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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U)
INTELLIGENCE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) PROCEDURES (U)

1. (U) PRE-STARTEX PHASE: USSTRATCOM J213 will stand up an Exercise Response Cell (ERC) to handle RFIs starting 01 August 2001 to coincide with transmittal of the first Pre-Start Exercise (Pre-StartEx) Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). Exercise participants will use the following procedures until the Strategic Joint Intelligence Center (STRATJIC) Intelligence Task Force (ITF) is activated:

a. (U) Hours of operation: M – F, 0730 – 1630 (CDT).

b. (U) All Pre-StartEx Intelligence RFIs will be submitted to J213, you can obtain an e-mail address from the J213 Intelink-S or Intelink homepages under GLOBAL GUARDIAN 2001-2/RFI Procedures. The URLs for J213's homepages are:

Intelink-S: <http://www.stratcom.smil.mil/j2/exercise>

Intelink: <http://www.usstratcom.ic.gov/j2/j213/j213homepage.html>

c. (U) When submitting e-mail RFI's, requestors are advised to include the following minimum information:

(1) Originator (Task Force (TF), Unit ID, Directorate/Division etc.)

(2) Requirements (Be as specific as possible)

(3) Justification. The end use should be detailed within this block. This will aid the analysts in producing a product which will best suit your needs.

(4) Date Desired

(5) Desired classification level of response

(6) Preferred means of dissemination (message, e-mail, telephone)

(7) POC information: name, telephone number, and e-mail address

d. (U) J213 will be the sole point of contact (POC) for Pre-StartEx Intelligence RFIs until the STRATJIC ITF is activated on 5 September 2001.

2. (U) STRATJIC ITF PHASE:

a. (U) Beginning 5 September 2001, the ITF RFI Managers will be available 24-hours daily to manage all intelligence exercise RFIs. The ITF RFI Managers will be the single POC in USSTRATCOM for all intelligence exercise RFIs generated during the STRATJIC Phase of Exercise GG 2001-2. Direct contact with J213 ERC for RFI's is authorized by the ITF RFI managers only; for all other participants direct contact with J213 ERC is prohibited.

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b(6) b. (U) The most timely and efficient means of submitting an RFI is via COLISEUM through a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) (system high) computer. The next choice is COLISEUM-S on the SIPRNET, contact JIC Operations before using COLISEUM-S. JIC Operations can be contacted via phone at DSN (b)(6) or via SIPRNET e-mail at JIC-OPSMail@stratnets.stratcom.smil.mil. Units that have COLISEUM must enter their RFI's into the system. Please use the appropriate Chain of Command and Validating Office when submitting RFIs (e.g. units to TF, TF to STRATJIC ITF). Identify all exercise GLOBAL GUARDIAN RFIs, at the start of the subject line as "GG 2001-2", the STRATJIC ITF RFI Manager is listed as "USSTRATCOM Intelligence Task Force" in COLISEUM. Please ensure RFIs are submitted under "Exercise GLOBAL GUARDIAN 2001-2" type, do not use "Normal" for GG 2001-2 RFIs.

c. (U) Task Force units that do not have COLISEUM must contact their intelligence support element in their chain of command. If the TF intelligence support element do not have access to COLISEUM, you must submit your request via e-mail to the ITF RFI Manager (this information will be placed on the J213 Intelink-S and Intelink homepages listed in 1.c. and on the STRATJIC ITF homepages when available). Coordinate all RFIs with the ITF RFI Manager at DSN (b)(6). All TF and units should coordinate ahead of time to have COLISEUM accounts prior to the exercise. b(6)

d. (U) When submitting RFI's, requestors are advised to include the following minimum information:

- (1) Originator (Task Force (TF), Unit ID, Directorate/Division etc.)
- (2) Subject (Start with "GG 2001-2")
- (3) Requirements (Be as specific as possible)
- (4) Justification. The end use should be detailed within this block. This will aid the analysts in producing a product which will best suit your needs.
- (5) Desired classification level of response
- (6) Date Desired
- (7) Preferred means of dissemination (message, e-mail, telephone). If possible, all responses will be placed in COLISEUM
- (8) POC information: name, telephone number, and e-mail address

3. (U) **Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC PHASE):** During the STRATCOM MCCC phase, all exercise participant RFIs must be directed to the STRAT MCCC. See Appendix 6 for STRATCOM MCCC phone numbers. STRAT MCCC can submit their RFIs to simulated surviving National Agencies or Theater Commands to the J213 ERC at the following numbers:

(b)(6) Secure FAX DSN 271-4725 or Defense Red Switch Network

(DRSN) (b)(6) b(6)

4. (U) **BLUE FORCE INFORMATION:** Neither USSTRATCOM/J213 or the USSTRATCOM/ITF broker requirements for BLUE force information. Before submitting any RFI, consider carefully if it concerns BLUE force issues. USSTRATCOM/J37's ERC, active during the exercise only, will be responsible for answering BLUE force questions. See Tab A to Appendix 6 for J37 ERC phone numbers.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U)
PRE-STARTEX EVENTS (U)

1. (U) SCENARIO OVERVIEW:

a. (S//REL) (b)(1) [redacted] b (1)

(b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]

b. (S//REL) (b)(1) [redacted] b (1)

(b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] b (1)

(b)(1) [Redacted]

b(1)

c. (S//REL) (b)(1)

(b)(1) [Redacted]

(b)(1) [Redacted]

b(1)

2. (U) **INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES (INTSUMs)**: USSTRATCOM/J213 will transmit three "scene setter" background INTSUMs beginning on 01 August 01. These will provide pre-STARTEX intelligence information for GG 2001-2. The INTSUMs will be addressed to Address Identifier Group (AIG) 11825 and AIG 11883. All Areas of Responsibility (AORs) will be included in each INTSUM through 04 September 2001. The INTSUMs will be transmitted at the approximate times shown below:

INTSUM Transmittal Date-Time Group

011700Z Aug 01
241700Z Aug 01
311700Z Aug 01

Through:

01 Jan - 31 Mar 01
01 Apr - 31 Jun 01
01 Jul - 04 Sep 01

Figure 1. (U) E-Day Conversion Chart

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E-247	01-Jan 01
E-246	02-Jan 01
E-245	03-Jan 01
E-244	04-Jan 01
E-243	05-Jan 01
E-242	06-Jan 01
E-241	07-Jan 01
E-240	08-Jan 01
E-239	09-Jan 01
E-238	10-Jan 01
E-237	11-Jan 01
E-236	12-Jan 01
E-235	13-Jan 01
E-234	14-Jan 01
E-233	15-Jan 01
E-232	16-Jan 01
E-231	17-Jan 01

