598 00:24:56,859 --> 00:24:59,459 view , as Stratcom commander , will 599 00:24:59,459 --> 00:25:02,250 slicker and address a capability gap . 600 00:25:02,880 --> 00:25:05,047 It will , ma'am , and and what it does 601 00:25:05,047 --> 00:25:07,949 for us is twofold . It gives the the 602 00:25:07,949 --> 00:25:10,699 president uh a broader range of options , 603 00:25:11,030 --> 00:25:13,197 um , and that , and , and I think that 604 00:25:13,197 --> 00:25:15,086 is my role and my job as a , as a 605 00:25:15,086 --> 00:25:17,197 combatant command is present , um , a 606 00:25:17,197 --> 00:25:19,339 broad range of , uh , capability and 607 00:25:19,339 --> 00:25:21,506 options uh for the for the president . 608 00:25:21,506 --> 00:25:25,130 Um , it also provides not only as it's , 609 00:25:25,199 --> 00:25:27,599 it's , it's a regional tool , um , that 610 00:25:27,599 --> 00:25:31,229 can be used as well , um , so we can 611 00:25:31,229 --> 00:25:33,640 actually benefit from our geographic 612 00:25:33,640 --> 00:25:36,030 combatant commanders , uh , which , um , 613 00:25:36,280 --> 00:25:38,502 they , they support the idea of slicker 614 00:25:38,502 --> 00:25:40,640 in as well because from a regional 615 00:25:40,640 --> 00:25:42,807 perspective it can hold adversaries at 616 00:25:42,807 --> 00:25:44,696 risk . And yes or no , do you see 617 00:25:44,696 --> 00:25:48,000 opportunities to um speed up that 618 00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:50,599 program ? I would hope so , uh , Madam 619 00:25:50,599 --> 00:25:52,710 Chairwoman , and the , and the reason 620 00:25:52,710 --> 00:25:54,710 is I know that there's a program or 621 00:25:54,710 --> 00:25:56,932 record that has been established in the 622 00:25:56,932 --> 00:25:59,043 department of the Navy . Um , I would 623 00:25:59,043 --> 00:26:01,377 love to see some acceleration from that , 624 00:26:01,377 --> 00:26:03,543 um , from that team , uh , to see what 625 00:26:03,543 --> 00:26:05,599 we can do to get the assets a little 626 00:26:05,599 --> 00:26:07,599 quicker and move to the left . Uh , 627 00:26:07,599 --> 00:26:09,599 General Whiting , I want to get one 628 00:26:09,599 --> 00:26:11,655 question in for you at this point as 629 00:26:11,655 --> 00:26:13,655 well . Um , every service relies on 630 00:26:13,655 --> 00:26:16,050 your assets that are based in space . 631 00:26:16,550 --> 00:26:18,719 Uh , I don't think that gets enough 632 00:26:18,719 --> 00:26:21,569 attention . Are you coordinating with 633 00:26:21,569 --> 00:26:23,969 the other combatant commands , uh , and 634 00:26:23,969 --> 00:26:26,650 also with services , with the 635 00:26:26,650 --> 00:26:29,530 intelligence community to make sure 636 00:26:29,530 --> 00:26:32,449 that these assets under your command 637 00:26:32,449 --> 00:26:34,671 are gonna be integrated appropriately ? 638 00:26:35,569 --> 00:26:37,902 Madam Chairwoman , absolutely . In fact , 639 00:26:37,902 --> 00:26:39,958 I have a liaison element that I have 640 00:26:39,958 --> 00:26:42,180 assigned to each of the other combatant 641 00:26:42,180 --> 00:26:44,402 commands . So there's a liaison from US 642 00:26:44,402 --> 00:26:46,458 Space Command that sits inside of US 643 00:26:46,458 --> 00:26:48,347 Stratcom as well as all the other 644 00:26:48,347 --> 00:26:50,458 combatant commands to persistently do 645 00:26:50,458 --> 00:26:52,625 that type of coordination to make sure 646 00:26:52,625 --> 00:26:52,260 that our operational plans are 647 00:26:52,260 --> 00:26:54,482 advancing together , that our real-time 648 00:26:54,482 --> 00:26:56,482 operations are are considering each 649 00:26:56,482 --> 00:26:58,649 other's capabilities . Uh , we do that 650 00:26:58,649 --> 00:27:00,704 with . Our intelligence community as 651 00:27:00,704 --> 00:27:02,816 well , primarily through the National 652 00:27:02,816 --> 00:27:04,982 Reconnaissance Office again we have an 653 00:27:04,982 --> 00:27:06,816 exchange of liaison officers and 654 00:27:06,816 --> 00:27:06,625 operational centers that work together 655 00:27:06,875 --> 00:27:08,986 and then with the services as a joint 656 00:27:08,986 --> 00:27:10,708 headquarters , I have not only 657 00:27:10,708 --> 00:27:12,764 components from each of the services 658 00:27:12,764 --> 00:27:14,875 assigned to me , but I have personnel 659 00:27:14,875 --> 00:27:16,986 from all of those services which keep 660 00:27:16,986 --> 00:27:18,986 us tightly linked with their future 661 00:27:18,986 --> 00:27:20,986 plans as well . Thank you , Senator 662 00:27:20,986 --> 00:27:23,208 King . Thank you Madam Chair . A couple 663 00:27:23,208 --> 00:27:25,375 of preliminary questions about staff , 664 00:27:25,375 --> 00:27:27,597 both of you mentioned in your testimony 665 00:27:27,597 --> 00:27:29,653 that you rely upon not only military 666 00:27:29,653 --> 00:27:31,542 personnel but civilians . Uh , my 667 00:27:31,542 --> 00:27:33,764 question to each of you is , have you , 668 00:27:33,764 --> 00:27:35,986 are you under any orders or have orders 669 00:27:35,986 --> 00:27:38,208 come down or are you , have you already 670 00:27:38,208 --> 00:27:40,264 started to implement or has somebody 671 00:27:40,264 --> 00:27:42,431 started to implement , uh , reductions 672 00:27:42,431 --> 00:27:44,819 in force , uh , firings , uh , people 673 00:27:44,819 --> 00:27:46,900 who have taken the , I call it the 674 00:27:46,900 --> 00:27:49,459 early retirement option . Uh , General 675 00:27:49,459 --> 00:27:51,810 Cotton , uh , where does your , what's 676 00:27:51,810 --> 00:27:54,560 the status of your civilian workforce ? 677 00:27:55,020 --> 00:27:57,131 Well , our civilian workforce , we're 678 00:27:57,131 --> 00:27:59,409 about 65% civilian in the headquarters , 679 00:27:59,409 --> 00:28:01,464 um , but that that doesn't count for 680 00:28:01,464 --> 00:28:03,869 the 41,000 that make up the componncies , 681 00:28:04,119 --> 00:28:06,140 um , that , that work under my , my 682 00:28:06,140 --> 00:28:09,140 charge . Right now , uh , Senator , 683 00:28:09,469 --> 00:28:12,010 very small amount of folks that took 684 00:28:12,010 --> 00:28:13,979 the , uh , early retirement , um , 685 00:28:13,989 --> 00:28:16,869 activities , um , but the option for 686 00:28:16,869 --> 00:28:19,036 them to do so still exists , but right 687 00:28:19,036 --> 00:28:21,091 now we're not seeing an effect . The 688 00:28:21,091 --> 00:28:23,202 numbers are pretty , pretty small and 689 00:28:23,202 --> 00:28:25,229 no , no firings . uh , we have not 690 00:28:25,229 --> 00:28:27,396 fired . Have you under , are you under 691 00:28:27,396 --> 00:28:29,829 any orders to reduce that staff by a 692 00:28:29,829 --> 00:28:32,239 certain percentage ? Uh , we're , we're , 693 00:28:32,359 --> 00:28:34,192 you know , we're looking for the 694 00:28:34,192 --> 00:28:36,415 efficiencies piece , but right now it's 695 00:28:36,415 --> 00:28:38,470 all voluntary and like I said from , 696 00:28:38,470 --> 00:28:40,803 from our perspective from Stratcom , uh , 697 00:28:40,803 --> 00:28:40,670 the numbers have been very , very small . 698 00:28:40,739 --> 00:28:43,017 And are you subject to a hiring freeze ? 699 00:28:43,017 --> 00:28:45,989 I am , so those people who are leaving , 700 00:28:46,079 --> 00:28:48,301 you're not allowed to replace , is that 701 00:28:48,301 --> 00:28:50,329 correct ? Well , we have uh uh uh 702 00:28:50,329 --> 00:28:53,819 opportunity to , um . Uh , get a waiver 703 00:28:53,819 --> 00:28:56,020 approved , uh , because of our mission 704 00:28:56,020 --> 00:28:58,339 set , um , and if , if there's a 705 00:28:58,339 --> 00:29:00,540 requirement for us to do a waiver to 706 00:29:00,540 --> 00:29:02,651 see if we can get someone through the 707 00:29:02,651 --> 00:29:04,818 hiring freeze so we can process that . 708 00:29:05,060 --> 00:29:07,004 General Blake , same , same set of 709 00:29:07,004 --> 00:29:09,180 questions , uh , Senator , um , my 710 00:29:09,180 --> 00:29:11,347 answers are almost identical to , to , 711 00:29:11,347 --> 00:29:13,513 uh , General Cotton's , uh , about 60% 712 00:29:13,513 --> 00:29:15,680 of my headquarters staff is government 713 00:29:15,680 --> 00:29:17,736 civilians . We've had a small number 714 00:29:17,736 --> 00:29:19,847 who have volunteered for the deferred 715 00:29:19,847 --> 00:29:22,013 retirement program . Um , we are under 716 00:29:22,013 --> 00:29:25,239 no orders to fire anyone . Um , we are 717 00:29:25,239 --> 00:29:27,461 aware that we're looking at , um , uh , 718 00:29:27,461 --> 00:29:29,295 need to look for efficiencies as 719 00:29:29,295 --> 00:29:31,461 General Cotton , uh , discussed . Uh , 720 00:29:31,461 --> 00:29:33,572 we also are under a hiring freeze and 721 00:29:33,572 --> 00:29:35,628 we have the opportunity for critical 722 00:29:35,628 --> 00:29:37,350 positions to , uh , to ask for 723 00:29:37,350 --> 00:29:39,461 exemptions to that . Thank you . Um , 724 00:29:39,569 --> 00:29:41,625 General Whiting , I was interested . 725 00:29:41,625 --> 00:29:43,791 You , you mentioned the , I think it's 726 00:29:43,791 --> 00:29:45,847 called the Artemis Accord , which is 727 00:29:45,847 --> 00:29:48,013 clearly based upon allies . Uh , I'm , 728 00:29:48,013 --> 00:29:50,125 I'm concerned that we seem to be in a 729 00:29:50,125 --> 00:29:53,010 process of alienating our allies . Talk 730 00:29:53,010 --> 00:29:54,899 to me about the importance of the 731 00:29:54,899 --> 00:29:57,121 Artemis cord in , in order to carry out 732 00:29:57,121 --> 00:30:00,180 your mission . Senator , the Arms cords 733 00:30:00,180 --> 00:30:02,770 are overseen by NASA and the Department 734 00:30:02,770 --> 00:30:05,699 of State , and that's a civil um 735 00:30:05,699 --> 00:30:08,500 exploratory set of agreements about 736 00:30:08,859 --> 00:30:10,803 shared principles in space between 737 00:30:10,803 --> 00:30:13,520 countries on the military side , I have 738 00:30:13,520 --> 00:30:16,180 a a named operation called Operation 739 00:30:16,180 --> 00:30:18,069 Olympic Defender which includes . 740 00:30:18,104 --> 00:30:20,255 Countries which is the United States 741 00:30:20,785 --> 00:30:23,155 plus the Five Eyes nations , Germany 742 00:30:23,155 --> 00:30:25,665 and France where we cooperate in space 743 00:30:25,665 --> 00:30:27,887 together to understand what's happening 744 00:30:27,887 --> 00:30:31,265 there and again we're we're showing 745 00:30:31,265 --> 00:30:32,987 those relationships with other 746 00:30:32,987 --> 00:30:34,709 countries are important to the 747 00:30:34,709 --> 00:30:36,709 execution of your mission , is that 748 00:30:36,709 --> 00:30:39,180 correct ? They are , Senator . A 749 00:30:39,180 --> 00:30:41,291 question I haven't been able to get a 750 00:30:41,291 --> 00:30:43,236 clear answer on is what does the , 751 00:30:43,236 --> 00:30:45,458 what's the concept of the golden dome ? 