USSTRATCOM Analytic Agenda Research Questions

Focus Area 1:  Security Environment What are the strategic implications of a two nuclear peer environment (e.g., for U.S. policy, nuclear modernization, arms control, strategic stability dialogues)? What is the role, if any, of parity in such an environment? Does it change how we think about 3rd, 4th, nth actors? What is the impact on U.S. strategy of increasing ties between U.S. strategic competitors? What are the implications for stability (e.g., strategic stability, first strike stability, crisis stability, arms race stability)? Describe the potential implications for U.S. policy, strategy, and force posture of a security environment where multiple potential adversaries are increasing reliance on nuclear weapons. How do U.S. perceptions of topics like warfare, nuclear use, deterrence, stability, and the spectrum of conflict compare to those of its competitors?  What risks arise in the differences among these perspectives? Given a rapidly evolving security environment, what are the potential risks to effectively assuring U.S. allies or deterring potential adversaries? Describe the “known unknowns” and hypothesize the “unknown unknowns.” What may buy down these risks (e.g., policy, strategy, posture, capabilities)? How might adversary perceptions of their ability to deny the United States the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for command and control, sensing, etc. affect stability (e.g., strategic stability, first strike stability, crisis stability, arms race stability)?

Focus Area 2:  Deterrence and Escalation Maneuver What are the escalation dynamics of simultaneous conflicts with more than one strategic adversary? How might those dynamics shift according to the relationship between adversaries (e.g., adversaries cooperating, coordinating, allied)? What strategies or approaches are necessary to deter multiple strategic actors simultaneously? How might the strategies and capabilities needed to deter a second adversary change if we are already in conflict with one? How might the United States and its allies shape the environment to enhance strategic stability among multiple nuclear-armed actors? How do deterrence and compellence strategies evolve across the spectrum of conflict?  What strategic approaches or concepts promote de-escalation or restoration of deterrence? What effects do non-nuclear capabilities have on escalation dynamics? What methods can be used to measure the effectiveness of a deterrence strategy? How might nuclear and non-nuclear integration enhance strategic deterrence? Extended deterrence? What are the potential risks? What are the key challenges to realizing integrated deterrence within and outside the Department of Defense (DOD), and how can they be resolved, managed, or mitigated? Describe and evaluate alternative restore deterrence strategies and operational concepts. What are the risks and benefits of responding to adversary aggression in a manner proportional to the values threatened? How should joint command and control doctrine for the combatant command and its functional components be modified to accept and enable the envisioned Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concepts of real-time centralized control? What are the electromagnetic spectrum implications of this shift and potential paths to address?

Focus Area 3:  Assurance and Extended Deterrence What is required of U.S. alliance architectures to address the growing momentum of adversaries acting against and/or subverting the liberal, rules-based international order? How does the United States and its allies remain resilient against adversarial nuclear coercion? How might the United States enhance the credibility of its extended deterrence commitments to its allies? How might advanced non-nuclear capabilities or conventional-nuclear integration enhance the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments? How should deterrence efforts be shared or divided among allies? What would be the consequences, especially to the credibility of U.S. security commitments and ally relationships, if allies or partners developed sovereign nuclear capabilities?