E-230	18-Jan 01
E-229	19-Jan 01
E-228	20-Jan 01
E-227	21-Jan 01
E-226	22-Jan 01
E-225	23-Jan 01
E-224	24-Jan 01
E-223	25-Jan 01
E-222	26-Jan 01
E-221	27-Jan 01
E-220	28-Jan 01
E-219	29-Jan 01
E-218	30-Jan 01
E-217	31-Jan 01
E-216	01-Feb 01
E-215	02-Feb 01
E-214	03-Feb 01

E-213	04-Feb 01
E-212	05-Feb 01
E-211	06-Feb 01
E-210	07-Feb 01
E-209	08-Feb 01
E-208	09-Feb 01
E-207	10-Feb 01
E-206	11-Feb 01
E-205	12-Feb 01
E-204	13-Feb 01
E-203	14-Feb 01
E-202	15-Feb 01
E-201	16-Feb 01
E-200	17-Feb 01
E-199	18-Feb 01
E-198	19-Feb 01
E-197	20-Feb 01

E-196	21-Feb 01
E-195	22-Feb 01
E-194	23-Feb 01
E-193	24-Feb 01
E-192	25-Feb 01
E-191	26-Feb 01
E-190	27-Feb 01
E-189	28-Feb 01
E-188	01-Mar 01
E-187	02-Mar 01
E-186	03-Mar 01
E-185	04-Mar 01
E-184	05-Mar 01
E-183	06-Mar 01
E-182	07-Mar 01
E-181	08-Mar 01
E-180	09-Mar 01

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E-179	10-Mar 01
E-178	11-Mar 01
E-177	12-Mar 01
E-176	13-Mar 01
E-175	14-Mar 01
E-174	15-Mar 01
E-173	16-Mar 01
E-172	17-Mar 01
E-171	18-Mar 01
E-170	19-Mar 01
E-169	20-Mar 01
E-168	21-Mar 01
E-167	22-Mar 01
E-166	23-Mar 01
E-165	24-Mar 01
E-164	25-Mar 01
E-163	26-Mar 01
E-162	27-Mar 01
E-161	28-Mar 01
E-160	29-Mar 01
E-159	30-Mar 01
E-158	31-Mar 01
E-157	01-Apr 01
E-156	02-Apr 01
E-155	03-Apr 01
E-154	04-Apr 01
E-153	05-Apr 01
E-152	06-Apr 01
E-151	07-Apr 01
E-150	08-Apr 01
E-149	09-Apr 01
E-148	10-Apr 01
E-147	11-Apr 01
E-146	12-Apr 01
E-145	13-Apr 01
E-144	14-Apr 01
E-143	15-Apr 01
E-142	16-Apr 01
E-141	17-Apr 01
E-140	18-Apr 01
E-139	19-Apr 01
E-138	20-Apr 01
E-137	21-Apr 01
E-136	22-Apr 01
E-135	23-Apr 01
E-134	24-Apr 01
E-133	25-Apr 01
E-132	26-Apr 01
E-131	27-Apr 01

E-130	28-Apr 01
E-129	29-Apr 01
E-128	30-Apr 01
E-127	01-May 01
E-126	02-May 01
E-125	03-May 01
E-124	04-May 01
E-123	05-May 01
E-122	06-May 01
E-121	07-May 01
E-120	08-May 01
E-119	09-May 01
E-118	10-May 01
E-117	11-May 01
E-116	12-May 01
E-115	13-May 01
E-114	14-May 01
E-113	15-May 01
E-112	16-May 01
E-111	17-May 01
E-110	18-May 01
E-109	19-May 01
E-108	20-May 01
E-107	21-May 01
E-106	22-May 01
E-105	23-May 01
E-104	24-May 01
E-103	25-May 01
E-102	26-May 01
E-101	27-May 01
E-100	28-May 01
E-99	29-May 01
E-98	30-May 01
E-97	31-May 01
E-96	1-Jun 01
E-95	2-Jun 01
E-94	3-Jun 01
E-93	4-Jun 01
E-92	5-Jun 01
E-91	6-Jun 01
E-90	7-Jun 01
E-89	8-Jun 01
E-88	9-Jun 01
E-87	10-Jun 01
E-86	11-Jun 01
E-85	12-Jun 01
E-84	13-Jun 01
E-83	14-Jun 01
E-82	15-Jun 01

E-81	16-Jun 01
E-80	17-Jun 01
E-79	18-Jun 01
E-78	19-Jun 01
E-77	20-Jun 01
E-76	21-Jun 01
E-75	22-Jun 01
E-74	23-Jun 01
E-73	24-Jun 01
E-72	25-Jun 01
E-71	26-Jun 01
E-70	27-Jun 01
E-69	28-Jun 01
E-68	29-Jun 01
E-67	30-Jun 01
E-66	1-Jul 01
E-65	2-Jul 01
E-64	3-Jul 01
E-63	4-Jul 01
E-62	5-Jul 01
E-61	6-Jul 01
E-60	7-Jul 01
E-59	8-Jul 01
E-58	9-Jul 01
E-57	10-Jul 01
E-56	11-Jul 01
E-55	12-Jul 01
E-54	13-Jul 01
E-53	14-Jul 01
E-52	15-Jul 01
E-51	16-Jul 01
E-50	17-Jul 01
E-49	18-Jul 01
E-48	19-Jul 01
E-47	20-Jul 01
E-46	21-Jul 01
E-45	22-Jul 01
E-44	23-Jul 01
E-43	24-Jul 01
E-42	25-Jul 01
E-41	26-Jul 01
E-40	27-Jul 01
E-39	28-Jul 01
E-38	29-Jul 01
E-37	30-Jul 01
E-36	31-Jul 01
E-35	1-Aug 01
E-34	2-Aug 01
E-33	3-Aug 01

E-32	4-Aug 01
E-31	5-Aug 01
E-30	6-Aug 01
E-29	7-Aug 01
E-28	8-Aug 01
E-27	9-Aug 01
E-26	10-Aug 01
E-25	11-Aug 01
E-24	12-Aug 01
E-23	13-Aug 01
E-22	14-Aug 01
E-21	15-Aug 01
E-20	16-Aug 01
E-19	17-Aug 01
E-18	18-Aug 01
E-17	19-Aug 01
E-16	20-Aug 01
E-15	21-Aug 01
E-14	22-Aug 01
E-13	23-Aug 01
E-12	24-Aug 01
E-11	25-Aug 01
E-10	26-Aug 01
E-9	27-Aug 01
E-8	28-Aug 01
E-7	29-Aug 01
E-6	30-Aug 01
E-5	31-Aug 01
E-4	1-Sep 01
E-3	2-Sep 01
E-2	3-Sep 01
E-1	4-Sep 01
E+0	5-Sep 01
E+1	6-Sep 01
E+2	7-Sep 01
E+3	8-Sep 01
E+4	9-Sep 01
E+5	10-Sep 01
E+6	11-Sep 01
E+7	12-Sep 01
E+8	13-Sep 01
E+9	14-Sep 01
E+10	15-Sep 01

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All b(3) redactions on pages 267-269 are protected from release IAW 50 USCA 403-1 (i) Intelligence Sources and Methods. The notional names are currently and properly classified and are exempt from disclosure under exemption b(1).