752 00:30:45,660 --> 00:30:47,660 In other words , would it be a 1000 753 00:30:47,660 --> 00:30:49,849 THAAD batteries or is it , um , 754 00:30:50,180 --> 00:30:52,347 conventional missile defense ? Is it ? 755 00:30:52,410 --> 00:30:54,410 Directed energy , what , what's the 756 00:30:54,410 --> 00:30:56,650 underlying concept of Golden Dome other 757 00:30:56,650 --> 00:30:58,872 than to protect the homeland , which is 758 00:30:58,872 --> 00:31:01,459 certainly a worthy goal . Senator , the 759 00:31:01,459 --> 00:31:03,459 department right now has been going 760 00:31:03,459 --> 00:31:05,626 through a series of , uh , of meetings 761 00:31:05,626 --> 00:31:07,792 and working groups to define what that 762 00:31:07,792 --> 00:31:07,750 architecture will look like , but in 763 00:31:07,750 --> 00:31:09,917 the executive order it lays out that , 764 00:31:09,917 --> 00:31:11,694 uh , the president's asking the 765 00:31:11,694 --> 00:31:13,583 department to develop a series of 766 00:31:13,583 --> 00:31:15,583 capabilities that will protect it . 767 00:31:15,583 --> 00:31:17,639 Against these new modernized threats 768 00:31:17,639 --> 00:31:20,150 like hypersonics , maneuvering vehicles 769 00:31:20,150 --> 00:31:23,040 that put the homeland at at risk , so I 770 00:31:23,040 --> 00:31:25,096 think it'll be a layered system that 771 00:31:25,096 --> 00:31:27,207 will have to account for all of those 772 00:31:27,207 --> 00:31:29,373 threats at multiple phases of a of the 773 00:31:29,373 --> 00:31:31,596 life cycle of a missile . Well , that's 774 00:31:31,596 --> 00:31:33,762 the mission . I understand . So I take 775 00:31:33,762 --> 00:31:35,818 it we're some distance away from the 776 00:31:35,818 --> 00:31:38,319 operational . Concepts of what what 777 00:31:38,319 --> 00:31:40,430 will actually uh what it will consist 778 00:31:40,430 --> 00:31:43,949 of a very specific question , uh , both 779 00:31:43,949 --> 00:31:47,150 of you rely heavily on qualine Atoll 780 00:31:47,150 --> 00:31:50,119 for , uh , for training and and testing 781 00:31:50,119 --> 00:31:52,230 uh purposes . My understanding is the 782 00:31:52,230 --> 00:31:54,390 infrastructure there is woefully 783 00:31:54,390 --> 00:31:57,680 inadequate . Uh , can you speak to an 784 00:31:57,680 --> 00:31:59,819 effort to try to . Upgrade that 785 00:31:59,819 --> 00:32:02,030 infrastructure so that that atoll can 786 00:32:02,030 --> 00:32:04,197 continue to be a part of our important 787 00:32:04,197 --> 00:32:06,510 part of our , uh , strategic uh uh uh 788 00:32:06,510 --> 00:32:10,020 deterrence initiative . Senator 789 00:32:10,020 --> 00:32:12,076 Quadulonto is very important for our 790 00:32:12,076 --> 00:32:14,131 space mission . I visited there last 791 00:32:14,131 --> 00:32:16,800 summer . There's 5 sensors there that 792 00:32:16,800 --> 00:32:19,390 support our mission . We have advocated 793 00:32:19,390 --> 00:32:22,000 with the Department of the Army for for 794 00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:24,222 investments there to make sure that the 795 00:32:24,222 --> 00:32:26,056 infrastructure can support those 796 00:32:26,056 --> 00:32:28,167 missions . And in fact , my combatant 797 00:32:28,167 --> 00:32:30,333 command is in the process right now of 798 00:32:30,333 --> 00:32:32,333 defining . Exactly what the support 799 00:32:32,333 --> 00:32:34,500 requirements are that we need there so 800 00:32:34,500 --> 00:32:36,667 we can put those into our next plan to 801 00:32:36,667 --> 00:32:38,833 make sure the army understands exactly 802 00:32:38,833 --> 00:32:41,056 what requirements we need but that is a 803 00:32:41,056 --> 00:32:43,167 very important location for us if you 804 00:32:43,167 --> 00:32:42,959 can just keep the committee informed of 805 00:32:42,959 --> 00:32:45,020 that of what's the the need is , 806 00:32:45,089 --> 00:32:47,200 whether it's authorities or funding , 807 00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:49,311 uh , it could be an important part of 808 00:32:49,311 --> 00:32:51,533 our ongoing deliberations . Thank you , 809 00:32:51,533 --> 00:32:53,645 thank you , Madam Chair . Thank you , 810 00:32:53,645 --> 00:32:55,867 Senator King . Senator Rounds , you are 811 00:32:55,867 --> 00:32:58,033 recognized . Thank you , Madam Chair . 812 00:32:58,033 --> 00:32:59,978 First of all , General Whiting and 813 00:32:59,978 --> 00:33:02,200 General Cotton , I wanna thank you both 814 00:33:02,200 --> 00:33:04,422 for your service to our country and for 815 00:33:04,422 --> 00:33:04,209 the role that you play in in keeping 816 00:33:04,209 --> 00:33:07,000 our country safe . Uh , General Whiting , 817 00:33:07,010 --> 00:33:09,280 I'll begin with you and um I'm gonna 818 00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:11,224 have the same question for General 819 00:33:11,224 --> 00:33:14,050 Cotton as well , but how important is 820 00:33:14,050 --> 00:33:17,650 it that the uh the use of the 821 00:33:17,650 --> 00:33:20,010 electromagnetic spectrum in particular 822 00:33:20,010 --> 00:33:23,089 areas of the lower 3 gigahertz band and 823 00:33:23,089 --> 00:33:24,969 the 7 to 8 gigahertz band of the 824 00:33:24,969 --> 00:33:27,750 spectrum be maintained by the 825 00:33:27,750 --> 00:33:30,369 Department of Defense . I've asked this 826 00:33:30,369 --> 00:33:33,439 of over 24 separate uniformed officers 827 00:33:33,439 --> 00:33:35,328 over the last two years , and the 828 00:33:35,328 --> 00:33:37,890 answer has been consistent , but I 829 00:33:37,890 --> 00:33:39,834 wanted to hear it from both of you 830 00:33:39,834 --> 00:33:41,834 again today in terms of the need to 831 00:33:41,834 --> 00:33:44,057 have that access for the defense of our 832 00:33:44,057 --> 00:33:46,279 country . Would you , General Whiting , 833 00:33:46,279 --> 00:33:48,839 explain at least or confirm clearly . 834 00:33:49,290 --> 00:33:51,457 The need for the Department of Defense 835 00:33:51,457 --> 00:33:53,599 to maintain its ability to use that 836 00:33:53,599 --> 00:33:55,719 unimpeded in that particular range of 837 00:33:55,719 --> 00:33:57,941 the spectrum , please , Senator , thank 838 00:33:57,941 --> 00:34:00,640 you for the question . I totally agree 839 00:34:00,640 --> 00:34:02,862 that those two bands are very important 840 00:34:02,862 --> 00:34:05,029 to our mission . In fact , vital . The 841 00:34:05,029 --> 00:34:07,196 lower three of that 3 gigahertz region 842 00:34:07,196 --> 00:34:09,196 is an area where we have radars and 843 00:34:09,196 --> 00:34:11,529 sensors which allow us . To detect , uh , 844 00:34:11,529 --> 00:34:14,175 track and engage targets through all 845 00:34:14,175 --> 00:34:16,064 weather , and we have a number of 846 00:34:16,064 --> 00:34:18,286 capabilities there like the , the Spy 1 847 00:34:18,286 --> 00:34:20,342 and Spy 6 radars which are on , uh , 848 00:34:20,342 --> 00:34:22,508 navy ships that , uh , can support our 849 00:34:22,508 --> 00:34:24,731 mission , uh , the long range detection 850 00:34:24,731 --> 00:34:26,953 radar in Alaska , which is critical for 851 00:34:26,953 --> 00:34:29,064 missile defense , the space fence and 852 00:34:29,064 --> 00:34:31,064 the future , uh , deep space , um , 853 00:34:31,064 --> 00:34:33,286 advance . Radar concept and then in the 854 00:34:33,286 --> 00:34:35,397 higher bands that you discussed the 7 855 00:34:35,397 --> 00:34:37,619 and 8 gigahertz , that's vital for SATO 856 00:34:37,619 --> 00:34:39,675 and special missions that we execute 857 00:34:39,675 --> 00:34:42,592 there and we could not do our global 858 00:34:42,592 --> 00:34:44,481 wide band satellite communication 859 00:34:44,481 --> 00:34:47,271 mission without that without that 860 00:34:47,271 --> 00:34:49,327 spectrum , sir . Thank you , General 861 00:34:49,327 --> 00:34:51,104 Whiting . General Cotton , same 862 00:34:51,104 --> 00:34:53,300 questions . Senator , I , I , I would 863 00:34:53,300 --> 00:34:55,620 echo , um exactly what my , my , my 864 00:34:55,620 --> 00:34:57,820 dear friend said in regards to um the 865 00:34:57,820 --> 00:35:01,659 lower bands , um . If we lose the 866 00:35:01,659 --> 00:35:04,629 ability for early detection that takes 867 00:35:04,629 --> 00:35:07,290 away decision space for for decision 868 00:35:07,290 --> 00:35:10,280 leaders um and decision makers um in 869 00:35:10,280 --> 00:35:13,610 regards to um being able to uh execute 870 00:35:13,610 --> 00:35:16,020 operational plans , um , so when we 871 00:35:16,020 --> 00:35:18,419 talk about what it affects in regards 872 00:35:18,419 --> 00:35:20,709 to ISR it's gonna be incredibly 873 00:35:20,709 --> 00:35:23,350 important . In the higher bands , um , 874 00:35:23,439 --> 00:35:25,879 you know , part of my UCP , um , is 875 00:35:25,879 --> 00:35:28,157 global reach through global , you know , 876 00:35:28,157 --> 00:35:30,379 through global strike , um , the bomber 877 00:35:30,379 --> 00:35:32,760 force , um , as an example , um , has 878 00:35:32,760 --> 00:35:35,100 the , the ability to , to traverse all 879 00:35:35,100 --> 00:35:37,360 over the world . SATCOM communications 880 00:35:37,360 --> 00:35:39,699 are gonna be vital , um , for those , 881 00:35:39,719 --> 00:35:41,830 those weapon systems today and in the 882 00:35:41,830 --> 00:35:44,199 future . Thank you , General . Also , 883 00:35:44,320 --> 00:35:46,487 General Cotton , um , you've mentioned 884 00:35:46,487 --> 00:35:48,653 it a little bit already , but with the 885 00:35:48,653 --> 00:35:50,931 B-21 , uh , there's a discussion about . 886 00:35:50,931 --> 00:35:53,429 You know , we're acquiring 100 of them 887 00:35:53,429 --> 00:35:55,485 currently . Uh , the number has been 888 00:35:55,485 --> 00:35:57,651 debated . Should it be 145 ? Should it 889 00:35:57,651 --> 00:35:59,262 be more than that ? And I've 890 00:35:59,262 --> 00:36:01,485 appreciated your indication that you've 891 00:36:01,485 --> 00:36:03,651 come around to approximately 145 . Can 892 00:36:03,651 --> 00:36:05,762 we talk a little bit about , I mean , 893 00:36:05,762 --> 00:36:07,818 this is the , this is the next gen . 