Focus Area 4:  Emerging and Future Technology What impact might advanced technologies have on assurance and deterrence? How might technologies 50 years in the future impact the security environment? What impact might these advanced technologies have on stability (e.g., strategic stability, first strike stability, crisis stability, arms race stability)? What technologies or technological trends might lead to capabilities with greater lethality than nuclear weapons? Describe the potential implications of such capabilities. What are the potential impacts on stability (e.g., strategic stability, first strike stability, crisis stability, arms race stability)? What are the potential benefits and risks of leveraging artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) or other novel technology applications for nuclear strategy development, nuclear command and control and operations, or nuclear enterprise modernization?  How can risks be mitigated? In what aspects of strategic deterrence can AI/ML provide the greatest benefits for the lowest risk? What processes and procedures might accelerate the coordination between military and civilian organizations to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic spectrum operational environment to attain electromagnetic spectrum superiority? What are the benefits and risks to deployed warfighters of commercial and military use of current and emerging communication standards such as 5G and 6G? How should DOD design wrap-around technologies to enable these benefits while protecting against the inherent risk? Describe the potential benefits of joint force and coalition force frequency de-confliction enabled by spectrum sharing technologies that allow unsynchronized simultaneous transmission over the same frequency bands by commercial and U.S. forces. How might coherent electromagnetic attack or sensing between mission aircraft and unmanned systems improve the overall range of effects or detection against a threat? How might electromagnetic spectrum-dependent systems leverage AI solutions real time? How might campaign-level modeling and simulation capture the impacts of electromagnetic attack (EA), electromagnetic support (ES), and electromagnetic protection (EP) on the joint force? To what extent would higher fidelity modeling of EA, ES, and EP of EMS-dependent systems result in significantly altered outcomes of current model success or failure metrics?

 

U.S. Strategic Command Academic Alliance 2022-2023 Academic Year Research Topics in PDF
U.S. Strategic Command Academic Alliance 2021-2022 Academic Year Research Topics in PDF
U.S. Strategic Command Academic Alliance 2020-2021 Academic Year Research Topics in PDF
U.S. Strategic Command Academic Alliance 2018-2019 Academic Year Research Topics in PDF
U.S. Strategic Command Academic Alliance 2017-2018 Academic Year Research Topics in PDF

Points of Reference for the Conduct of
21st Century Deterrence and Assurance Research

 

Deterrence and Assurance are abstract political-military concepts.   They are also conditions attained in the minds of deterrees and assurees, achieved only at their respective discretion, and only in nuanced context of their unique decision spaces.  Activities undertaken to achieve deterrence and assurance goals comprise planning and execution of a strategy, an equally abstract concept requiring similar research consideration.  Simply stated, research involves gaining understanding of both the nature of a given deterrence and assurance problem, and how to address it.

With these themes in mind, new thinking in deterrence and assurance is not exclusively adversary and/or military in scope.  It calls for research into topics that go beyond consideration of adversary military capabilities and attendant U.S./Allied means to countervail them.  Topics include (but are not limited to) local, regional, and international political and economic factors; socio-cultural and decision-making dynamics; as well as psychological lines of inquiry, all of which are geared toward informing policies pursuant to tailored deterrence and allied assurance objectives.

While better understanding into how objectives might be achieved vis-à-vis a given deterrence and assurance problem set remains a central focus, equally as pertinent is appreciating the mechanics of how objectives are to be achieved.  Such research involves understanding the political, fiscal, and bureaucratic aspects of marshalling limited national resources into coherent deterrence and assurance strategies.  Underlying all of this is the need to understand the nature of the term strategy itself.

While not exhaustive, researchers are encouraged to consider the following alphabetized list of references selected with each of these themes in mind as they pursue efforts to add to the literature.

 

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UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL INTERESTS: 

• Cross, Theresa, Aaron Bazin, and Montgomery Erfourth.  “Starting with ‘Why’: The National Security Strategy and America’s National Interests.” Small Wars Journal, (12 Dec 2019).
• Deibel, Terry L. “Chapter 4: Interests, Threats, and Opportunities.” Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 123-156.
• Gaddis, John Lewis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
• Hamilton, Lee H. “Defining National Interest.” Editorial. The Christian Science Monitor, (30 Mar. 1998).
• Morgenthau, Hans J. “What Is the National Interest of the United States?” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, The National Interest-Alone or with Others? (Jul., 1952). pp. 1-7.
• Nuechterlein, Donald E. “National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-making.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 2, Iss. 3 (Oct., 1976), pp. 246-266.
• Rice, Condoleezza. “Promoting the National Interest.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 2000), pp. 45-62.
• Rieff, David.  “A New Hierarchy of Values and Interests.” World Policy Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall, 1999), pp. 28-34.
• Russel, Greg. “John Quincy Adams and the Ethics of America’s National Interest.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 23-38.
• Sondermann, Fred A. “The Concept of the National Interest.” Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring, 1977), pp. 121-138. 
• Van Dyke, Vernon. “Values and Interests.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Sep., 1962), pp. 567-576.