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
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TAB D TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U)

b(3) (b)(3) EXERCISE POLICY (U)

b(3) 1. (U) PURPOSE. To provide exercise planners with guidance on the proper coordination of (b)(3) inputs into local installation and unified command exercise play.

2. (U) CONCEPT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR (b)(3)
(b)(3) ACTIVITIES

a. (U) (b)(3) inputs contribute greatly to local and national military exercise programs. They allow exercise planners to create scenarios that test installation leaders and infrastructure capability to react to crisis situations. In the past, local exercise planners could create scenarios without being concerned about how realistic the scripting was to actual threats. Unfortunately, in today's information age, with rapid data processing and computer support, local exercise activities can, and will be, monitored and reported to higher headquarters command centers in seconds. This creates the need for exercise planners to carefully develop their exercise scripting and coordinate the inputs through the chain of command controlling the exercise. Local exercise planners cannot depend on "local play" remaining "local."

h. (U) The (b)(3) inputs for exercises must be coordinated through installation and unified command (b)(3) focal points who are responsible for briefing senior leadership regarding the events. At the installation level, exercise planners must coordinate their (b)(3) exercise support with local planners and integrate their planned exercise activity into the local master database, if one is available. These inputs must also be pre-coordinated with USSTRATCOM (b)(3) to insure continuity and deconfliction. Scripted items not coordinated with (b)(3) prior to the Final Planning Conference will be removed from the STRATCOM exercise database. Exercise planners must also forward a copy of their (b)(3) exercise plan to:

HQ USSTRATCOM (b)(3)
Attn: (b)(3)
901 SAC BLVD STE M121
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6200

c. (U) The (b)(3) serves as USCINCPAC's sole liaison with the individual Service (b)(3) Task Force (TF) planners should ensure their (b)(3) exercise play is realistic and contains background and closure information. To facilitate continuity and fidelity of (b)(3) scenarios will be consistent with the notional group profiles provided in this EXORD. Other groups are acceptable upon pre-coordination with J2SS1.

3. (U) OBJECTIVES

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- a. (U) Train (b)(3) personnel at all levels of command in assigned crisis and wartime responsibilities and functions.
- b. (U) Provide the (b)(3) information necessary for USSTRATCOM to accomplish the overall exercise objectives.
- c. (U) Evaluate all phases of the (b)(3) cycle through exercise play with (b)(3) inputs.
- d. (U) Create realistic (b)(3) inputs for USSTRATCOM exercises that contribute to the quality of the exercise scenario. Coordination with local (b)(3) services will greatly improve this process.
- e. (U) Ensure that (b)(3) inputs are "seamless." They should have some level of rudimentary warning, the event itself, and proper closure (b)(3)
- f. (U) Ensure that local, intermediate headquarters, and USSTRATCOM (b)(3) have coordinated (b)(3) inputs.
- g. (U) Create a point of contact listing for all TF Service units in the field for use by the (b)(3) staff.

4. (U) SCRIPTING ASSUMPTIONS

Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activities

- a. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]
- b. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]
- c. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]
- d. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]
- e. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]
- f. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]

Antiterrorism/Domestic Threats

- a. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]
- b. (S) (b)(1) & b(3) [Redacted]

All b(3)

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(b)(1) & b(3)

c. (S) (b)(1) & b(3)

(b)(1) & b(3)

d. (S) (b)(1) & b(3)

(b)(1) & b(3)

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GLOBAL GUARDIAN 2001-2

(U) NOTIONAL GROUP PROFILES

(U) TERRORIST GROUPS

1. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1978

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 200 Active/600-800 supporters

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1) previously (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) is an (b)(1) state-sponsored group of (b)(1) fanatics who support anti-US causes throughout the world. It was founded by and under the current leadership of a (b)(1) national, (b)(1). Its current headquarters is located in (b)(1). The (b)(1) is well-financed by a number of anti-US governments (b)(1), (b)(1), (b)(1) who endorse their platform of violence against US interests. Specific information on the size of the (b)(1) is unavailable, however, they could have up to 200 active members and 600-800 support personnel in the world. (b)(1) has conducted operations throughout the world and is known to have active members in the United States and (b)(3) near major population centers. The largest (b)(1) contingents in the US are located in Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, New York, Atlanta, and Kansas City. In (b)(3), (b)(1) contingents are located in (b)(3), (b)(3) and (b)(3). (b)(1) has shown a capability to conduct acts of extreme violence in support of their anti-US activities, including the use of large explosive devices, car bombs, hijackings, and kidnapping. Terrorist attacks are usually conducted by "action cell" groups of 4-6 individuals. (b)(1) action cell members are usually heavily armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and have even worn body armor on occasion. (b)(1) leaders have conducted constant barrages of anti-US rhetoric and have vowed to "strike the great Satan America" at any opportunity. It is reported that the (b)(1) has significant databases available on many DOD installations in the CONUS and overseas. Information is available that (b)(1) members prefer to survey their targets from vehicles. (b)(1) has access to a full range of man-portable weapons to include rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), hand-held surface-to-air missiles, crew served machine guns, automatic rifles/pistols, and shotguns. They have successfully used many types of explosive charges to include Semtex and fertilizer based devices. There are no indications of (b)(1) access to any NBC devices, however, they have expressed interest in acquiring nuclear materials through theft or purchase. Little is known about (b)(1) training other than they operate some scattered training facilities in the countries of (b)(1), (b)(1) and (b)(1). It is known that they train for all weather attacks, day or night. There is also information that they have been focusing on training members to operate and conduct surveillance activities in US communities without attracting attention to themselves or their operations. A majority of (b)(1) operations have been focused on gathering media attention through aircraft hijackings, car bombs, and attacks on US facilities and interests. It is believed that the (b)(1) has contingency plans to exploit world events by striking US military facilities in (b)(1) and the CONUS in the event of a major regional conflict (MRC). Intelligence points to special funding provided by anti-US governments to utilize the (b)(1) as a "diversionary fifth column" to divert US security and military forces during an MRC situation. (b)(1) standard operating procedures regarding targeting includes the utilization of their extensive databases on military installations in the US and

All b(3) redactions on pages 270-280 are protected from release IAW 10 USC 130c Nondisclosure of Information: Certain sensitive information of foreign governments and international organizations. The notional names are currently and properly classified and are exempt from disclosure under exemption b(1).