894 00:36:07,818 --> 00:36:09,929 This is the 6th generation aircraft , 895 00:36:09,929 --> 00:36:11,985 this platform that's there . Can you 896 00:36:11,985 --> 00:36:13,707 talk a little bit in this open 897 00:36:13,707 --> 00:36:15,929 discussion , but . I think the American 898 00:36:15,929 --> 00:36:18,151 public need to understand just what a a 899 00:36:18,151 --> 00:36:20,270 a platform this is and what it is 900 00:36:20,270 --> 00:36:22,669 capable of doing and once again in this 901 00:36:22,669 --> 00:36:25,370 unclassified environment . Yeah , thank 902 00:36:25,370 --> 00:36:27,537 you for that , uh , Senator . You know 903 00:36:27,537 --> 00:36:29,703 when we , when we talk about stealth , 904 00:36:29,703 --> 00:36:31,426 um , there's actually only two 905 00:36:31,426 --> 00:36:33,648 platforms on the face of the earth that 906 00:36:33,648 --> 00:36:35,969 is that has all stealth capability and 907 00:36:35,969 --> 00:36:38,929 that is the current B2 spirit and , and 908 00:36:38,929 --> 00:36:41,040 it's next generation of replacement , 909 00:36:41,040 --> 00:36:44,370 the B-21 . There is no other all 910 00:36:44,370 --> 00:36:46,770 aspects stealth aircraft on the face of 911 00:36:46,770 --> 00:36:48,949 the planet . Uh , the B-2 is the only 912 00:36:48,949 --> 00:36:51,659 one , and the B-21 , um , just will 913 00:36:51,659 --> 00:36:54,030 dwarf , um , its capabilities with 914 00:36:54,030 --> 00:36:56,419 advanced technologies that it has . Um , 915 00:36:56,469 --> 00:36:58,830 it will be the predominant bomber for 916 00:36:58,830 --> 00:37:00,774 the United States Air Force moving 917 00:37:00,774 --> 00:37:03,719 forward as we move to a two bomber 918 00:37:03,719 --> 00:37:06,189 fleet , um , which will only be the 919 00:37:06,189 --> 00:37:09,760 B-21 and the , you know , the B-52 and 920 00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:12,149 it's the modified version of that , the 921 00:37:12,149 --> 00:37:14,879 B-52J . Um , so it's incredibly 922 00:37:14,879 --> 00:37:17,101 important , um , it's incredibly lethal 923 00:37:17,101 --> 00:37:19,435 with a stand in and standout capability , 924 00:37:19,929 --> 00:37:21,919 um , so that's why I'm , I'm a big 925 00:37:21,919 --> 00:37:24,790 proponent , um , on constant production , 926 00:37:25,080 --> 00:37:27,870 um , that's , that's far exceed 100 to 927 00:37:27,879 --> 00:37:30,560 to the 145 number to get us about 220 928 00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:32,727 with those two platforms . I , I noted 929 00:37:32,727 --> 00:37:34,959 that you've had a , a view that 930 00:37:34,959 --> 00:37:37,239 indicated the need to accelerate the 931 00:37:37,239 --> 00:37:39,760 B-21 production . Can you explain just 932 00:37:39,760 --> 00:37:41,649 a little bit about why we need to 933 00:37:41,649 --> 00:37:45,070 accelerate that production ? Sir , as 934 00:37:45,070 --> 00:37:48,260 we start to see the legacy systems , um , 935 00:37:48,590 --> 00:37:50,646 start to divest , uh , that the that 936 00:37:50,646 --> 00:37:52,868 the fleet has , uh , with the , the Air 937 00:37:52,868 --> 00:37:55,034 Force fleet , the B-1s and the B-2s in 938 00:37:55,034 --> 00:37:57,034 particular , um , I wanna make sure 939 00:37:57,034 --> 00:37:59,300 that we don't see a , a large bathtub , 940 00:37:59,629 --> 00:38:02,379 um , and the ability of operational , 941 00:38:02,510 --> 00:38:04,750 uh , platforms that are available to be 942 00:38:04,750 --> 00:38:08,070 used . We've worn our current weapons 943 00:38:08,070 --> 00:38:10,820 platforms out . We do . Thank you , 944 00:38:11,149 --> 00:38:13,610 thank you , Madam Chair . Thank you , 945 00:38:13,629 --> 00:38:15,851 Senator Rounds . Senator Reed , you are 946 00:38:15,851 --> 00:38:18,185 recognized . Thank you , Madam Chairman . 947 00:38:18,185 --> 00:38:20,407 Uh , General Carton , as I indicated in 948 00:38:20,407 --> 00:38:22,573 my opening remarks , there is an issue 949 00:38:22,573 --> 00:38:24,629 regarding the separation of the dual 950 00:38:24,629 --> 00:38:26,949 hatting of the US European commander 951 00:38:26,949 --> 00:38:29,669 and secure . Uh , what's your military 952 00:38:29,669 --> 00:38:31,836 opinion of the effects this could have 953 00:38:32,229 --> 00:38:34,550 possibly weakening the extended 954 00:38:34,550 --> 00:38:37,050 deterrence of your force , uh , 955 00:38:37,290 --> 00:38:39,512 affecting your force structure in other 956 00:38:39,512 --> 00:38:41,639 ways , and also , uh . Uh , the 957 00:38:41,639 --> 00:38:43,610 potential to accelerate nuclear 958 00:38:43,610 --> 00:38:45,879 proliferation , I would note that the 959 00:38:45,879 --> 00:38:47,990 front page of The Wall Street Journal 960 00:38:47,990 --> 00:38:51,620 has an article titled War Your Eyes Own 961 00:38:51,620 --> 00:38:54,120 Nuclear Force . Could you call me 962 00:38:54,120 --> 00:38:57,929 please ? Thank you ranking member Reed , 963 00:38:58,060 --> 00:39:00,639 um , I , I , I think . You know , the 964 00:39:00,639 --> 00:39:02,750 relationship that I have as far as my 965 00:39:02,750 --> 00:39:05,530 operational plans , um , with General 966 00:39:05,530 --> 00:39:08,949 Kavoli both as the UCO commander , um , 967 00:39:08,959 --> 00:39:11,320 and as SA your , uh , you know , to 968 00:39:11,320 --> 00:39:13,487 your point in your opening , um , is , 969 00:39:13,487 --> 00:39:15,709 is incredibly important , um , in the , 970 00:39:15,760 --> 00:39:18,199 in the execution of , uh , operational 971 00:39:18,199 --> 00:39:21,060 plans for me even in Stratcom . Um , as 972 00:39:21,060 --> 00:39:23,729 you know , I have a , uh , uh , a , a , 973 00:39:23,739 --> 00:39:25,979 a , a relationship with , with the 974 00:39:25,979 --> 00:39:28,419 United Kingdom . Um , I have a 975 00:39:28,419 --> 00:39:32,060 relationship with Sakur in the in the 976 00:39:32,060 --> 00:39:35,620 relationship of , of what the DCA 977 00:39:35,620 --> 00:39:37,699 aircraft bring to bear to be able to 978 00:39:37,699 --> 00:39:40,820 hold , um , the adversary at risk , and 979 00:39:40,820 --> 00:39:43,000 that is done through the lens of , you 980 00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:45,056 know , currently General Kavoli with 981 00:39:45,056 --> 00:39:47,340 his SA your hat . Um , that would 982 00:39:47,340 --> 00:39:49,580 change a little bit , um , if , if that 983 00:39:49,580 --> 00:39:51,899 commander was , was not a US commander 984 00:39:51,899 --> 00:39:54,121 in the relationship that I would have , 985 00:39:54,121 --> 00:39:56,232 um , now the relationship that I have 986 00:39:56,232 --> 00:39:57,899 with my allies and partners , 987 00:39:57,899 --> 00:39:59,788 especially my European allies and 988 00:39:59,788 --> 00:40:02,121 partners , um , is still steadfast , uh , 989 00:40:02,121 --> 00:40:04,343 whether it be with the United Kingdom , 990 00:40:04,343 --> 00:40:06,566 uh , whether it be with , with France , 991 00:40:06,566 --> 00:40:08,621 um , um , or , or whether it be with 992 00:40:08,621 --> 00:40:11,100 the the other NATO nations . Thank you , 993 00:40:11,179 --> 00:40:12,957 uh , General Cotton , one other 994 00:40:12,957 --> 00:40:15,739 question , uh , the Air Air Force has 995 00:40:15,739 --> 00:40:18,020 proposed a reorganization which I 996 00:40:18,020 --> 00:40:20,131 understand has been put on hold until 997 00:40:20,131 --> 00:40:22,131 the new Secretary is confirmed that 998 00:40:22,131 --> 00:40:24,076 would cede much of the operational 999 00:40:24,076 --> 00:40:26,242 control of heavy bombers away from Air 1000 00:40:26,242 --> 00:40:28,939 Force Global Strike Command to new 1001 00:40:28,939 --> 00:40:31,219 composite wings out of Air Combat 1002 00:40:31,219 --> 00:40:33,739 Command . In response to this Section 1003 00:40:33,739 --> 00:40:37,459 1631 of the 2025 NDAA stop 1004 00:40:37,459 --> 00:40:41,149 this until a report is submitted . Uh , 1005 00:40:41,209 --> 00:40:43,399 it's not yet been received . How 1006 00:40:43,399 --> 00:40:45,010 concerned are you about this 1007 00:40:45,010 --> 00:40:47,270 reorganization impacting your nuclear 1008 00:40:47,270 --> 00:40:48,437 deterrence mission ? 1009 00:40:51,310 --> 00:40:54,669 Senator Reed , today , um , I have 1010 00:40:54,669 --> 00:40:57,429 one belly button in the department of 1011 00:40:57,429 --> 00:41:00,110 the Air Force that presents two legs of 1012 00:41:00,110 --> 00:41:03,110 the triad and 68% of the NC-3 1013 00:41:03,110 --> 00:41:05,949 capability , uh , to me as my component 1014 00:41:06,350 --> 00:41:08,517 and that is the commander of Air Force 1015 00:41:08,517 --> 00:41:10,683 Global Strike Command . So , um , as a 1016 00:41:10,683 --> 00:41:12,628 4 star , uh , the commander of Air 1017 00:41:12,628 --> 00:41:14,406 Force Global Strike Command has 1018 00:41:14,406 --> 00:41:17,889 oversight and has the , the , the , um , 1019 00:41:17,899 --> 00:41:20,330 subject matter experts , um , in the , 1020 00:41:20,340 --> 00:41:22,530 in the nuclear deterrent field , um , 1021 00:41:22,550 --> 00:41:25,250 and he owns the bomber leg as well as 1022 00:41:25,250 --> 00:41:28,820 the ICBM leg , um . You know , all I 1023 00:41:28,820 --> 00:41:30,931 ask the United States Air Force is to 1024 00:41:30,931 --> 00:41:32,653 ensure that when I have forced 1025 00:41:32,653 --> 00:41:34,764 presentation that I can still look to 1026 00:41:34,764 --> 00:41:36,709 one person that can give me uh the 1027 00:41:36,709 --> 00:41:38,899 answers to readiness , give me the 1028 00:41:38,899 --> 00:41:40,899 answers to where we are acquisition 1029 00:41:40,899 --> 00:41:43,060 strategies , gives me the answers to 1030 00:41:43,060 --> 00:41:45,500 where we are on , you know manpower and 1031 00:41:45,500 --> 00:41:48,050 help that they might need . um , today , 1032 00:41:48,260 --> 00:41:50,689 um , I only have to look to Barksdale 1033 00:41:50,689 --> 00:41:52,411 Air Force Base and talk to the 1034 00:41:52,411 --> 00:41:54,578 commander of Global strike to get that 1035 00:41:54,578 --> 00:41:56,467 answer . Thank you , uh , General 1036 00:41:56,467 --> 00:41:58,745 Whiting , um , are you concerned about , 1037 00:41:58,745 --> 00:42:01,129 uh , becoming overly reliant upon 1038 00:42:01,129 --> 00:42:03,185 commercial providers for too many of 1039 00:42:03,185 --> 00:42:05,370 the department's missions into space ? 