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NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIC POLICY GUIDANCE: 

• Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (2021)
• National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017).
• Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2018).
• Nuclear Posture Review (2018)
• Missile Defense Review (2019) 

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH: 

• Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept v. 2.0 (2006).
• Strategic Communications Joint Integrating Concept v. 1.0 (2009).
• Vitto, Vincent, comp. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. Rep. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, (Jan., 2008).

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THINKING ABOUT STRATEGY: 

• Benson, Kevin C. M., “It Is Our Fault: ‘No Overarching Strategy’.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 (Summer, 2018), pp. 20-22.
• Betts, Richard K. “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, Fiftieth Anniversary Special Issue (Oct., 1997), pp. 7-33.
• Bracken, Paul. “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide.” Parameters, Vol. 36 (Spring, 2006), pp. 90-100.
• Brands, Hal. “Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era.” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 (Mar., 2018), pp. 8-33.
• Builder, Carl H. “Keeping the Strategic Flame.” Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 14 (Winter, 1996-97), pp. 76-84.
• Christopher, Paul. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. (Praeger, 2007).
• Ellis, Jr., James O., James N. Mattis, and Kori Schake. “Chapter 10: Restoring Our National Security.” Blueprint for America. Ed. George P. Shultz. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2016). 137-150.
• Freedman, Lawrence. “The Meaning of Strategy Part I: The Origin Story.” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 (Dec., 2017), pp. 90-105.
• Freedman, Lawrence. “The Meaning of Strategy Part II: The Objectives.” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 (Mar., 2018), pp. 34-57.
• Gray, Colin S. “Deterrence and the Nature of Strategy.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2000), pp. 17-26.
• Gray, Colin S. “So What! The Meaning of Strategy.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter, 2018), pp. 4-7.
• Gray, Colin S. Theory of Strategy. (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018).
• Gray, Colin S. The Sheriff:  America’s Defense of the New World Order. (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2004).
• Harrison, Ross. Strategic Thinking in 3D: A Guide for National Security, Foreign Policy, and Business Professionals. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2013).
• Heffington, Steven, Adam Oler, and David Tretler eds. A National Security Strategy Primer. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019).
• Henderson, Bruce D. “The Origin of Strategy.” Harvard Business Review, (Nov.-Dec., 1989).
• Howard, Michael. “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 5 (Summer, 1979), pp. 975-986.
• Howard, Michael. “The Transformation of Strategy.” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 4 (Aug.-Sept., 2011), pp. 12-16.
• MCDP 1-1 Strategy.
• Layne, Christopher.  The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. (Ithica, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2007).
• Lenczowski, John. Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011).
• Lykke Jr., Col. Arthur F. “Defining Military Strategy = E+W+M.” Military Review, Vol. LXIX, No. 5 (May, 1989), pp. 1-8.
• May, Ernest R., ed. American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68. (Boston, MA: Bedford Books 1993).
• McCauley, Daniel H. "Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking: Developing 21st Century Strategic Leaders." Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 81 (2nd Quarter, 2016), pp. 26-33.
• Meiser, Jeffery W. “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy.” Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter, 2016-17), pp. 81-91.
• Metz, Steven. “Why Aren’t Americans Better at Strategy?” Military Review, Vol. LXIX, No. 5 (May, 1989), pp. 9-15.
• Mintzberg, Henry. “Patterns in Strategy Formation.” Management Science, Vol. 24, No. 9 (May, 1978), pp. 934-948.
• Owens, Mackubin. “On Strategy and Strategic Planning: Repairing America’s Strategic ‘Black Hole’.” The Heritage Foundation, Military Strength Topical Essays (7 Oct 2016).
• Ross, Dennis. Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2008).
• Rumelt, Richard, Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. (New York: Crown Publishing, 2011).
• Silove, Nina. “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy’.” Security Studies, (2017), pp. 1-31.
• Sinek, Simon. Start with Why:  How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action. (Penguin Books, 2009).
• Sinek, Simon. The Infinite Game. (Penguin, 2019).
• Svechin, Aleksandr A. Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, Inc., 1991).
• Smith, M.L.R. “Why Strategy is Easy but Difficult (at the Same Time): A Short Study on the Complexities of Escalation.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 (Summer, 2017), pp. 10-13.
• Van Riper, Lt. Gen. Paul. “From Grand Strategy to Operational Design: Getting It Right.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 (Fall, 2014), pp. 13-18.
• Van Riper, Lt. Gen. Paul. “The Foundation of Strategic Thinking.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 2, Iss. 3 (Summer, 2012), pp. 4-10.
• Webb, Major Andrew C. "Rethinking Strategy-Art Lykke and the Development of the Ends, Ways, Means, Model of Strategy." Thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, (2019).
• Zinni, General Tony and Tony Koltz. Before the First Shots Are Fired:  How America Can Win or Lose off the Battlefield. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