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(b)(3) These databases are used to create active target lists and extensive surveillance of the target to develop intelligence on security operations and procedures. It is believed that the (b)(1) is also recruiting US nationals to assist in some intelligence or even operational activities in the CONUS. Intelligence sources note that the (b)(1) has shown particular interest in US military strategic installations and facilities during the last few years. This may be part of their requirement to provide a "diversionary fifth column" as requested by some governments who provide (b)(1) funding and support. (b)(1) leadership has expressed interest in how the US military protects weapons of mass destruction and other strategic weapons systems. It is likely that the (b)(1) will increase its attempts to covertly introduce (b)(1) personnel into the CONUS during increased tensions. Both DOD counterintelligence and the FBI rate the (b)(1) as the most significant terrorist group threat to DOD, particularly during increased world tensions.

2. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1968

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 500 active and 3000 full-time supporters

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: Principally (b)(1) and (b)(1)

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) and its principal patron, (b)(1) pose a significant threat to US interests both abroad and inside the US. (b)(1) is a (b)(1) extremist group that was formed with the assistance of (b)(1) in the early 1980s. The group seeks to destroy the state of (b)(1) and eliminate Western influences in (b)(1). (b)(1) maintains close relations with, and carries out terrorist operations for, (b)(1). (b)(1) has threatened to attack (b)(1) targets worldwide in retaliation for (b)(1) air strikes in (b)(1) in June 1995. (b)(1) established its international reputation through a series of terrorist attacks against US interests in (b)(1). (b)(1) has killed more than 270 Americans since 1983. In recent years, (b)(1) has focused on attacking (b)(1) targets. (b)(1) has fired rockets against civilian targets in northern (b)(1) including several hundred rockets fired in April 1997. They have been known to travel on forged or photo-substituted passports, but also may travel on legitimate passports from countries that have substantial (b)(1) expatriate populations (for example, (b)(1) the US, and (b)(3)). (b)(1) has cells in most cities with a significant (b)(1) population and in at least six major US cities. (b)(1) is one of the most operationally sophisticated and lethal terrorist groups operating in the world today. Its operations are characterized by meticulous planning and execution. (b)(1) usually conducts extensive pre-operational surveillance and reconnaissance of potential targets. (b)(1) has previously threatened to attack US facilities in the CONUS, but has not yet carried out these threats. The (b)(1) has a close relationship with the (b)(1) military through training and liaison relationships. (b)(1) has used automatic weapons, grenades, and sophisticated, improvised explosive devices in their attacks. Recent intelligence indicates the (b)(1) has recruited a number of computer engineers and technicians. Besides their worldwide web site, which supports clandestine communications and training, the (b)(1) is believed to be developing an offensive information operations capability. A (b)(1) raid on a (b)(1) safehouse disclosed plans and schematics for power distribution facilities in southern (b)(1) (NFI). In one instance, an (b)(1) dissident and former member of the former (b)(1) government was assassinated by (b)(1) operatives in (b)(1).

AN 5 (3)

3. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1982

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 300

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: (b)(1) (b)(1) AND (b)(1)

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) is a (b)(1) sponsored terrorist group. One of the most capable (b)(1) terrorist groups, the (b)(1) rejects negotiations with (b)(1). Since January 1995, the group has killed fifteen Americans and more than 100 (b)(1) and wounded more than 200 people--including (b)(1) in several large-scale bombing attacks. (b)(1) is the second most influential (b)(1) organization in (b)(1) and the (b)(1). This group emerged in the late 1980s, during the (b)(1) uprisings, which it helped organize and focus. (b)(1) has used both political and violent means to pursue the goal of establishing a (b)(1) state in the territory that is now (b)(1). (b)(1) is loosely structured with some elements working openly through social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. (b)(1) militants operate in compartmented cells that conduct target studies, recruit new militants and suicide bombers, maintain safehouses, and manufacture improvised explosive devices for delivery to the suicide bombers. (b)(1) members are generally ethnic (b)(1) but because of the status of the occupied territories and the (b)(1) dispersal throughout the region, they may be traveling on a variety of documents including (b)(1), (b)(1), (b)(1)-issued (b)(1) documents, (b)(1) authority-issued documents, (b)(1), (b)(1) or (b)(1) documents. Recently, the (b)(1) population in (b)(1) has risen dramatically. US intelligence sources assess this change as a possible staging and infiltration point for targets in (b)(1). Many (b)(1) members reside in the US and may have green cards or US passports. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individuals in the US affiliated with (b)(1) have planned and trained to commit terrorist acts in the US and abroad. (b)(1) militants are well trained in surveillance and counter-surveillance. A suicide bomber typically carries an improvised explosive device in a duffel bag or briefcase, which he detonates when his vehicle draws close to the target in order to maximize casualties. Foreign intelligence liaison disclosed that over fifty goats were killed by a biological or chemical (b/c) (NFI) training session near a (b)(1) training camp in (b)(1). There has been no independent corroboration of this information or whether the (b)(1) has obtained or intends to use b/c weapons. This marks the first evidence of a terrorist group testing b/c weapons, since the (b)(1) cult attack in (b)(1). It is also a major departure from (b)(1) attack methodologies. The source, type, and number of b/c weapons are unknown. Recently, developments in (b)(1) have caused the (b)(1) to become extremely militant. (b)(1) is suspected of conducting surveillance of US installations in (b)(1) and (b)(1). The close relationship between (b)(1) intelligence and (b)(1) makes distinguishing between state intelligence collections and terrorist pre-attack surveillance/reconnaissance difficult.