1040 00:42:05,909 --> 00:42:08,169 Uh , do we draw a line ? do we ensure 1041 00:42:08,169 --> 00:42:10,520 that there's a , a competitive 1042 00:42:10,520 --> 00:42:14,090 situation ? Um , Senator Reed , 1043 00:42:14,169 --> 00:42:16,449 um , I think the , uh , principle we 1044 00:42:16,449 --> 00:42:18,449 need to apply is balance , uh , for 1045 00:42:18,449 --> 00:42:20,171 those things that we can go to 1046 00:42:20,171 --> 00:42:22,171 commercial industry for , we should 1047 00:42:22,171 --> 00:42:23,838 absolutely leverage that . US 1048 00:42:23,838 --> 00:42:26,005 commercial space industry is a massive 1049 00:42:26,005 --> 00:42:28,227 advantage for this nation , and it's an 1050 00:42:28,227 --> 00:42:27,889 advantage that's widened over the last 1051 00:42:27,889 --> 00:42:29,778 several years , and I think we'll 1052 00:42:29,778 --> 00:42:31,667 continue to widen . But there are 1053 00:42:31,667 --> 00:42:33,722 certain missions where we absolutely 1054 00:42:33,722 --> 00:42:36,000 need to design and build for ourselves , 1055 00:42:36,000 --> 00:42:38,333 um , our own capabilities , for example , 1056 00:42:38,333 --> 00:42:40,445 the space capabilities we provided uh 1057 00:42:40,445 --> 00:42:42,278 sport general cotton for nuclear 1058 00:42:42,278 --> 00:42:44,389 command and control for SATCOM , uh , 1059 00:42:44,389 --> 00:42:46,389 those are not capabilities that are 1060 00:42:46,389 --> 00:42:48,500 that are easily replicatable in the . 1061 00:42:48,500 --> 00:42:50,611 In the commercial market , so we need 1062 00:42:50,611 --> 00:42:52,500 to design those for purpose-built 1063 00:42:52,500 --> 00:42:54,500 reasons so we can assure to General 1064 00:42:54,500 --> 00:42:54,064 Cotton to the secretary to the 1065 00:42:54,064 --> 00:42:56,175 president that they can talk to their 1066 00:42:56,175 --> 00:42:58,175 nuclear forces when required . So I 1067 00:42:58,175 --> 00:43:00,397 think it's a matter of balance , and we 1068 00:43:00,397 --> 00:43:02,731 need to apply that lens to each mission , 1069 00:43:02,731 --> 00:43:02,554 sir . Thank you very much , gentlemen . 1070 00:43:02,665 --> 00:43:04,943 Thank you for your service . Thank you , 1071 00:43:04,943 --> 00:43:06,943 Madam Chairman . Thank you , Sunder 1072 00:43:06,943 --> 00:43:08,943 Reid . Sunder Tupperville , you are 1073 00:43:08,943 --> 00:43:11,949 recognized . Thank you , Madam Chair . 1074 00:43:12,320 --> 00:43:14,520 Uh , good morning , man . General 1075 00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:16,631 Cotton , thanks for your service . 39 1076 00:43:16,631 --> 00:43:18,853 years . I , I retired after 40 years of 1077 00:43:18,853 --> 00:43:20,853 coaching after the first week I was 1078 00:43:20,853 --> 00:43:22,909 sitting around the house reading the 1079 00:43:22,909 --> 00:43:24,909 paper , drinking coffee and my wife 1080 00:43:24,909 --> 00:43:24,639 said , You ain't been here in 40 years 1081 00:43:24,639 --> 00:43:27,370 to get you a job . So here I am today , 1082 00:43:27,649 --> 00:43:29,649 uh , so don't think you're gonna go 1083 00:43:29,649 --> 00:43:31,816 home and fish and play golf , uh , but 1084 00:43:31,816 --> 00:43:33,982 thank you for your service , um . Uh , 1085 00:43:33,982 --> 00:43:36,205 General , in 2024 , the Navy eliminated 1086 00:43:36,205 --> 00:43:39,239 the lead Columbia cast submarine . Uh , 1087 00:43:39,290 --> 00:43:41,512 said it couldn't be delivered for 12 to 1088 00:43:41,512 --> 00:43:44,570 16 months late . Uh , GOA also reported 1089 00:43:44,570 --> 00:43:46,409 that late delivery of the lead 1090 00:43:46,409 --> 00:43:48,409 submarine could jeopardize its plan 1091 00:43:48,409 --> 00:43:50,576 availability for operation in 2030 and 1092 00:43:50,576 --> 00:43:52,687 delays the class could impact planned 1093 00:43:52,687 --> 00:43:54,909 transition from Ohio class submarines . 1094 00:43:54,909 --> 00:43:56,965 If Columbia class submarines are not 1095 00:43:56,965 --> 00:43:59,076 available , general , uh , what plans 1096 00:43:59,076 --> 00:44:01,298 have we taken , uh , you know , in that 1097 00:44:01,298 --> 00:44:03,550 regard to fill the gap . Yeah , thank 1098 00:44:03,550 --> 00:44:05,606 you for that question , uh , Senator 1099 00:44:05,606 --> 00:44:07,717 Tuberville , and you're right , right 1100 00:44:07,717 --> 00:44:09,939 now we're anticipating a 12 to 16 month 1101 00:44:09,939 --> 00:44:11,772 delay . Um , for , for the first 1102 00:44:11,772 --> 00:44:13,883 Columbia class , uh , what's gonna be 1103 00:44:13,883 --> 00:44:16,050 incredibly important , and , and I say 1104 00:44:16,050 --> 00:44:18,272 this constantly , is how do we continue 1105 00:44:18,272 --> 00:44:20,439 to fortify our legacy systems until we 1106 00:44:20,439 --> 00:44:22,439 do that ? So the what what what the 1107 00:44:22,439 --> 00:44:24,959 Navy is doing is a project called PIRA , 1108 00:44:25,090 --> 00:44:27,389 and that's the pre-inactivation 1109 00:44:27,389 --> 00:44:29,689 restricted availabilities . That's what 1110 00:44:29,689 --> 00:44:32,050 that that acronym stands for in which 1111 00:44:32,050 --> 00:44:35,790 they will look at up to . Uh , 5 boats , 1112 00:44:36,080 --> 00:44:38,024 um , and figure out which of the 5 1113 00:44:38,024 --> 00:44:39,969 boats , uh , they might be able to 1114 00:44:39,969 --> 00:44:42,409 modernize or do some , um , extended 1115 00:44:42,409 --> 00:44:45,489 life work to , um , to make it so we 1116 00:44:45,489 --> 00:44:48,080 don't lose anything from our legacy 1117 00:44:48,080 --> 00:44:50,879 systems , uh , to counter the delay , 1118 00:44:51,129 --> 00:44:53,351 um , and create a bathtub , um , in our 1119 00:44:53,351 --> 00:44:55,462 capabilities on the submarine force . 1120 00:44:55,462 --> 00:44:57,685 What's the cost that cost has got to be 1121 00:44:57,685 --> 00:44:59,851 astronomical though , right ? If we're 1122 00:44:59,851 --> 00:45:01,962 running late and we have to fill in a 1123 00:45:01,962 --> 00:45:04,129 gap with that , I mean . And we looked 1124 00:45:04,129 --> 00:45:06,462 at that , do we have the funding ? Well , 1125 00:45:06,462 --> 00:45:08,518 I , I , I , you know , I would , you 1126 00:45:08,518 --> 00:45:10,573 know , uh , I can . I don't have the 1127 00:45:10,573 --> 00:45:12,629 numbers before me in regards of what 1128 00:45:12,629 --> 00:45:14,740 the Navy is doing in regard uh um for 1129 00:45:14,740 --> 00:45:16,907 the cost of of power I can get that to 1130 00:45:16,907 --> 00:45:19,073 you um we can probably talk about that 1131 00:45:19,073 --> 00:45:21,407 and I'll have it by closed session , um , 1132 00:45:21,407 --> 00:45:23,462 but , uh , but I think , um . Bottom 1133 00:45:23,462 --> 00:45:27,159 line in that regard , um , we need to 1134 00:45:27,159 --> 00:45:29,949 ensure that we keep that capability , 1135 00:45:30,199 --> 00:45:32,421 um , alive and well , right ? I need to 1136 00:45:32,421 --> 00:45:34,310 make sure that the tubes that are 1137 00:45:34,310 --> 00:45:36,959 available on the SSBNs remain the tubes 1138 00:45:36,959 --> 00:45:39,199 that are available on SSBNs even if 1139 00:45:39,199 --> 00:45:41,421 there's a slip to the new system that's 1140 00:45:41,421 --> 00:45:43,643 supposed to replace it so I'm trying to 1141 00:45:43,643 --> 00:45:45,649 make it so we prevent . Um , a 1142 00:45:45,649 --> 00:45:48,050 catastrophic failure in regards of 1143 00:45:48,050 --> 00:45:50,969 creating a bathtub in all three legs of 1144 00:45:50,969 --> 00:45:53,302 the triad to ensure that doesn't happen . 1145 00:45:53,320 --> 00:45:55,431 Thank you . And again , thank you for 1146 00:45:55,431 --> 00:45:57,810 your service , uh , General Whiting . 1147 00:45:58,669 --> 00:46:01,379 Uh , US Space Command's role in missile 1148 00:46:01,379 --> 00:46:03,212 defense planning and operational 1149 00:46:03,212 --> 00:46:05,350 support for Guam , uh . 1150 00:46:07,080 --> 00:46:09,469 How critical is that ? And , uh , 1151 00:46:09,959 --> 00:46:12,181 obviously you've been given that task , 1152 00:46:12,239 --> 00:46:15,610 and where do we stand on that ? Senator 1153 00:46:15,610 --> 00:46:18,300 Guam is a vital location for um many of 1154 00:46:18,300 --> 00:46:20,522 our national defense needs including uh 1155 00:46:20,522 --> 00:46:22,633 for space and , and through our joint 1156 00:46:22,633 --> 00:46:24,467 functional component command for 1157 00:46:24,467 --> 00:46:26,411 integrated missile defense , we do 1158 00:46:26,411 --> 00:46:28,522 provide that planning and operational 1159 00:46:28,522 --> 00:46:30,800 support that that you highlight and uh . 1160 00:46:30,800 --> 00:46:32,911 We are regularly working with uh Indo 1161 00:46:32,911 --> 00:46:35,022 Paycom as well as the missile defense 1162 00:46:35,022 --> 00:46:37,189 agency , the army , and the navy to uh 1163 00:46:37,189 --> 00:46:39,915 to uh develop that architecture , uh , 1164 00:46:39,925 --> 00:46:42,485 that is being delivered to defend Guam 1165 00:46:42,485 --> 00:46:44,763 against the missile threats we now see , 1166 00:46:44,763 --> 00:46:46,707 uh , primarily from China . Yeah , 1167 00:46:46,707 --> 00:46:48,818 thank you . We're doing a lot of work 1168 00:46:48,818 --> 00:46:50,874 in Guam , obviously AI system , uh , 1169 00:46:50,874 --> 00:46:52,929 being put on the island , it's first 1170 00:46:52,929 --> 00:46:52,645 line of defense . Let me ask you too 1171 00:46:52,645 --> 00:46:55,274 about the Golden Dome president gave us , 1172 00:46:55,445 --> 00:46:58,245 uh , uh , obviously that . 1173 00:46:59,020 --> 00:47:01,242 Referendum that he wants to protect our 1174 00:47:01,242 --> 00:47:03,464 country with some kind of golden dome . 1175 00:47:03,464 --> 00:47:05,687 Do you have a certain group , uh , that 1176 00:47:05,687 --> 00:47:07,909 works with that uh within Space Command 1177 00:47:07,909 --> 00:47:10,076 or is the entire Space Command working 1178 00:47:10,076 --> 00:47:12,298 on this together ? How does that work ? 1179 00:47:12,879 --> 00:47:14,935 Sir , it's a whole of command effort 1180 00:47:14,935 --> 00:47:16,935 supporting a whole of Department of 1181 00:47:16,935 --> 00:47:19,101 Defense effort , um , and so certainly 1182 00:47:19,101 --> 00:47:20,990 within my command that uh uh that 1183 00:47:20,990 --> 00:47:23,101 subordinate command , the , the Joint 1184 00:47:23,101 --> 00:47:24,935 Functional Component Command for 1185 00:47:24,935 --> 00:47:24,280 integrated Missile Defense has a 1186 00:47:24,280 --> 00:47:27,040 leading role as well as my J8 uh 1187 00:47:27,040 --> 00:47:29,229 resourcing and requirements division . 1188 00:47:29,479 --> 00:47:31,701 In fact , uh , that J-8 division , uh , 1189 00:47:31,701 --> 00:47:33,812 we have , uh , we have partnered with 1190 00:47:33,812 --> 00:47:36,185 North . and General Gio there to 1191 00:47:36,185 --> 00:47:38,665 co-write requirements document for the 1192 00:47:38,665 --> 00:47:41,225 Golden Dome for America , and we will 1193 00:47:41,225 --> 00:47:43,281 be delivering that over the next few 1194 00:47:43,281 --> 00:47:45,392 months to the Department of Defense . 