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THINKING ABOUT THREAT:

• Belden, Thomas G. “Indications, Warning, and Crisis Operations.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, Special Issue on International Crisis: Progress and Prospects for Applied Forecasting and Management (Mar., 1977), pp. 181-198.
• Betts, Richard K. “Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas.” Parameters, Vol. 28 (Spring, 1998), pp. 26-35.
• Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1982).
• Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Director of National Intelligence, (9 April 2021).
• Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. Ed. Jan Goldman. (Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, D.C.: 2002). Web.
• Hybel, Alex Roberto. The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict. (Lexington Books, 1986).
• Milburn, Thomas W. “The Nature of Threat.” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 33, No. Iss. 1 (Jan., 1977), pp. 126–139.
• Singer, J. David. “Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, No .1, Studies on Attitudes and Communication (Mar., 1958), pp. 90-105.
• Wohlstetter, Roberta. “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1965), pp. 691-707.
• Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
• Yarhi-Milo, Keren. “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries.” International Security, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 (Summer, 2013), pp. 7-51. 

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THINKING ABOUT DETERRENCE AT THE “STRATEGIC” LEVEL: 

• Chilton, Gen. Kevin, and Greg Weaver. “Waging Deterrence in the 21st Century.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, (2009), pp. 31–42.
• Ducharme, Douglas R. “Measuring Strategic Deterrence: A Wargaming Approach.” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 82, 3rd Quarter (2016), pp. 40-46.
• Haney, Adm. Cecil D. “Strategic Deterrence for the Future.” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug., 2015), pp. 4–8.
• Mazarr, Michael J. et al, “What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression.” RAND, RR2451 (2018).
• Payne, Keith B. “Understanding Deterrence.” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 5 (Nov., 2011), pp. 393-427. 
• Richard, Adm. Charles A. “Forging 21st-Century Strategic Deterrence.” Proceedings, Vol. 147, No. 2 (Feb., 2021).

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THINKING ABOUT DETERRENCE AT THE “OPERATIONAL” LEVEL:

• Blackwell, James. “Deterrence at the Operational Level of War.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, (2011), pp. 30–51. 