11 b(3)

4. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1989

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 200

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: (b)(1)

(U) LEADERSHIP: Unknown

(U) BACKGROUND: The (b)(1) is the largest and most violent extremist group in (b)(1) where it has waged an aggressive terrorist campaign against Western leaning (b)(1) governments. Most (b)(1) attacks have been against (b)(1) targets, but the group's harsher anti-US rhetoric, increased willingness to carry out high-profile operations, and overseas network make it a growing threat to US citizens and facilities. The (b)(1) has a large number of supporters and sympathizers in various US cities. While there is no information suggesting they are planning attacks against targets in the CONUS, their presence provides an existing infrastructure for conducting such attacks. Previously, the (b)(1) limited its attacks against US citizens in (b)(1). In December 1997, however, a (b)(1) leader publicly threatened to kidnap US citizens to hold until the release of the group's spiritual leader who is serving a life sentence for plotting to bomb several sites in New York and Washington DC. After the spiritual leader's arrest in 1997, the (b)(1) threatened unspecified retaliation against the US if any harm came to him. In addition to its home base in (b)(1) the (b)(1) has developed a large network overseas, particularly throughout (b)(1) and (b)(1) that could enable it to carry out attacks abroad, including US interests. Over the past year, the group has demonstrated an increased willingness to conduct attacks outside (b)(1) and to attack non-(b)(1) targets. These factors increase the threat of an anti-US (b)(1) attack.

5. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1977

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 150,000 in (b)(1) 20,000-40,000 in (b)(1) (concentrated principally in (b)(1) (b)(1) and (b)(1))

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: (b)(1)

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: The (b)(1) is a Marxist-Leninist organization, which seeks to undermine the (b)(1) government and establish a (b)(1) homeland in their inhabited areas in eastern (b)(1) and Northwestern (b)(1). The (b)(1) is responsible for numerous attacks against (b)(1) government and commercial facilities in (b)(1). They have previously attacked Western tourists, US military facilities, and US forces personnel in (b)(1) to gain publicity and drive a wedge between the US and (b)(1) government. (b)(1) extensively uses improvised explosive devices, car bombs, and rocket attacks intended to cause casualties and property destruction. The (b)(1)

has also used sniper assassinations and kidnappings of Western personnel to further their aims. Molotov cocktails are weapons of choice. Since the end of the Cold War, and fall of the (b)(1) (b)(1) the (b)(1) has obtained a significant arsenal of weapons from the (b)(1) including heavy automatic weapons, explosives and 15 SA-7 man-portable surface-to-air missiles (manpads), which are believed to be in (b)(1) There are no reports of SA-7 manpads outside of (b)(1) however this cannot be discounted as a possibility. The (b)(1) has also conducted terrorist attacks against (b)(1) facilities, tourist offices, citizens, and cultural centers in (b)(1) and (b)(1) These attacks in (b)(1) are limited to (b)(1) targets, however collateral damage has included Western citizens unfortunate enough to be in the vicinity of attacks. The (b)(1) has an extensive support network in (b)(1) but only an extremely limited presence in the US. The (b)(1) has distributed anti-US propaganda, but has not conducted any attacks against US interests outside of (b)(1)

6. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1970

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 30 Active

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: The (b)(1) is a left wing organization primarily sponsored by (b)(1) The (b)(1) objective is to overthrow the (b)(1) government and establish a leftist government in (b)(1) The (b)(1) promotes other groups with similar aims and has formed close relations with radical (b)(1) organizations. The group maintains a base in (b)(1) but has ties to several terrorist organizations throughout the world. The (b)(1) recent activity and main source of income has been training other terrorist organizations in methods of terrorism; however, they have expressed an interest in carrying out terrorist acts on behalf of other organizations for money. In the past, the group has received funding from (b)(1) radical groups, (b)(1) and (b)(1) In the early 70s, it was estimated the (b)(1) had 400 active members and 1000 support personnel. This number has radically reduced due to the arrest of several key members of the group, and the loss of support for the group's causes (in the 1970s and early 80s, the (b)(1) world trade market increased by 200 percent causing a majority of (b)(1) nationals to become satisfied with the current government). Specific information on the size of the (b)(1) is unavailable, however, it is estimated they now have 30 active members and 500 support personnel in the world. In an attempt to rejuvenate recruitment into the (b)(1) the group has "hacked" into web pages throughout the Internet and posted propaganda in support of their organization and cause. The remaining active members are "hard core" members and experts in their fields ranging from explosives to computer science. The group has attempted to promote world revolution by forging links with other terrorist, guerrilla and insurgent organizations acting on behalf of radical causes. In 1994, (b)(1) members attended a meeting in (b)(1) which had representatives from terrorist organizations throughout the world present. In the 1970s and 80s the (b)(1) conducted over 50 terrorist incidents. A majority of these incidents occurred in (b)(1) and (b)(1) Recently, the (b)(1) has not specifically targeted the US; however, in 1988, the group was responsible for bombing a USO in (b)(1) and simultaneously attempted to halt the US commerce industry by blowing up intersections of major highways in Kansas City, Chicago, and Saint Louis.

7. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1985

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 10,000 members in (b)(1) estimated 30,000 members in (b)(1). There are indicators that (b)(1) has established a presence in New York City, (b)(1) and (b)(1) making them a transnational-group/threat.