1195 00:47:45,392 --> 00:47:47,558 Thank you . There's recently President 1196 00:47:47,558 --> 00:47:47,145 Trump put me on the board of visitors 1197 00:47:47,145 --> 00:47:49,504 for , uh , Air Force Academy . I look 1198 00:47:49,504 --> 00:47:51,726 forward to coming out and visiting with 1199 00:47:51,726 --> 00:47:53,893 y'all and possibly seeing some of your 1200 00:47:53,893 --> 00:47:55,948 work . So thank both of you for your 1201 00:47:55,948 --> 00:47:58,060 service . Thank you , General . Thank 1202 00:47:58,060 --> 00:48:00,282 you , Madam Chair . Thank you , Senator 1203 00:48:00,282 --> 00:48:02,393 Tuperville . Senator Cotton , you are 1204 00:48:02,393 --> 00:48:02,100 recognized . General Whiting . I want 1205 00:48:02,100 --> 00:48:04,100 to return to Senator Reid's line of 1206 00:48:04,100 --> 00:48:06,044 questioning about commercial space 1207 00:48:06,044 --> 00:48:08,689 launch and any kind of risk it might 1208 00:48:08,689 --> 00:48:11,179 pose us . You called the commercial 1209 00:48:11,179 --> 00:48:13,100 space industry a quote massive 1210 00:48:13,100 --> 00:48:15,219 advantage . Um , I , I assume you're 1211 00:48:15,219 --> 00:48:17,441 saying it's a massive advantage against 1212 00:48:17,441 --> 00:48:19,608 our chief adversaries in this domain , 1213 00:48:19,608 --> 00:48:21,608 China and Russia . That's correct , 1214 00:48:21,608 --> 00:48:23,663 Senator . Can you give us a sense of 1215 00:48:23,663 --> 00:48:25,886 scale of how big the advan well , first 1216 00:48:25,886 --> 00:48:28,108 off , commercial space launch , to , to 1217 00:48:28,108 --> 00:48:30,219 be precise here , we're talking about 1218 00:48:30,219 --> 00:48:30,129 ULA , the United Launch Alliance , and 1219 00:48:30,129 --> 00:48:32,810 SpaceX , correct ? Uh , that , that has 1220 00:48:32,810 --> 00:48:34,977 been the providers and now Blue Origin 1221 00:48:34,977 --> 00:48:37,032 has recently demonstrated New Glen , 1222 00:48:37,032 --> 00:48:39,909 yes sir , um . So can you give us a 1223 00:48:39,909 --> 00:48:42,020 sense of scale of just how massive an 1224 00:48:42,020 --> 00:48:44,110 advantage we have over say China 1225 00:48:44,110 --> 00:48:47,899 because of ULA and SpaceX ? Yes , 1226 00:48:47,939 --> 00:48:49,995 Senator , and while I don't have the 1227 00:48:49,995 --> 00:48:52,379 numbers , I can qualitatively describe 1228 00:48:52,379 --> 00:48:54,601 those . If you go back probably 5 to 10 1229 00:48:54,601 --> 00:48:56,768 years , the number of launches we were 1230 00:48:56,768 --> 00:48:58,990 executing compared to those in China or 1231 00:48:58,990 --> 00:49:01,101 Russia looked very similar , but over 1232 00:49:01,101 --> 00:49:03,212 time , the US has massively increased 1233 00:49:03,212 --> 00:49:05,101 the number of launches , and that 1234 00:49:05,101 --> 00:49:07,323 equates to what we call mass to orbit . 1235 00:49:07,323 --> 00:49:09,490 So that means we're able . To put more 1236 00:49:09,490 --> 00:49:11,268 satellites on orbit whether for 1237 00:49:11,268 --> 00:49:13,490 commercial or government purposes , and 1238 00:49:13,490 --> 00:49:15,601 those are getting cheaper and cheaper 1239 00:49:15,601 --> 00:49:17,657 per pound , which also gives us more 1240 00:49:17,657 --> 00:49:19,657 opportunities to leverage space for 1241 00:49:19,657 --> 00:49:21,823 various missions . So you said 5 to 10 1242 00:49:21,823 --> 00:49:23,879 years ago we had roughly equal space 1243 00:49:23,879 --> 00:49:25,990 launch capacity as China and Russia , 1244 00:49:25,990 --> 00:49:28,046 but now we've substantially exceeded 1245 00:49:28,046 --> 00:49:27,709 them , right ? Correct . Yes , Senator . 1246 00:49:28,330 --> 00:49:30,330 And what's been the driver over the 1247 00:49:30,330 --> 00:49:32,497 last 5 to 10 years of that substantial 1248 00:49:32,497 --> 00:49:34,663 increase ? Is it ULA or is it SpaceX ? 1249 00:49:34,663 --> 00:49:36,774 Um , predominantly SpaceX , yes sir . 1250 00:49:36,774 --> 00:49:38,886 So if it wasn't for SpaceX , we might 1251 00:49:38,886 --> 00:49:41,052 be in this position where we still are 1252 00:49:41,052 --> 00:49:43,219 at near equivalent to China and Russia 1253 00:49:43,219 --> 00:49:45,386 and space launch . Uh , they certainly 1254 00:49:45,386 --> 00:49:47,441 have been innovative and and rapidly 1255 00:49:47,441 --> 00:49:47,370 changed that market . Yes sir , thank 1256 00:49:47,370 --> 00:49:50,939 you , General Cotton . You've testified 1257 00:49:50,939 --> 00:49:53,272 in the past , as have your predecessors , 1258 00:49:53,272 --> 00:49:55,580 that China has undertaken a 1259 00:49:55,580 --> 00:49:57,729 breathtaking buildup of its nuclear 1260 00:49:57,729 --> 00:49:59,729 arsenal . It used to have what it's 1261 00:49:59,729 --> 00:50:01,562 called minimal deterrence , um , 1262 00:50:01,590 --> 00:50:03,701 something , uh , uh , nuclear arsenal 1263 00:50:03,701 --> 00:50:05,812 just sufficient for a second strike , 1264 00:50:05,812 --> 00:50:07,923 obviously now it's moving on to first 1265 00:50:07,923 --> 00:50:09,868 strike capabilities , whatever its 1266 00:50:09,868 --> 00:50:09,500 rhetoric is . I think the department . 1267 00:50:10,229 --> 00:50:12,285 Uh , estimates that it's doubled its 1268 00:50:12,285 --> 00:50:14,396 nuclear arsenal since Xi Jinping took 1269 00:50:14,396 --> 00:50:16,949 power . It projects to double again by 1270 00:50:16,949 --> 00:50:19,310 the end of this decade and maybe even 1271 00:50:19,310 --> 00:50:21,477 double again by the middle of the next 1272 00:50:21,477 --> 00:50:24,030 decade . Could , could you explain the 1273 00:50:24,030 --> 00:50:26,086 kind of advantage this might provide 1274 00:50:26,086 --> 00:50:28,197 China not just in the nuclear balance 1275 00:50:28,197 --> 00:50:30,750 of power but also in a conventional 1276 00:50:30,750 --> 00:50:33,020 conflict , say if China decided to go 1277 00:50:33,020 --> 00:50:35,709 for the jugular in Taiwan . Thank you , 1278 00:50:35,729 --> 00:50:37,951 Senator Cotton , nice seeing you . Um , 1279 00:50:38,129 --> 00:50:40,600 I , I think . You know , when we put in 1280 00:50:40,600 --> 00:50:42,711 perspective where we were just , uh , 1281 00:50:42,739 --> 00:50:45,120 you know , left of probably 2018 , um , 1282 00:50:45,129 --> 00:50:47,340 and we saw it as a uh uh a nascent 1283 00:50:47,340 --> 00:50:49,118 threat and the breakout that my 1284 00:50:49,118 --> 00:50:51,560 predecessor uh announced , um , you , 1285 00:50:51,979 --> 00:50:54,146 you're , you're right , what it does , 1286 00:50:54,146 --> 00:50:56,689 um , in changing the calculus in our 1287 00:50:56,689 --> 00:50:59,659 strategy is now we're , we're we must 1288 00:50:59,659 --> 00:51:02,370 be prepared for two nuclear piers , um , 1289 00:51:02,399 --> 00:51:04,939 instead of one , I would , I would 1290 00:51:04,939 --> 00:51:08,379 garner to say Senator , um . Included 1291 00:51:08,379 --> 00:51:11,139 in that is two nuclear peers that have 1292 00:51:11,139 --> 00:51:13,250 a transactional relationship that has 1293 00:51:13,250 --> 00:51:16,179 blossomed um over the last couple of 1294 00:51:16,179 --> 00:51:19,090 years as well . So , so as we look at 1295 00:51:19,090 --> 00:51:21,201 the capabilities that we're seeing on 1296 00:51:21,201 --> 00:51:23,146 all three legs , you're absolutely 1297 00:51:23,146 --> 00:51:26,219 right , you know , having an H6N with 1298 00:51:26,219 --> 00:51:28,620 long range strike capability is not a 1299 00:51:28,620 --> 00:51:32,070 regional hegemon weapon system . Um , 1300 00:51:32,239 --> 00:51:35,580 you know , having land-based ICBMs , um , 1301 00:51:35,620 --> 00:51:38,409 is not a is not a regional hegemon , uh , 1302 00:51:38,419 --> 00:51:41,479 weapon system , um , um , building out 1303 00:51:41,479 --> 00:51:43,439 their submarine forces and having 1304 00:51:43,439 --> 00:51:45,495 hypersonic weapons that are dual use 1305 00:51:45,495 --> 00:51:48,280 capable and fobbed , um , is not 1306 00:51:48,280 --> 00:51:50,840 necessarily seen as a regional hegemon 1307 00:51:50,840 --> 00:51:53,360 weapon system , uh , so it , it makes 1308 00:51:53,360 --> 00:51:55,439 us , uh , look at things a little 1309 00:51:55,439 --> 00:51:57,520 differently and , and our and our 1310 00:51:57,520 --> 00:51:59,790 strategy is changed to compensate for 1311 00:51:59,790 --> 00:52:03,669 that . Thank you , um , I'll close on a 1312 00:52:03,669 --> 00:52:05,659 couple points I made them before . 1313 00:52:07,159 --> 00:52:09,570 You've agreed with him before . I'd 1314 00:52:09,570 --> 00:52:11,626 love to hear your agreement one more 1315 00:52:11,626 --> 00:52:13,459 time . Some people say about our 1316 00:52:13,459 --> 00:52:15,570 nuclear weapons that we spend way too 1317 00:52:15,570 --> 00:52:17,903 much money on weapons we never use . Um , 1318 00:52:17,903 --> 00:52:19,848 I respond to them that we actually 1319 00:52:19,848 --> 00:52:19,290 don't spend that much money on them . 1320 00:52:19,409 --> 00:52:21,076 We may be spending some money 1321 00:52:21,076 --> 00:52:23,131 modernizing them now compared to our 1322 00:52:23,131 --> 00:52:25,242 total defense expenditures , but more 1323 00:52:25,242 --> 00:52:27,409 importantly , we have used our nuclear 1324 00:52:27,409 --> 00:52:30,649 weapons every single day going back 80 1325 00:52:30,649 --> 00:52:33,169 years this August to prevent the kind 1326 00:52:33,169 --> 00:52:37,120 of war that the world saw twice in 1327 00:52:37,729 --> 00:52:39,729 20 years . Do you agree with that , 1328 00:52:39,729 --> 00:52:41,729 General Cotton ? I absolutely agree 1329 00:52:41,729 --> 00:52:43,951 with that , Senator . Thank you . I , I 1330 00:52:43,951 --> 00:52:46,118 wanna finally add my note of agreement 1331 00:52:46,219 --> 00:52:49,219 with our fantastic chairwoman Senator 1332 00:52:49,219 --> 00:52:51,108 Fisher on what she said about the 1333 00:52:51,108 --> 00:52:53,330 nuclear arm sea launch cruise missile , 1334 00:52:53,330 --> 00:52:55,979 also known as Slick em in , um , the 1335 00:52:55,979 --> 00:52:58,580 program . Held on by a thread 1336 00:52:58,580 --> 00:53:00,747 throughout the Biden era , um , thanks 1337 00:53:00,747 --> 00:53:02,858 to congressional support and I'm glad 1338 00:53:02,858 --> 00:53:04,969 that you acknowledge how important it 1339 00:53:04,969 --> 00:53:07,080 is and that if anything we need to do 1340 00:53:07,080 --> 00:53:09,247 everything possible to accelerate that 1341 00:53:09,247 --> 00:53:11,191 capability . Thank you gentlemen . 