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TAILORED DETERRENCE: 

• Bunn, M. Elaine. “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum, No. 225 (Jan., 2007), pp. 1–8.
• Johnson, Michael, and Terrence K. Kelly. “Tailored Deterrence: Strategic Context to Guide Joint Force 2020.” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 74, 3rd Quarter (2014), pp. 22-29.
• Lantis, Jeffrey S. “Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice.” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Dec., 2009), pp. 467-485.
• McVicar, Michael "Profiling Leaders and Analyzing their Motivations." Phalanx, Vol, 44, No. 4 (Dec., 2011), pp. 6-8.
• Payne, Keith B. “Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era: Applying ‘Tailored Deterrence’.” (May, 2018), National Institute for Public Policy. 
• Schneider, Barry R. and Patrick D. Ellis, eds. Tailored Deterrence: Influencing States and Groups of Concern. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2011).

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EXTENDED DETERRENCE:

• Anderson, Justin V., and Jeffery A. Larsen. Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy. Issue brief. INSS Occasional Paper 69. (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, Sept. 2013).
• Foerster, Schuyler. “Chapter 2: NATO’s Return: Implications for Extended Deterrence.” NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond. Eds. Rebecca R. Moore and Damon V. Coletta. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), pp. 46-70.
• Howard, Michael. “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter, 1982), pp. 309-324. 

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DETERRENCE SUCCESS AND FAILURE:

• Ben-Zvi, Abraham. “The Outbreak and Termination of the Pacific War: A Juxtaposition of American Preconceptions.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 33-49.
• Hosoya, Chihiro. “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-US Relations, 1938-1941.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 (Jun., 1968), pp. 97-115.
• Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980.” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Jul., 1984), pp. 496-526
• Russett, Bruce M. “The Calculus of Deterrence.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jun., 1963), pp. 97-109.
• Russett, Bruce M. “Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1967), pp. 89-106.
• Wolf, Barry. “When the Weak Attack the Strong: Failures of Deterrence.” RAND, N-3261-A (1991). 

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ARMS CONTROL AND DETERRENCE:

• Bronder, Lieutenant Colonel T. Justin. “Future Directions for Great Power Nuclear Arms Control: Policy Options and National Security Implications”  Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper, No. 13 (Oct., 2021).
• Giles, Gregory F. "Deterrence and the NPT: Compatible and Reinforcing." Survival, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Aug. – Sep., 2020).
• Larsen, Jeffrey and James J. Wirtz, eds., Arms Control and Cooperative Security. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009).
• Koch, Susan J. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Case Study 5 (Sep., 2012).
• Perkovich, George and James M. Acton, eds. Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).
• Pifer, Steve and Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
• Woolf, Amy E., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Congressional Research Service, No. RL32572, (Dec., 2012).

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UPDATING DETERRENCE EDUCATION:

• Bernstein, Paul I. "Deterrence in Professional Military Education." Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 2015), pp. 84-88.
• Kaupa, Douglas F. and L. Martin Hahn. "Examining and Enhancing Deterrence Education for Future Leaders." Wild Blue Yonder, (30 Mar 2020).
• McGiffin, Curtis, "The Lost Art of Deterrence Education." National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, Issue No. 446 (2 Oct 2019).
• Obradovic, Lana and Michelle Black. "Teaching Deterrence: A 21st-Century Update." Journal of Political Science Education, (5 March 2019).

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ASSOCIATED RESEARCH CATEGORIES: 

Strategic Intelligence

• Aspin, Les. “Misreading Intelligence.” Foreign Policy, No. 43 (Summer, 1981), pp. 166-172.
• Hall, Leon. “Strategic Intelligence and the Decision to Go to War.” Modern War Institute (2 November 2019).
• Heidenrich, John G. “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 2007).
• Immerman, Richard H. “Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Policy, and Politics.” Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan., 2008) pp. 1-23.
• Johnson, Loch K. “Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2003), pp. 638-63.
• Johnson, Loch. “Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence.” World Affairs, Vol. 146, No. 2 National Security Decision Making in the White House and Its Organization (Fall, 1983), pp. 176-204.
• Johnson, Loch K. The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for Security after the Cold War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
• Kent, Sherman. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
• Kuhns, Woodrow. “The Beginning of Intelligence Analysis in CIA - The Office of Reports and Estimates: CIA’s First Center for Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 27–45.
• Marrin, Stephen. “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy.” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 6 (Jan., 2017), pp. 725-742.
• Matthias, Willard C. "America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991." (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2001).
• Maddrell, Paul, Ed. The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015).
• May, Ernest R. Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
• Ransom, Harry Howe. “Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy.” World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Oct., 1974), pp. 131-146.
• Rose, P. K. “Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950.” Studies in Intelligence, No. 11 (Fall, 2001).
• Russell, Richard L. “CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 191-207.
• Russell, Richard L. Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 