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(3)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: In March 1995, (b)(1) was responsible for a Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Several cult members burst newspaper-wrapped plastic bags containing 2-3 liters of a liquid containing Sarin. Fortunately, the liquid did not evaporate as intended and only a few deaths resulted. If the devices worked as planned, it is estimated that 15,000 deaths would have resulted. The cult's leader, (b)(1) and most of the critical technical and scientific personnel, escaped the ensuing (b)(1) raids of their facilities and properties. (b)(1) was originally created as an amalgamation of Hindu/Buddhist/Yoga type beliefs that generally advocate an ascetic lifestyle and devotion to the leader. (b)(1) leader, (b)(1) aka (b)(1) professes to have existed in a previous life as (b)(1) and thus responsible for building some of the (b)(1). (b)(1) claims that he has attained the ability to levitate and he has openly praised (b)(1) as a prophet. (b)(1) focuses on a traditional resource, e.g., bright university students, somehow alienated, who can contribute immediately to the cause. Students willing to join the cult are encouraged to pursue studies in the fields of physics, chemistry, biology, and computer science/information technology. Recruitment also focuses on computer specialists, lawyers, doctors, members of the (b)(1) Defense Force and National Police. The collapse of the (b)(1) and subsequent release of the constraints on religious practices in (b)(1) provided the missionaries of (b)(1) with a fertile source of new membership. The spiritually starved (b)(1) are alleged to have quickly swelled the ranks of (b)(1) with a membership approximating 30,000 at the height of the cult's short lived popularity in (b)(1). (b)(1) recruitment attracts a wealthy and educated membership. Financial holdings exceed a reported \$1.4 billion and include such assets as discount stores, coffee shops, a computer assembly factory and a computer network provider. The organization is incorporated in (b)(1) (b)(3) and New York under the trade company name (b)(1). The corporation is licensed in the United States as a general trading company through which imports such as computers and agricultural products are exported. (b)(1) is also involved in illegal drug production and sales to include LSD and stimulants. It is through (b)(1) that (b)(1) is able to acquire the equipment required to develop and manufacture (b)(1) arsenal; an arsenal that includes chemical and biological agents. It is reported from several reliable sources that (b)(1) is known to possess a large WMD manufacturing potential that includes huge stockpiles of chemicals. They include sodium fluoride, phosphorus trichloride, isopropyl alcohol, and acetonitrile. All are components of various forms of nerve gas. It is assessed that once combined to make a nerve agent, this stockpile of chemicals has the potential to kill approximately 4.2 million people. It is not known how many other caches might exist. It is also reported that (b)(1) possess massive amounts of ergotamine used for LSD production, phenylacetinitrile used for producing stimulants, and massive amounts of other chemicals which could be used to manufacture explosives. (b)(1) scientists are also in the process of developing biological weapons, having experimented with anthrax, Q fever, and botulinum. It is alleged that (b)(1) actually

attempted to perfect and deploy a biological weapon several years prior to the attack on the (b)(3) (b)(3) In 1990 (b)(1) directed his top scientist (NFI) to develop a bio-weapon that could be used against the Junta Jubanese royal family on the day of the prince's wedding. At (b)(1) direction, the scientist developed an anthrax agent and dispersal system. Fortunately, the system was not ready for use on the day of the wedding. However, when it was ready, (b)(1) directed that it be tried out against the population of (b)(3) he even accompanied the "assault party." Fortune was on the side of the (b)(1) (b)(1) public as the scientist had not perfected a viable anthrax bug and the attack did little more than pollute the air. Failure to create a viable biological weapon caused (b)(1) scientists to focus on development of a less sophisticated, phosphate based nerve agent.

(U) Following the (b)(3) attack, (b)(1) national police raids of (b)(1) facilities led to confiscation of a (b)(1) made helicopter and a nerve gas detection device (there are indications that four (b)(1) helicopters were purchased by the cult, but only one was found). Chemical agent spraying equipment that could have been installed on the helicopter was also confiscated. Additionally, documents discovered by the raids revealed a keen interest in the procurement of new and used (b)(1) tanks, fighter aircraft and nuclear weapons technology. Not found in the raids, but listed in inventories, and mentioned during interrogation of some cult members:

(U) Conventional arms cache and the necessary industrial machinery to manufacture a variant of the (b)(1) AK-47. This equipment, which includes computer-controlled lathes and steel fabrication equipment, was acquired when (b)(1) bought out a failing steel manufacturing company. Blueprints for the AK-47s are alleged to have been smuggled out of (b)(1)

(U) Three MI-17 (b)(1) helicopters and spray kits, (b)(1) was experimenting with the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) equipped with spray kits. The RPVs can be used to release nerve agent.

(U) Molecular modeling software from a Vermont based company; also \$400K worth of software and computer hardware used in biogenic research for a US firm located on the east coast.

(U) 400 gas masks from a firm in San Jose, CA.

(U) A sophisticated laser from an upstate New York manufacturer and an interferometer from a Rhode Island firm. Both systems have nuclear material enrichment applications.

(U) At least 20 (b)(1) Intel Services manuals dealing with the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices and related topics.

(U) BOTTOM LINE: (b)(1) possesses the personnel, desire, will, money, and weapons to deliver another WMD attack. As they are a transnational-group, (b)(1) can strike anywhere. Their leader, (b)(1) is unstable enough to launch a biological/chemical attack during heightened international tensions, hoping to act as the catalyst to precipitate a war. A cult member, no matter how docile in appearance, will carry out (b)(1) orders with unthinking fanaticism.

8. (U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1990

Att 503

(U) ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP: 1000 Active/10,000 Supporters

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1) previously (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) is a personality led charismatic terrorist organization credited with the large scale bombing attacks on American Embassies in (b)(3). (b)(1) himself has called for a religious jihad against American and Western influence in the Middle East. The group was originally brought together from elements of various insurgent military groups which have fought continuously in the Middle East since the 1980s. Some of these groups had US backing in the past. (b)(1) is a wealthy fanatic who was exiled from his homeland for terrorist activity. His current goal is to "reestablish the (b)(1) throughout the world. Works with allied extremist groups to overthrow regimes which do not agree with his philosophy and remove Westerners from (b)(1) countries. Has issued a statement stating it was their "duty to kill US citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere".

(U) (b)(1) has been credited with the deaths of over 300 people and injuring over 5000 in various terrorist actions. (b)(1) continues to plan for events to include bombings and assassinations. (b)(1) has the finances, support structure, and desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction. (b)(1) has demonstrated the capability to strike anywhere in the world. The dispersed nature of the organization with remotely operating cells, has hindered US countermeasures. Some successes have been realized, most notably in (b)(1) where a cell was captured prior to executing its planned bombing of a soccer match. The captured members of the cell included a nephew of (b)(1) himself. This action has been viewed as a direct insult by (b)(1) who has vowed revenge. The US Intel Community is also concerned about (b)(1) assimilation of other terrorist groups such as the (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) and the (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) is taking on the mantle of Carlos the Jackal with the addition of these groups and their willingness to do his bidding.