1342 00:53:11,719 --> 00:53:13,775 Thank you , Senator Cotton . Senator 1343 00:53:13,775 --> 00:53:16,052 Kelly , you are recognized . Thank you , 1344 00:53:16,052 --> 00:53:18,139 Madam Chair . Uh , General Cotton , 1345 00:53:18,260 --> 00:53:20,371 General Whiting , thank you for being 1346 00:53:20,371 --> 00:53:22,593 here . Wanna first touch on Golden Dome 1347 00:53:22,593 --> 00:53:24,704 and then I wanna save some time for , 1348 00:53:24,780 --> 00:53:27,600 uh , Slickam and . Um , 1349 00:53:28,100 --> 00:53:30,760 agree , uh , nuclear deterrence keep 1350 00:53:31,219 --> 00:53:34,530 keeps us safe . And General Cotton , 1351 00:53:34,540 --> 00:53:38,090 you mentioned um two nuclear piers . 1352 00:53:38,580 --> 00:53:41,870 One of my biggest concerns is the 1353 00:53:41,870 --> 00:53:45,419 3rd 1 , which is the DPRK . 1354 00:53:46,260 --> 00:53:49,750 And I think it's fair to say that most 1355 00:53:49,750 --> 00:53:53,199 of the time we with our nuclear peers 1356 00:53:53,199 --> 00:53:56,510 we're dealing with rational actors . Um , 1357 00:53:56,719 --> 00:53:59,600 we hope that's the case . That's the 1358 00:53:59,959 --> 00:54:02,629 thing that part of nuclear deterrence 1359 00:54:02,629 --> 00:54:05,500 that they will act rationally . Not so 1360 00:54:05,500 --> 00:54:07,949 sure that's the case with the DPRK . 1361 00:54:09,070 --> 00:54:11,600 And they are building more nuclear 1362 00:54:11,600 --> 00:54:14,879 weapons , uh , they're working on other 1363 00:54:14,879 --> 00:54:17,159 systems to deliver them and they can 1364 00:54:17,159 --> 00:54:20,239 now range into the United States . I 1365 00:54:20,239 --> 00:54:23,199 believe that's our view as a nation . 1366 00:54:23,320 --> 00:54:26,409 So can you talk a little bit about . Uh , 1367 00:54:26,530 --> 00:54:30,219 Golden Dome . And my concern with this 1368 00:54:30,219 --> 00:54:32,620 is it could potentially , even though I 1369 00:54:32,620 --> 00:54:36,459 am not against the idea of a system 1370 00:54:36,459 --> 00:54:38,403 that can protect the entire United 1371 00:54:38,403 --> 00:54:42,100 States from incoming ballistic missiles . 1372 00:54:42,889 --> 00:54:45,639 Nuclear armed At the same time this 1373 00:54:45,639 --> 00:54:48,510 could accelerate a A 1374 00:54:49,929 --> 00:54:52,290 growing number , our adversaries' 1375 00:54:52,290 --> 00:54:54,449 response to having a missile defense 1376 00:54:54,449 --> 00:54:56,560 system could be to build more nuclear 1377 00:54:56,560 --> 00:55:00,520 weapons . And If 1 or 2 get through , 1378 00:55:00,580 --> 00:55:03,060 that is too many . Right now we do have 1379 00:55:03,060 --> 00:55:07,040 a defensive system . Um , to protect 1380 00:55:07,040 --> 00:55:10,320 us from a rogue actor in launching one 1381 00:55:10,320 --> 00:55:13,320 ICBM , and my understanding is , and if 1382 00:55:13,320 --> 00:55:15,487 you could share a little bit , General 1383 00:55:15,487 --> 00:55:17,653 Cotton about how effective that system 1384 00:55:17,653 --> 00:55:19,653 is with the interceptors we have in 1385 00:55:19,653 --> 00:55:22,120 Alaska and in California , um , so 1386 00:55:22,600 --> 00:55:24,879 could you provide an estimate of how 1387 00:55:24,879 --> 00:55:28,760 much this would cost and what enhanced 1388 00:55:28,760 --> 00:55:30,982 capability we would get out of this and 1389 00:55:30,982 --> 00:55:33,350 do you feel we could build a system . 1390 00:55:33,959 --> 00:55:36,649 That is not penetrable . 1391 00:55:39,070 --> 00:55:41,237 Well thank you Senator Kelly . I don't 1392 00:55:41,237 --> 00:55:43,348 want to get out of my lane because uh 1393 00:55:43,348 --> 00:55:45,459 NorthCO , uh , General Gio is the one 1394 00:55:45,459 --> 00:55:47,514 that's uh undertaking that role . My 1395 00:55:47,514 --> 00:55:49,681 responsibility from Golden Dome , um , 1396 00:55:49,681 --> 00:55:52,014 is twofold in accordance to the EO , um , 1397 00:55:52,014 --> 00:55:54,014 and mine is to make sure that I can 1398 00:55:54,014 --> 00:55:56,181 assure that a second strike capability 1399 00:55:56,310 --> 00:55:58,469 for the United States remains and how 1400 00:55:58,469 --> 00:56:02,139 do we ensure that , um . Um , as far 1401 00:56:02,139 --> 00:56:05,510 as , uh , the reliability of , of the , 1402 00:56:05,520 --> 00:56:07,631 the ground-based interceptors piece , 1403 00:56:07,631 --> 00:56:09,687 uh , once again that I , I don't own 1404 00:56:09,687 --> 00:56:11,798 that platform . That platform belongs 1405 00:56:11,798 --> 00:56:13,853 to North Common . It's probably best 1406 00:56:13,853 --> 00:56:16,020 for , for General Gio to answer that . 1407 00:56:16,020 --> 00:56:18,187 I do believe and we heard my colleague 1408 00:56:18,187 --> 00:56:20,409 talk about the the the layered approach 1409 00:56:20,409 --> 00:56:22,298 um that is kind of the essence of 1410 00:56:22,298 --> 00:56:24,353 Golden Dome uh for America . I think 1411 00:56:24,353 --> 00:56:26,576 that's that's the answer and the key on 1412 00:56:26,576 --> 00:56:28,850 on on how um that system can be 1413 00:56:28,850 --> 00:56:31,000 deliverable , um , moving forward . 1414 00:56:32,379 --> 00:56:34,620 Alright and uh thank you thank you 1415 00:56:34,620 --> 00:56:36,939 general um I I do agree I think it's 1416 00:56:36,939 --> 00:56:39,050 something we need to look into and we 1417 00:56:39,050 --> 00:56:42,129 need to look at a cost uh benefit 1418 00:56:42,129 --> 00:56:45,300 analysis of this and also consider how 1419 00:56:45,939 --> 00:56:49,739 it would potentially change the nuclear 1420 00:56:49,739 --> 00:56:52,820 deterrence posture of not only us but 1421 00:56:52,820 --> 00:56:56,790 China and Russia . On , on Slick em and 1422 00:56:56,790 --> 00:56:58,879 I know it was brought up here also 1423 00:56:59,330 --> 00:57:02,810 general , um , if , if one of my 1424 00:57:02,810 --> 00:57:05,050 concerns here is one of the things that 1425 00:57:05,050 --> 00:57:07,209 makes makes us stand out is our 1426 00:57:07,209 --> 00:57:09,530 submarine force , especially the attack 1427 00:57:09,530 --> 00:57:13,010 submarines are incredibly effective to 1428 00:57:13,010 --> 00:57:16,939 integrate a tactical nuclear , um , 1429 00:57:17,209 --> 00:57:21,030 missile . Uh , into a Virginia class 1430 00:57:21,030 --> 00:57:24,080 sub would take , uh , modifications , 1431 00:57:24,250 --> 00:57:27,409 uh , um , that are significant , and 1432 00:57:27,409 --> 00:57:29,520 you'd have to put the security system 1433 00:57:29,520 --> 00:57:31,465 that we have in effect for nuclear 1434 00:57:31,465 --> 00:57:34,169 weapons and my . 1435 00:57:35,550 --> 00:57:38,939 Uh , Problem I think that I have with 1436 00:57:38,939 --> 00:57:42,580 this is in the western Pacific , um , 1437 00:57:42,939 --> 00:57:46,379 this is a capability . Our attack 1438 00:57:46,379 --> 00:57:49,169 submarine force is incredibly capable 1439 00:57:49,419 --> 00:57:51,363 and I think this would be somewhat 1440 00:57:51,363 --> 00:57:53,586 disruptive . I think that needs to be a 1441 00:57:53,586 --> 00:57:56,139 consideration . Uh , before we go down 1442 00:57:56,139 --> 00:57:58,860 the road of significant modifications 1443 00:57:58,860 --> 00:58:00,916 to these systems , if you could just 1444 00:58:00,916 --> 00:58:02,919 comment briefly on that . Well , 1445 00:58:02,959 --> 00:58:05,181 Senator , I think from my perspective a 1446 00:58:05,181 --> 00:58:07,348 lot of those are TTPs that the the the 1447 00:58:07,348 --> 00:58:09,610 Department of the Navy um had , and I 1448 00:58:09,610 --> 00:58:11,832 think they need to uh pull those out of 1449 00:58:11,832 --> 00:58:14,054 the um out of the cupboard and and look 1450 00:58:14,054 --> 00:58:16,221 to see what those uh TTPs were when we 1451 00:58:16,221 --> 00:58:19,250 had TLAM ends um . I , I don't know if 1452 00:58:19,250 --> 00:58:21,250 it'd be disruptive , especially now 1453 00:58:21,250 --> 00:58:23,028 that , uh , what we're seeing , 1454 00:58:23,028 --> 00:58:25,139 especially in the Indo Paycom Theater 1455 00:58:25,139 --> 00:58:27,139 in regards to , um , our allies and 1456 00:58:27,139 --> 00:58:29,361 partners , uh , uh , ability of letting 1457 00:58:29,361 --> 00:58:31,250 us , um , have a dual use nuclear 1458 00:58:31,250 --> 00:58:33,472 capable things arrive on their shores , 1459 00:58:33,472 --> 00:58:36,129 um , the fact that , um , you know , I 1460 00:58:36,129 --> 00:58:39,909 can now have B-52s fly into Japan . Uh , 1461 00:58:39,959 --> 00:58:42,199 where I , I didn't before , um , and , 1462 00:58:42,239 --> 00:58:44,072 and , and on the , on the Korean 1463 00:58:44,072 --> 00:58:46,017 Peninsula , I think there's , um , 1464 00:58:46,017 --> 00:58:48,128 there's work to be done , but I think 1465 00:58:48,128 --> 00:58:50,183 it can be accomplished . Thank you , 1466 00:58:50,183 --> 00:58:52,295 thank you , Madam Chair . Thank you , 1467 00:58:52,295 --> 00:58:54,517 Senator Kelly . Senator Banks , you are 1468 00:58:54,517 --> 00:58:55,517 recognized . 1469 00:59:00,850 --> 00:59:03,017 Thank you , Madam Chair , and uh thank 1470 00:59:03,017 --> 00:59:05,350 you to both of you for being here today . 1471 00:59:05,350 --> 00:59:07,350 Uh , General Cotton , thank you for 1472 00:59:07,350 --> 00:59:09,350 your service . Uh , you're a hero . 1473 00:59:09,350 --> 00:59:11,517 What you've done over the last 3 years 1474 00:59:11,517 --> 00:59:13,739 is remarkable and it's been an honor to 1475 00:59:13,739 --> 00:59:13,389 to work with you on the House Armed 1476 00:59:13,389 --> 00:59:15,699 Services Committee and now again . On 1477 00:59:15,699 --> 00:59:17,810 the Senate Armed Services Committee , 1478 00:59:17,810 --> 00:59:19,866 as we've talked about before , Slick 1479 00:59:19,866 --> 00:59:21,977 amen is meant to deter China would be 1480 00:59:21,977 --> 00:59:24,199 launched from attack submarines . Slick 1481 00:59:24,199 --> 00:59:25,921 amen is needed to help address 1482 00:59:25,921 --> 00:59:27,977 capability and escalation management 1483 00:59:27,977 --> 00:59:30,143 gaps stemming from the rapid growth of 1484 00:59:30,143 --> 00:59:31,977 China and Russia's theater range 1485 00:59:31,977 --> 00:59:33,921 nuclear systems . General , do you 1486 00:59:33,921 --> 00:59:36,330 agree with the 2018 nuclear posture 1487 00:59:36,330 --> 00:59:38,274 review that validated the need for 1488 00:59:38,274 --> 00:59:40,419 slick amends ? And if so , what does 1489 00:59:40,419 --> 00:59:43,060 this need , uh , what does this need to 1490 00:59:43,060 --> 00:59:46,290 still stand ? I do agree , uh , Senator , 1491 00:59:46,300 --> 00:59:48,969 and , and thank you for , for the , for 1492 00:59:48,969 --> 00:59:52,860 the comments that you made . What was 1493 00:59:52,860 --> 00:59:55,870 said in 2018 still holds true today . I 1494 00:59:55,870 --> 00:59:57,981 think even more so , um , it's what I 1495 00:59:57,981 --> 00:59:59,981 had , uh , um , when I talk about . 