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Strategic Culture

• Aid, Matthew M. “Sins of Omission and Commission: Strategic Cultural Factors and US Intelligence Failures During the Cold War.” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 (Aug., 2011), 478-494.
• Atran, Scott, and Jeremy Ginges. “Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict.” Science, Vol. 336, Iss. 6083 (May, 2012), pp. 855-857.
• Dowdall, Jonathan. “Strategic Culture: A Look at Europe.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 (Winter, 2010): 23-26.
• Gray, Colin. “National Style in Strategy: The American Example.” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall, 1981), pp. 21-47.
• Gray, Colin. “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 49-69.
• Johnson, Jeannie L., and Matthew T. Berrett. “Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Jun., 2011), pp. 1-22.
• Johnson, Jeannie L., Kerry M. Kartchner, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
• Lantis, Jeffrey S. Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism. Issue brief. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, (31 Oct. 2006).
• Larsen, Jeffrey A. ed. Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum: Assessing Strategic Culture as a Methodological Approach to Understanding WMD Decision-Making by States and Non-State Actors. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, (31 Oct. 2006).
• Mahnken, Thomas G. United States Strategic Culture. Issue brief. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, (13 Nov. 2006).
• McFate, Montgomery. “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture.” Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 38 (4th Quarter, 2005), pp. 42-48.

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Decision-Making Dynamics

• Gartzke, Erik, Jeffrey M. Kaplow and Rupal N. Mehta. “The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2013), pp 481-508.
• Knopf, Jeffrey W. Rationality, Culture and Deterrence. Rep. No. 2013-009. Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC), (Sept., 2013).
• McVicar, Michael. “Decisions in Crisis - An Examination.” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 2015), pp. 14-43.
• Snowden, David J., and Mary E. Boone. “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making.” Harvard Business Review. (Nov., 2007).
• Solingen, Etel. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
• Trexel, Jonathan, “Deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: The Role of Missile Defense” (2013). Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. 28.

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Behavioral Dynamics

• Deutschman, Alan. “Change or Die.” Fast Company, (1 May 2005).
• Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Psychology & Deterrence. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
• Kertzer, Joshua D. Resolve in International Politics. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
• Knorr, Klaus. “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles.” World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Apr., 1964), pp. 455-467.
• McDermott, Rose, Anthony C. Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi. “‘Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It’: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence.” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 (Dec., 2017), pp. 68-88.
• Mercer, Jonathan. “Emotional Beliefs.” International Organization, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 (Winter, 2010), pp. 1-31.
• Mercer, Jonathan. “The Illusion of International Prestige.” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Spring, 2017), pp. 133-168.
• Milburn, Thomas W. “The Concept of Deterrence: Some Logical and Psychological Considerations.” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 (1961), pp. 3-11.
• Wright, Nicholas, and Karim Sadjadpour. “The Neuroscience Guide to Negotiations with Iran.” The Atlantic, (14 Jan. 2014).