(U) AGITATIONAL ELEMENTS (ANTI-NUCLEAR)

1. (U) (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) are a violent peace group which targets the US and (b)(3). It is mainly comprised of US personnel who have targeted US government property and resources for damage based on their platform of "beating swords into (b)(1)". Their past acts include extensive physical damage to US Navy submarines, Air Force missile silos, and other DOD resources. They have displayed a capability to conduct rudimentary SIGINT collections, PHOTOINT, and are versed in standard procedures used by US security force personnel. In the past, (b)(1) groups have shown the capability to conduct well-timed operations using powerboats, cutting torches, power tools, and other sophisticated equipment to severely damage government weapon systems and property. They are located throughout the US and (b)(3) and have displayed a capability to penetrate DOD facilities to conduct their anti-war activities. They tend to seek "newsworthy" targets and enjoy the media attention resulting from their actions. For exercise purposes, they are more likely to be involved in encouraging or

conducting property damage in conjunction with other protest activities such as those conducted by (b)(1)

2. (U) (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) was organized in the early 1970s as an international anti-nuclear and pro-environmental organization created to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and governmental activities against the environment. (b)(1) have engaged in large scale protest activities throughout the world and some protesters have conducted illegal acts of minor property damage and trespassing. Most of their activities are peaceful and consist of demonstrations, sit-ins, and propaganda campaigns. (b)(1) personnel have not been known to specifically target military weapons systems for damage. (b)(1) personnel have caused significant work stoppages and shutdowns at many governmental and civilian work facilities. (b)(1) have approximately 25,000 members worldwide with stronger followings in developed countries. Much of their membership comes from university students and disaffected youths. Since the end of the Cold War, (b)(1) have focused mainly on environmental issues. This was primarily due to the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and turning back of the "doomsday clock." (b)(1) maintain a robust worldwide web site to communicate with members and advocate their positions on various issues. They are well financed through various environmental funds and have generated significant media attention to their causes in the past. (b)(1) protest activities have been exploited by (b)(1) members in the past.

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(U) DOMENGAS DRUG CARTEL

(U) ORGANIZATION: The (b)(1) headquartered in (b)(1) actively smuggles illegal drugs/narcotics (cocaine, heroin) into the US. Normal routes used are through (b)(1) and (b)(1) to (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) and Miami. They also transship through (b)(1) into (b)(1) and (b)(1) into the southern US. This group has purchased property in the Miami area. It is purported that Miami serves as their base of operations in the US. The (b)(1) reportedly has established connections to the (b)(1) intelligence services. Former intelligence officers have found a profitable niche with the cartel and bring unique intelligence skills to this organization.

(U) ROUTES: Through (b)(1) and (b)(1) to (b)(1) (b)(1) and then on to Miami. Also (b)(1) into (b)(1) and through (b)(1) into the southern US.

(U) INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES: The (b)(1) possesses sophisticated and effective intelligence capabilities, using both human and technical methods to thwart counterdrug efforts. They have developed an extensive human intelligence network throughout (b)(1) (b)(1) and to a lesser degree, but still effective, throughout the Southwestern and Western US.

(U) OTHER ACTIVITIES: Money Laundering.
Weapons for drug deals.

(U) STATE SPONSORED GROUP

(U) (b)(1)

(U) DATE FORMED: 1990

(U) ESTIMATED EMPLOYEES: 26,000

(U) HEADQUARTERS: (b)(1)

(U) AREA OF OPERATIONS: International

(U) LEADERSHIP: (b)(1)

(U) BACKGROUND: (b)(1) originated as a small company located in (b)(1) specializing in the import/export of toys. With increasing government support and contracts with Western companies seeking business opportunities into (b)(1) has expanded dramatically. Additionally, strategically located overseas establishments, offices, shipping lines, warehouses, and a cargo airline service have created an international presence for the company in over fifty countries. US intelligence has long suspected the company of facilitating (b)(1) smuggling of prohibited items such as supercomputers and technically sophisticated machining devices. The company is also believed to allow its offices to be used for industrial espionage and support for (b)(1) monitoring of dissident expatriates. (b)(1) also hires native citizens of the countries where it maintains a presence and has implemented popular public relations programs in many countries. (b)(1) has also made soft money contributions to foreign political campaigns in areas where it feels this will support the company and (b)(1) While this has caused some embarrassment at times, the practice continues.

A11 3(3)

(U) Western intelligence remains suspicious of (b)(1) and whether a distinction can be made in being a private company or an organ of the state. Some sensitive reporting has indicated (b)(1) vessels have been used to ship fissionable material between (b)(1) and (b)(1). There have also been rumors of missiles being moved between (b)(1) and (b)(1). Vessels have also been suspected of conducting clandestine collection during USN exercises due to their unexplained proximity at opportune dates and times. All such activity would have to be coordinated by the (b)(1) government. (b)(1) remains a question mark for US CI.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

TAB E TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U)
INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPPORT STAFF (IOSS) (U)

- (U) REFERENCES.
- a. (U) CJCS Instruction 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy (S)
 - b. (U) DODD, S-3600.1, Information Operations (S)
 - c. (U) CJCS MOP 30, Command and Control Warfare (U)
 - d. (U) Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for IO (U)
 - e. (U) CJCS MOP 006, Electronic Warfare (S)
 - f. (U) Joint Pub 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare (U)
 - g. (U) Joint Pub 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (U)
 - h. (U) USSTRATCOM SAI 500-1, Information Operations (U)

1. (S) PURPOSE. (b)(1) [REDACTED]
(b)(1) [REDACTED]

2. (U) OBJECTIVES
- a. (S) (b)(1) [REDACTED] b(1)
 - b. (S) (b)(1) [REDACTED] b(1)

3. (U) PLANNING

- a. (S) Concept of Operations. (b)(1) [REDACTED] b(1)

- b. (S) Tasks/Responsibilities. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

- c. (S) Assumptions. (b)(1) [REDACTED]

4. (S) EXECUTION.

(b)(1) [Redacted]

5. (S) LIMITATIONS.

(b)(1) [Redacted]

b(1)

6. (S) Operations Security (OPSEC)/Communications Security (COMSEC).

(b)(1) [Redacted]

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

TAB F TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2) (U)
INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR) (U)

1. (S) PURPOSE. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

2. (U) OBJECTIVES

a. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

b. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

3. (U) PLANNING

a. (S) Concept of Operations. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

b. (S) Tasks/Responsibilities. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. (U) Assumptions

(1) (U) The hostile country or countries have an undetermined IO capability.

(2) (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

b(1)

(3) (U) The base security has already been violated.