1496 01:00:00,419 --> 01:00:02,780 Being able to give a geographic 1497 01:00:02,780 --> 01:00:05,899 combatant commander the ability to also 1498 01:00:05,899 --> 01:00:08,199 hold an adversary in their region at 1499 01:00:08,199 --> 01:00:11,379 risk , um , you can now see that what 1500 01:00:11,379 --> 01:00:13,546 you're seeing in this weapon system is 1501 01:00:13,546 --> 01:00:16,459 more than just a strategic weapon it is 1502 01:00:16,459 --> 01:00:19,060 now , um , can be a regional weapon and 1503 01:00:19,060 --> 01:00:21,409 regional deterrence as well for for for 1504 01:00:21,409 --> 01:00:23,520 my fellow combat commanders that that 1505 01:00:23,520 --> 01:00:26,500 that hold the the the regions um of 1506 01:00:26,500 --> 01:00:28,699 responsibility . What and what do we 1507 01:00:28,699 --> 01:00:31,860 need to do to . The program , the 1508 01:00:31,860 --> 01:00:34,138 program of record has been established . 1509 01:00:34,260 --> 01:00:36,290 We just need to make sure we , uh , 1510 01:00:36,340 --> 01:00:38,780 continue to pump the well , uh , to 1511 01:00:38,780 --> 01:00:40,836 ensure that they move out and , um , 1512 01:00:40,836 --> 01:00:43,459 and as the chairwoman said , um , if we 1513 01:00:43,459 --> 01:00:45,699 can get things to the left , um , I 1514 01:00:45,699 --> 01:00:48,300 would gladly , um , accept , uh , being 1515 01:00:48,300 --> 01:00:50,411 able to get the , the articles , uh , 1516 01:00:50,411 --> 01:00:52,633 quicker than than later got it . Fiscal 1517 01:00:52,633 --> 01:00:54,959 year 2024 NDAA directed the Navy and 1518 01:00:54,959 --> 01:00:57,780 the NNSA to develop and deploy an 1519 01:00:57,780 --> 01:00:59,836 operational slicker in no later than 1520 01:00:59,836 --> 01:01:02,780 2034 . Do you believe that we should 1521 01:01:02,780 --> 01:01:04,947 still have slick them in no later than 1522 01:01:04,947 --> 01:01:07,409 202034 ? I would love to move that to 1523 01:01:07,409 --> 01:01:09,409 the left , senator . Got it , um . 1524 01:01:11,040 --> 01:01:12,929 General Whiting , the president's 1525 01:01:12,929 --> 01:01:15,151 executive order to establish the Golden 1526 01:01:15,151 --> 01:01:17,318 Dome for America stresses the need for 1527 01:01:17,318 --> 01:01:19,151 both weapons to shoot down enemy 1528 01:01:19,151 --> 01:01:21,207 missiles and the satellites to track 1529 01:01:21,207 --> 01:01:22,969 them . The EO called for the 1530 01:01:23,610 --> 01:01:26,629 acceleration of the deployment . Of the 1531 01:01:26,629 --> 01:01:28,518 hypersonic and ballistic tracking 1532 01:01:28,518 --> 01:01:30,790 sensor layer . If we're gonna have an 1533 01:01:30,790 --> 01:01:32,623 effective golden dome for the US 1534 01:01:32,623 --> 01:01:34,790 homeland , how important is it that we 1535 01:01:34,790 --> 01:01:36,679 expand our fleet of ballistic and 1536 01:01:36,679 --> 01:01:36,550 hypersonic missile tracking satellites 1537 01:01:36,550 --> 01:01:38,772 and space-based sensors ? Thank you for 1538 01:01:38,772 --> 01:01:40,994 the question , Senator . For the modern 1539 01:01:40,994 --> 01:01:43,217 threats that we need to track , we will 1540 01:01:43,217 --> 01:01:45,272 only be able to do that from space , 1541 01:01:45,272 --> 01:01:47,217 and we need to be able to maintain 1542 01:01:47,217 --> 01:01:49,217 custody of those threats , not only 1543 01:01:49,217 --> 01:01:49,129 when they're in the boost phase when 1544 01:01:49,129 --> 01:01:51,296 the rockets are burning very hot , and 1545 01:01:51,296 --> 01:01:53,296 we can track them with our infrared 1546 01:01:53,296 --> 01:01:55,518 satellites , but then also when they're 1547 01:01:55,518 --> 01:01:57,685 coasting so that we can again maintain 1548 01:01:57,685 --> 01:01:59,796 custody to engage at the various . So 1549 01:01:59,796 --> 01:02:01,907 it's absolutely vital , Senator . And 1550 01:02:01,907 --> 01:02:01,540 do you agree with President Trump that 1551 01:02:01,540 --> 01:02:04,100 we need to rapidly accelerate HBTSS so 1552 01:02:04,100 --> 01:02:06,219 that we can have the sensors in space 1553 01:02:06,219 --> 01:02:08,552 that we need to target incoming threats ? 1554 01:02:08,580 --> 01:02:10,802 I do , Senator . Those threats are real 1555 01:02:10,802 --> 01:02:12,913 today . Those more advanced threats , 1556 01:02:12,913 --> 01:02:15,024 and our current systems are optimized 1557 01:02:15,024 --> 01:02:17,302 against traditional ballistic missiles , 1558 01:02:17,302 --> 01:02:17,139 not against the variants that we're 1559 01:02:17,139 --> 01:02:19,139 seeing fielded today . And General 1560 01:02:19,139 --> 01:02:21,300 Cotton , China leads the world in 1561 01:02:21,300 --> 01:02:23,300 hypersonics and as hundreds of long 1562 01:02:23,300 --> 01:02:25,467 range long range hypersonic missiles . 1563 01:02:26,229 --> 01:02:28,451 As you know , China shocked the world 4 1564 01:02:28,451 --> 01:02:30,562 years ago when its hypersonic vehicle 1565 01:02:30,562 --> 01:02:32,896 orbited the entire Earth before landing . 1566 01:02:32,896 --> 01:02:34,618 The US has still not fielded a 1567 01:02:34,618 --> 01:02:36,679 functional hypersonic weapon . Naval 1568 01:02:36,679 --> 01:02:38,568 Surface Warfare Center Crane is a 1569 01:02:38,568 --> 01:02:40,679 proven leader in hypersonics , as you 1570 01:02:40,679 --> 01:02:42,623 and I have talked about many times 1571 01:02:42,623 --> 01:02:44,623 before . How important is increased 1572 01:02:44,623 --> 01:02:44,320 investment in hypersonics if we're 1573 01:02:44,320 --> 01:02:46,487 going to regain our military edge over 1574 01:02:46,487 --> 01:02:49,040 China ? Senator , is very important in 1575 01:02:49,040 --> 01:02:51,262 the work that that I've seen um done by 1576 01:02:51,262 --> 01:02:52,873 Crane , um , has been , um , 1577 01:02:52,873 --> 01:02:55,040 extraordinary uh for the Department of 1578 01:02:55,040 --> 01:02:58,449 the Navy , um . I think 1579 01:02:58,449 --> 01:03:02,229 uh investments but actually production 1580 01:03:02,560 --> 01:03:04,338 and and getting them to the war 1581 01:03:04,338 --> 01:03:06,560 fighters so they can be implemented and 1582 01:03:06,560 --> 01:03:08,616 put in our arsenal . Got it . And um 1583 01:03:08,689 --> 01:03:11,050 finally . Well , we're replacing most 1584 01:03:11,050 --> 01:03:12,994 of our nuclear arsenal in the next 1585 01:03:12,994 --> 01:03:15,161 decade or two , we're keeping the B-52 1586 01:03:15,161 --> 01:03:17,439 bombers around well in the mid century . 1587 01:03:17,449 --> 01:03:19,489 How critical is the B-52 program if 1588 01:03:19,489 --> 01:03:21,711 we're going to keep those planes in the 1589 01:03:21,711 --> 01:03:24,739 skies for decades to come ? Incredible , 1590 01:03:24,879 --> 01:03:27,212 uh , important for us , sir , um , as I , 1591 01:03:27,212 --> 01:03:29,323 as I mentioned , Senator , you know , 1592 01:03:29,323 --> 01:03:32,060 we're going to move to a two platform , 1593 01:03:32,419 --> 01:03:34,790 um , bomber force , you know , for the 1594 01:03:34,790 --> 01:03:36,901 United States of America . It will be 1595 01:03:36,901 --> 01:03:39,709 the B-21 and the B-52J . Um , it is 1596 01:03:39,709 --> 01:03:41,931 incredibly important . Uh , that we get 1597 01:03:41,931 --> 01:03:44,500 those 75 birds , um , into modern , you 1598 01:03:44,500 --> 01:03:46,979 know , and modify them , um , with the 1599 01:03:46,979 --> 01:03:49,146 replacement of their engines , their , 1600 01:03:49,146 --> 01:03:51,035 their radars , and there I got 10 1601 01:03:51,035 --> 01:03:52,868 seconds . Can you talk about the 1602 01:03:52,868 --> 01:03:55,090 advantages of the new B-52 engines over 1603 01:03:55,090 --> 01:03:57,368 the old engines ? Yes , the , uh , the , 1604 01:03:57,368 --> 01:03:59,590 the Rolls-Royce engines , uh , that are 1605 01:03:59,590 --> 01:03:59,500 right there in , uh , they're being 1606 01:03:59,500 --> 01:04:01,780 worked in , uh , in Indiana , um , are 1607 01:04:01,780 --> 01:04:03,929 gonna be , uh , gives us about , uh , 1608 01:04:03,939 --> 01:04:07,479 incredible increase in range , um , um , 1609 01:04:07,500 --> 01:04:10,610 and speed and durability . Thank you , 1610 01:04:10,739 --> 01:04:13,110 my time has expired . Thank you , 1611 01:04:13,149 --> 01:04:16,110 Senator Banks . Um , Senator King and I 1612 01:04:16,110 --> 01:04:18,459 would like a second round , uh , before 1613 01:04:18,459 --> 01:04:20,750 we head to classified , and I'd like to 1614 01:04:20,750 --> 01:04:23,350 follow up on , um , some of Senator 1615 01:04:23,350 --> 01:04:26,959 Banks's comments about , uh , Golden 1616 01:04:26,959 --> 01:04:30,070 Dome and space . Space , uh , sensors , 1617 01:04:30,419 --> 01:04:32,475 uh , General Whiting , what would be 1618 01:04:32,475 --> 01:04:35,100 the impacts to the mission 1619 01:04:35,100 --> 01:04:37,260 effectiveness of SpaceCom where the 1620 01:04:37,260 --> 01:04:39,204 government to auction off Spectrum 1621 01:04:39,204 --> 01:04:41,371 currently utilized by the department ? 1622 01:04:41,500 --> 01:04:44,469 Could Golden Dome even take place ? Uh , 1623 01:04:45,149 --> 01:04:47,316 man , we could not execute Golden Dome 1624 01:04:47,316 --> 01:04:49,538 without , uh , full access to those two 1625 01:04:49,538 --> 01:04:51,649 spectrums that we discussed earlier , 1626 01:04:51,649 --> 01:04:53,705 the lower , lower 3 , and then the 7 1627 01:04:53,705 --> 01:04:55,816 and 8 gigahertz . We use that lower 3 1628 01:04:55,816 --> 01:04:57,705 band again through so many of our 1629 01:04:57,705 --> 01:04:59,871 radars to be able to to track from the 1630 01:04:59,871 --> 01:05:01,982 ground and then the 7 and 8 gigahertz 1631 01:05:01,982 --> 01:05:03,871 band is , is so important for our 1632 01:05:03,871 --> 01:05:05,705 communications and other special 1633 01:05:05,705 --> 01:05:07,649 missions . Uh , can only see those 1634 01:05:07,649 --> 01:05:09,816 requirements , uh , getting bigger for 1635 01:05:09,816 --> 01:05:11,927 those spectrums , uh , as Golden Dome 1636 01:05:11,927 --> 01:05:14,149 delivers . And if , if it was auctioned 1637 01:05:14,149 --> 01:05:16,929 off , if and if it was vacated by the 1638 01:05:16,929 --> 01:05:20,570 department , um , what's the time 1639 01:05:20,570 --> 01:05:22,850 frame , not to mention the cost , what 1640 01:05:22,850 --> 01:05:26,750 is the time frame ? In research 1641 01:05:26,750 --> 01:05:29,979 development for for um those new 1642 01:05:29,979 --> 01:05:33,149 sensors to be even located in another 1643 01:05:33,149 --> 01:05:35,709 spectrum that wouldn't have the 1644 01:05:35,709 --> 01:05:38,610 capability uh that the current spectrum 1645 01:05:38,610 --> 01:05:40,949 has to even to even accomplish that . 