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Legacy Deterrence Theory

• Jervis, Robert. “Deterrence Theory Revisited.” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jan., 1979), pp. 289-324.
• Kahn, Herman. On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).
• Payne, Keith B. The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century. (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008).
• Quester, George H. Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy. (New Brunswick (U.S.A.): Transaction, 1986).
• Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

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Deterrence in the “Second Nuclear Age”

• Colby, Elbridge. “Restoring Deterrence.” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 413-428.
• Harrison, Todd, Zack Cooper, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts. Escalation & Deterrence in the Second Space Age. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017). Web.
• Joseph, Robert G. Countering WMD: The Libyan Experience. (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2009).
• Kamp, Karl-Heinz, and David S. Yost, eds. “NATO and 21st Century Deterrence.” NDC Forum Paper 8 (May, 2009).
• Knopf, Jeffrey W. “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research.” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr., 2010), pp. 1-33.
• Lupovici, Amir. “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Sept., 2010), pp. 705-732.
• Payne, Keith B. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
• Payne, Keith B. The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001).
• Shaub Jr., Gary. “When Is Deterrence Necessary? Gauging Adversary Intent.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 (Winter, 2009).
• Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes, eds. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

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Deterring Terrorism

• MacKinney, John. “The Balance of Pain: Terrorism Deterrence in Israel.” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 2015), pp. 1-13.
• Munoz, SSgt. Megan J., and Dr. Matthew Crosston. “Diplomatic Counterterrorist Deterrence.” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July – Aug., 2015), pp. 15-26.
• Rid, Thomas. “Deterrence beyond the State: The Israeli Experience.” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Apr., 2012), pp. 124-147.
• Stone, John. “Al Qaeda, Deterrence, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 9 (Aug., 2009), pp.763-775. 
• Trager, Robert F., and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done.” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter, 2005/06), pp. 87-123.
• Vinson, Mark. “An Israeli Approach to Deterring Terrorism: Managing Persistent Conflict through a Violent Dialogue of Military Operations.” Prism, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2015), pp. 61-75.

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History

• Brands, Hal. “The Triumph and Tragedy of Diplomatic History.” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Dec., 2017), pp. 133-43.
• Brands, Hal and Charles Edel. The Lesson of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019).
• Dorondo, David R. “The U.S. Army, the Nuclear Posture Review, and Nuclear Deterrence: A European Historical Context.” The Institute of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Paper 124, (Mar., 2019).
• Gray, Colin S. “Strategic History.” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 (Summer, 2018), pp. 4-8.
• Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. (New York: Anchor, 1996).
• Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1989).
• Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-makers. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986).
• Shirley, Craig. December 1941: 31 Days That Change America and Save the World. (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2011).
• Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations Go to War. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2011).
• Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. Rex Warner, with an introduction and notes by M. I. Finley, rev. ed., (with a new introduction and appendices) (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1972).
• Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. (New York: Ballantine, 1994).

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ONLINE DIGITAL RESEARCH RESOURCES:

• Central Intelligence Agency Library
• Cold War International History Project
• Department of State, Office of the Historian
• Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
• Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum 
• George C. Marshall Foundation Library
• Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library
• Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
• National Security Strategy Archive
• Robert S. McNamara Nuclear Archive
• The American Presidency Project
• Wilson Center Digital Archive
• Winston Churchill Speeches

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VIDEO RESOURCES:

Concept of Deterrence

• Deterrence 101 (Project on Nuclear Issues video series)
• On Deterrence (Sandia National Labs documentary)
• 21st Century Nuclear Deterrence & Missile Defense (DoD Archived Content)

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Practitioners of Deterrence

• Meet the Air Force Officers in Control of the U.S. Nuclear Missiles
• Elite Professional
• A Day in the Life of a B-52 Student Pilot
• Here’s How B-2 Bomber Pilots Pull Off Grueling 33-Hour Flights
• Day in the Life of an SSBN Submariner
• Exclusive look into a US Ballistic Missile Submarine Helping to Deter Nuclear War

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MUSEUMS:

• Minute Man Missile National Historic Site (Philip, SD)
• National Museum of the U.S. Air Force (Dayton, OH)
• Quebec 01 Missile Alert Facility (Cheyenne, WY)
• Ronald Reagan Minuteman Missile State Historic Site (Cooperstown, ND)
• Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center (Chantilly, VA)
• Strategic Air Command & Aerospace Museum (Ashland, NE)
• Submarine Force Library and Museum Association (Groton, CT)
• The Cold War Museum (Vint Hill, VA)
• The National Museum of Nuclear Science and History (Albuquerque, NM)
• Nuclear Weapons Instructional Museum (Kirtland AFB, NM)
• Titan Museum (Sahuarita, AZ)
• U.S. Navy Museum Cold War Gallery (Washington, DC)

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Points of Reference for the Conduct of 21st Century Deterrence and Assurance Research in PDF

LARRY D. WELCH DETERRENCE WRITING AWARD

The Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is sponsoring a competition for the best research papers on the subject of strategic deterrence. Participating researchers are asked to submit papers to USSTRATCOM by June 1, 2025.

Submissions will be judged in one of two categories. The “junior” category is for undergraduate and masters students. The “senior” category is for doctoral students, postdocs, and entry to mid-level professionals. The winning author in each category will be recognized with an award, publication in a peer reviewed journal and travel funding to attend the 2025 Deterrence Symposium.

NEW for 2025!

• Norwich University, Journal of Peace & War Studies (JPWS) will serve on the junior category selection panel and publish the winning paper in JPWS
• Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) will serve on the senior category selection panel and publish the winning paper in JFQ

Criteria for papers:

• Recommended paper length: 4,000-5,000 words. Articles substantially longer will not be eligible for publication
• Citation format for footnotes/endnotes must follow The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed.
• Please confirm your manuscript is not under consideration for publication elsewhere
• Submissions must not contain any classified references or material
• For additional information, please see the submission guidelines for Journal of Peace & War Studies or Joint Force Quarterly.

Submission requirements:

• Please include your full name, email address, current position or educational pursuit
• Indicate if you are submitting for the Junior or Senior award category
• Submit papers via email to Dr. Jennifer Bradley at stratcom.offutt.j5.mbx.welch-writing-award-mailbox@mail.mil

A panel of defense policy experts will judge papers on the following:

• Applicability to current deterrence issues
• Quality of argument
• Implications for future deterrence analysis, planning, and operations
• Historical accuracy
• Quality of reference material

Research topics:

• Strategic deterrence is a broad subject, and paper topics need not be limited to nuclear deterrence
• Current USSTRATCOM research focus areas can be found at: https://www.stratcom.mil/Academic-Alliance/USSTRATCOM-Academic-Alliance/
  • “Selected Research Topics” tab

For more information click here

STUDENT RESEARCH POSTER PRESENTATIONS

In addition to sponsoring the Welch Deterrence Writing Award, we are pleased to offer students the opportunity to present deterrence and assurance related research through poster sessions at the 2025 United States Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium. The top undergraduate and graduate student submissions will be selected to present their research both days of the symposium during event breaks and between panel sessions. Selected students will also be provided no-cost symposium registration and travel funding to attend.

Why should a student participate? The Deterrence Symposium provides an excellent opportunity for students to engage deterrence experts from military, government, academia, and industry. As in previous years, we anticipate over 700 U.S. and international participants. We suggest students bring copies of their research and business cards.

Poster element recommendations:

• Title/Author
• Abstract: Identify research topic, intent of research, and findings/conclusion.
• Body: What are the main questions paper is addressing?
• Data/empirics: Opportunity to use graphs, charts or quantitative analysis. Visual representations of argument or data is very useful in a poster.
• Conclusions: Be clear and concise. What did you find and how is this similar/different from previous analyses? What is the “bottom line” of your analysis?
• Have references available.

Poster size and visual format: Will be provided to selected students

Submission details: Submit poster proposal, abstract of the research, university affiliation and contact information no later than 1 July 2025 via email to Dr. Jennifer Bradley at stratcom.offutt.j5.mbx.welch-writing-award-mailbox@mail.mil