(4) (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

b(1)

(5) (U) USSTRATCOM has the capability (b)(3) 50 USCA 403-1 (i)

4. (S) EXECUTION. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

5. (S) LIMITATIONS. (b)(1)
(b)(1)

6. (S) Operations Security (OPSEC)/Communications Security (COMSEC). (b)(1)
(b)(1)

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U) EXERCISE OPERATIONS (U)

1. (U) **GENERAL.** As many of the commands and units as possible that interface with USSTRATCOM in wartime will participate in GG 2001-2. The attached tabs to this appendix outline the details of unit participation.
2. (U) **TERMINOLOGY.** USSTRATCOM follows Joint terminology in defining its level of exercise participation. Units participating in GG 2001-2 will respond in a Command Post Exercise (CPX) or a Field Training Exercise (FTX) role.
 - a. (U) **Command Post Exercise (CPX).** An exercise that simulates forces and involves commanders, their staffs, and communications within and among headquarters.
 - b. (U) **Field Training Exercise (FTX).** An exercise that trains and evaluates actual forces deployed in a field environment under simulated war conditions.
 - c. (U) **Battle Staff Exercise.** USSTRATCOM Emergency Action (EA) procedures use this term, which is equivalent to CPX.
3. (U) **EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS**
 - a. (U) Tab A to Appendix 3 lists the expected exercise participants. Commanders may direct additional levels of CPX or FTX play, as desired, that do not interfere with exercise objectives. Commands, units, or agencies not participating in GG 2001-2 are listed in Tab A to Appendix 6, Table 9 along with their corresponding response cell or role player location.
 - b. (U) We will provide Trusted Agents with the simulated destruction time for their respective commands, agencies, or units. Unless otherwise noted, participants are expected to play through ENDEX or simulated destruction time.

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(U) TABS

- A (U) Organization and Levels of Participation
- B (U) Bomber Operations
- C (U) Tanker Operations
- D (U) ICBM Operations
- E (U) SSBN and SSN Operations
- F (U) USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) Operations
- G (U) National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) Operations
- H (U) STRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC) Operations
- I (U) Airborne Communications Operations
- J (U) Reconnaissance Operations
- K (U) BLUE Force Status
- L (U) SITREP Requirements and STARTEX CJCS SITREP
- M (U) Operational Reporting
- N (U) Force Protection and Antiterrorism

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U)
ORGANIZATION AND LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION (U)

1. (U) US STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)

a. (U) The USSTRATCOM battle staffs, crisis action teams, and supporting groups will convene, when directed, to respond to exercise events.

b. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(1)

c. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

2. (U) US SPACE COMMAND (USSPACECOM)/HEADQUARTERS NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND (HQ NORAD), HQ NORAD will conduct a VIGILANT GUARDIAN in conjunction with GG 2001-2. USSPACECOM/HQ NORAD will provide an Exercise Control Group (ECG), collocated with the USSTRATCOM ECG, to manage exercise play.

3. (U) JOINT STAFF

a. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(1)

b. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(1)

4. (U) NATIONAL AIRBORNE OPERATIONS CENTER (NAOC). NAOC will use a combination of actual flight and simulated airborne operations during the exercise. If real-world events preclude NAOC participation, the USSTRATCOM ECG will simulate NAOC. See Tab G to Appendix 3 for NAOC exercise activity.

5. (U) HQ AIR COMBAT COMMAND (HQ ACC) AND 8 AF/TASK FORCE (TF)-204 (BOMBER). Eighth AF/TF-204 will provide exercise play and control. The HQ 8 AF/TF-204 Battle Staff will parallel USSTRATCOM Battle Staff operations from start of exercise (STARTEX) until end of exercise (ENDEX), or simulated destruction. The 2 BW, 5 BW, and 509 BW are scheduled to participate in the exercise. See Tab B to Appendix 3 for bomber exercise activity.

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6. (U) HQ AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (HQ AMC) AND 15 AF/TF-294 (TANKER).

The 4 AF and 15 AF/TF-294 staff will deploy to Scott AFB, IL, to join HQ AMC's Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Response Cell (SRC). The SRC consists of personnel from 15 AF, HQ AMC/DOX, and the HQ AMC Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)/XOCW. The SRC will provide exercise play and control from STARTEX until ENDEX or until its simulated destruction. SIOP-tasked active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve tanker units are scheduled to participate in the exercise. See Tab C to Appendix 3 for tanker exercise activity.

7. (U) 20 AF/TF-214 (ICBM). The 20 AF/TF-214 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Battle Staffs will participate on a 24-hour basis from STARTEX through ENDEX or until their simulated destruction. The 90 SW, 91 SW, and the 341 SW are scheduled to participate in the exercise. See Tab D to Appendix 3 for ICBM exercise activity.

8. (U) CINCPACFLT/TF-134 (SSBN PAC) AND CINCLANTFLT/TF-144 (SSBN LANT). CINCPACFLT/TF-134 (SSBN PAC) and CINCLANTFLT/TF-144 (SSBN LANT) Battle Staffs will participate on a 24-hour/day basis from STARTEX until ENDEX or their simulated destruction. See Tab E to Appendix 3 for SSBN/SSN exercise activity.

9. (U) STRATCOMM WING ONE/TF-124 AIRBORNE COMMUNICATIONS. The STRATCOMM WING ONE/TF-124 will command post exercise (CPX)/FTX play from STARTEX through ENDEX. See Tabs F and I to Appendix 3 for ABNCP and Airborne Communications PAC/CENT/LANT exercise activity.

10. (U) 12 AF/TF-224 (RECONNAISSANCE). 12 AF/TF-224 will participate with a full battle staff and exercise response cell, on a 24-hour basis, from STARTEX through ENDEX or their simulated destruction. Reconnaissance units (9 RW, 55 WG, VQ-1, and VQ-2) are scheduled to participate in the exercise. See Tab J to Appendix 3 for reconnaissance exercise activity.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6300

TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX X (GG 2001-2 EXORD) (U)
BOMBER OPERATIONS (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To explain bomber operations during GG 2001-2.

2. (U) TASKED ORGANIZATIONS

- a. (U) Headquarters, Air Combat Command (ACC), Langley AFB, VA.
- b. (U) HQ 8AF and Task Force (TF)-204 (Bomber), Barksdale AFB, LA.
- c. (U) 2 BW, Barksdale AFB, LA.
- d. (U) 5 BW, Minot AFB, ND.
- e. (U) 509 BW, Whiteman AFB, MO.

3. (U) PARTICIPATION

a. (U) TF-204 will provide exercise play and control. The TF-204 Battle Staff will mirror US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Battle Staff operations. HQ ACC will determine the level and extent of HQ ACC staff participation.

b. (S) TF-204 (b)(1)

(b)(1)

c. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

d. (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

b(1)

4. (U) AIRCRAFT GENERATION

a. (U) Pre A-Hour b(1)

(1) (S) (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)

(2) (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)

(3) (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

(4) (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)

b. (S) Exercise A-Hour Declaration. (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

c. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

5. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)

6. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)

7. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

8. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)

9. (S) QUICK START. (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

10. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)] b(1)