1646 01:05:41,949 --> 01:05:45,129 Madam Chair , I don't have a timeline 1647 01:05:45,129 --> 01:05:47,296 because I think our focus has been not 1648 01:05:47,296 --> 01:05:49,560 on vacating that but figuring out if 1649 01:05:49,560 --> 01:05:51,616 there's a way to share that spectrum 1650 01:05:51,616 --> 01:05:54,159 through dynamic spectrum sharing , and 1651 01:05:54,159 --> 01:05:56,381 I understand there's technologies there 1652 01:05:56,381 --> 01:05:58,326 that may make that available . The 1653 01:05:58,326 --> 01:06:00,437 department has done . Some studies on 1654 01:06:00,437 --> 01:06:02,103 that and laid out a series of 1655 01:06:02,103 --> 01:06:04,326 conditions that would need to be met if 1656 01:06:04,326 --> 01:06:06,492 dynamic spectrum sharing can occur and 1657 01:06:06,492 --> 01:06:08,603 I endorse that those those conditions 1658 01:06:08,603 --> 01:06:10,770 must be met if we're going to if we're 1659 01:06:10,770 --> 01:06:12,992 going to figure out a way to share that 1660 01:06:12,992 --> 01:06:15,215 spectrum with commercial industry . Can 1661 01:06:15,215 --> 01:06:17,679 dynamic sharing take place now ? Ma'am , 1662 01:06:17,840 --> 01:06:20,919 I am told the technology is close to 1663 01:06:20,919 --> 01:06:23,141 being ready . I , I don't know if it is 1664 01:06:23,141 --> 01:06:25,141 actually ready today , but we would 1665 01:06:25,141 --> 01:06:27,141 want to verify that , yes , ma'am , 1666 01:06:27,141 --> 01:06:29,308 absolutely . And General Cotton , same 1667 01:06:29,308 --> 01:06:31,308 question to you . If the government 1668 01:06:31,308 --> 01:06:33,475 were to auction off Spectrum currently 1669 01:06:33,475 --> 01:06:35,641 utilized by the department , how would 1670 01:06:35,641 --> 01:06:37,641 Stratcom's mission effectiveness be 1671 01:06:37,641 --> 01:06:39,808 impacted ? Um , it would be impacted , 1672 01:06:39,808 --> 01:06:41,752 um , Madam Chair , because of what 1673 01:06:41,752 --> 01:06:44,000 would happen . Is , uh , to the point 1674 01:06:44,000 --> 01:06:46,520 that was made by General Whiting , you 1675 01:06:46,520 --> 01:06:48,800 know , we count on understanding what 1676 01:06:48,800 --> 01:06:51,459 the threat looks like , uh , being able 1677 01:06:51,459 --> 01:06:53,570 to see that threat before it actually 1678 01:06:53,570 --> 01:06:55,570 comes , we call that left of launch 1679 01:06:55,570 --> 01:06:58,149 type of activities , um , as well as , 1680 01:06:58,199 --> 01:07:00,255 uh , what we're talking about in the 1681 01:07:00,255 --> 01:07:02,310 higher bands on what is the capacity 1682 01:07:02,310 --> 01:07:04,679 and capability of my three legs to be 1683 01:07:04,679 --> 01:07:08,350 able to utilize , uh , SATO , etc . um , 1684 01:07:08,360 --> 01:07:10,360 it , it would , it would absolutely 1685 01:07:10,360 --> 01:07:12,416 affect us . Thank you , sir . Sender 1686 01:07:12,416 --> 01:07:16,090 King . Uh , two things I just wanted to 1687 01:07:16,090 --> 01:07:18,312 follow up on the , on the discussion of 1688 01:07:18,312 --> 01:07:20,760 hypersonics . I , I believe that we 1689 01:07:20,760 --> 01:07:23,820 have missed two critical strategic 1690 01:07:23,820 --> 01:07:26,219 technologies and are woefully behind 1691 01:07:26,530 --> 01:07:29,250 hypersonics and directed energy . Uh , 1692 01:07:29,409 --> 01:07:31,465 these are things that we should have 1693 01:07:31,465 --> 01:07:33,687 seen coming and now we're playing catch 1694 01:07:33,687 --> 01:07:35,853 up . I just want to emphasize not only 1695 01:07:35,853 --> 01:07:38,649 do we need a hypersonic weapon for 1696 01:07:38,649 --> 01:07:41,409 deterrent possibilities , but we need 1697 01:07:41,409 --> 01:07:44,280 hypersonic defense . Those aircraft 1698 01:07:44,280 --> 01:07:46,280 carriers in the Pacific are sitting 1699 01:07:46,280 --> 01:07:49,520 ducks , uh , for hypersonic missiles 1700 01:07:49,520 --> 01:07:51,889 coming at them 4 or 5000 miles an hour , 1701 01:07:51,899 --> 01:07:54,066 100 ft above the surface of the of the 1702 01:07:54,066 --> 01:07:56,479 ocean . So hypersonic defense is 1703 01:07:56,479 --> 01:07:58,479 something that I think we need to 1704 01:07:58,479 --> 01:08:00,919 invest in as well as the development of 1705 01:08:01,209 --> 01:08:03,840 a hypersonic offensive capacity in 1706 01:08:03,840 --> 01:08:06,330 order again to provide a deterrent . 1707 01:08:06,379 --> 01:08:09,030 General Cotton , would you agree ? I do 1708 01:08:09,030 --> 01:08:11,141 agree with that statement , Senator . 1709 01:08:11,141 --> 01:08:13,030 Uh , the , the other thing that I 1710 01:08:13,030 --> 01:08:15,252 wanted to mention , it's sort of become 1711 01:08:15,252 --> 01:08:17,252 conventional wisdom here that we're 1712 01:08:17,252 --> 01:08:19,430 going from , from , uh , one near peer 1713 01:08:19,430 --> 01:08:22,540 adversary to 2 . I believe we're going 1714 01:08:22,540 --> 01:08:25,740 from one near peer adversary to 1715 01:08:26,270 --> 01:08:29,709 3.5 because of the , as I think you 1716 01:08:29,709 --> 01:08:31,487 touched upon this , the growing 1717 01:08:31,487 --> 01:08:33,653 cooperation between China and Russia . 1718 01:08:33,939 --> 01:08:36,290 And then you put in Iran , which has 1719 01:08:36,290 --> 01:08:39,350 also become a contributor to Russia's 1720 01:08:39,350 --> 01:08:42,100 war machine as well as North Korea , 1721 01:08:42,229 --> 01:08:44,589 which is also contributing to Russia's 1722 01:08:44,589 --> 01:08:47,250 efforts in Ukraine . So I think we need 1723 01:08:47,250 --> 01:08:51,109 to think strategically not to near 1724 01:08:51,109 --> 01:08:53,589 peer adversaries , but the potential of 1725 01:08:53,589 --> 01:08:55,950 two new near peer adversaries who are 1726 01:08:55,950 --> 01:08:58,750 working together and that creates its 1727 01:08:58,750 --> 01:09:00,694 own strategic challenges . General 1728 01:09:00,694 --> 01:09:03,028 Cotton , what are your thoughts on that ? 1729 01:09:03,290 --> 01:09:05,512 Senator , you're absolutely right , and 1730 01:09:05,512 --> 01:09:07,512 that's what we're actually doing at 1731 01:09:07,512 --> 01:09:09,734 Stratcom today , um , when we look at , 1732 01:09:09,734 --> 01:09:11,790 and , and you're right , I call them 1733 01:09:11,790 --> 01:09:13,846 third party influencers . Um , and , 1734 01:09:13,846 --> 01:09:15,957 and what I mean by that , and , and , 1735 01:09:15,957 --> 01:09:18,179 you know , to your point , um , I would 1736 01:09:18,179 --> 01:09:20,290 add one that I think is , is , is a , 1737 01:09:20,290 --> 01:09:22,346 is a little different nuance that is 1738 01:09:22,346 --> 01:09:24,512 the new relationship that's being that 1739 01:09:24,512 --> 01:09:26,623 we're seeing that's happening between 1740 01:09:26,623 --> 01:09:29,830 Russia and the DPRK . Um , so we're , 1741 01:09:29,870 --> 01:09:31,703 we're talking about DPRK , we're 1742 01:09:31,703 --> 01:09:33,648 talking about Iran , we're talking 1743 01:09:33,648 --> 01:09:35,759 about uh China as well as the Russian 1744 01:09:35,759 --> 01:09:37,759 Federation , and I think we have to 1745 01:09:37,759 --> 01:09:39,592 assume that in a time of serious 1746 01:09:39,592 --> 01:09:42,350 conflict . It wouldn't be just with one 1747 01:09:42,350 --> 01:09:44,549 or the other . It could well and 1748 01:09:44,549 --> 01:09:46,830 probably would involve all four of 1749 01:09:46,830 --> 01:09:48,886 those powers that you've mentioned . 1750 01:09:48,886 --> 01:09:51,052 That's why I call them the third party 1751 01:09:51,052 --> 01:09:53,219 influencers because what they could do 1752 01:09:53,219 --> 01:09:52,790 is they could be a distraction for the 1753 01:09:52,790 --> 01:09:54,957 main effort that could be , you know , 1754 01:09:54,957 --> 01:09:57,012 that could be launched by any one of 1755 01:09:57,012 --> 01:09:59,123 those that we had mentioned . General 1756 01:09:59,123 --> 01:10:01,123 Whiting , your thoughts on that new 1757 01:10:01,123 --> 01:10:02,957 strategic reality , Senator , we 1758 01:10:02,957 --> 01:10:05,123 watched those same four countries that 1759 01:10:05,123 --> 01:10:07,290 General Cotton just mentioned in their 1760 01:10:07,290 --> 01:10:09,457 bilateral bilateral relationships with 1761 01:10:09,457 --> 01:10:09,129 each other , and we see increasingly 1762 01:10:09,129 --> 01:10:11,589 that space is becoming an area where 1763 01:10:11,890 --> 01:10:14,112 countries with more sophisticated space 1764 01:10:14,112 --> 01:10:16,223 knowledge like Russia or China appear 1765 01:10:16,223 --> 01:10:18,810 to be willing to trade off that um . 1766 01:10:19,009 --> 01:10:21,231 Space knowledge for something that they 1767 01:10:21,231 --> 01:10:23,453 want in return whether that's armaments 1768 01:10:23,453 --> 01:10:26,870 or or some other political agreement so 1769 01:10:26,870 --> 01:10:29,037 we're very concerned with that and and 1770 01:10:29,037 --> 01:10:31,037 watching how they're cooperating on 1771 01:10:31,037 --> 01:10:32,981 space . I just think that this new 1772 01:10:32,981 --> 01:10:35,037 relationship needs to be part of our 1773 01:10:35,037 --> 01:10:37,037 strategic thinking going forward to 1774 01:10:37,037 --> 01:10:39,203 inform things like the nuclear posture 1775 01:10:39,203 --> 01:10:41,426 review and also the fundamental defense 1776 01:10:41,426 --> 01:10:43,259 strategy . Thank you very much , 1777 01:10:43,259 --> 01:10:42,970 gentlemen thank you again for your 1778 01:10:42,970 --> 01:10:45,290 service and uh I appreciate having been 1779 01:10:45,290 --> 01:10:47,330 able to work with you you're you're 1780 01:10:47,330 --> 01:10:49,219 still at it . He's the guy that's 1781 01:10:49,219 --> 01:10:51,497 leaving we're gonna miss you , General . 1782 01:10:51,497 --> 01:10:53,774 Thank you . We haven't for a while yet , 1783 01:10:54,450 --> 01:10:57,129 uh , with that we will adjourn the open 1784 01:10:57,129 --> 01:10:59,930 session of this hearing and reconvene 1785 01:10:59,930 --> 01:11:02,649 down in classified in order to have our 1786 01:11:02,649 --> 01:11:04,927 classified briefing from you gentlemen . 1787 01:11:04,927 --> 01:11:07,038 Thank you very much . This section of 1788 01:11:07,038 --> 01:11:07,959 the hearing is closed .