House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Holds Hearing on Strategic Forces Posture

COOPER:
Appreciate having such distinguished witnesses before the subcommittee. We face a high-class problem. We been kinder to the programs under our jurisdiction in the president's budget then, perhaps, we expected or deserved. But we look forward to hearing the justification. So, the first witness will be Dr. Anderson. Let me ask, too, by unanimous consent, we will not only accept our honorary member, Mr. Lamborn, for questioning after subcommittee members have asked the questions, but I asked unanimous consent that any member's opening statement be inserted for the record. The ranking member, Mr. Turner, would you --your opening statement? Okay. Dr. Anderson.

ANDERSON:
Chairman Cooper, ranking member Turner, and distinguished members of committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. Today, the United States faces an increasingly complex global security environment in which the central challenge to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition by revisionist powers in the PRC and Russia. At the same time, we must be prepared to counter the clear and present dangers posed by world regimes such as North Korea and Iran. Each of these competitors confronts us with unique and overlapping challenges in our strategic forces, nuclear, space, and missile defense offer critical capabilities necessary to meet these challenges.
Nuclear deterrence that the department highest priority mission. Our deterrence is the foundation of backstop of our national defense. It underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world, and provides extended deterrence guarantees over 30 allies and partners. Effective deterrence requires tailored strategies supported by flexible capabilities. Capabilities that reside in the nuclear triad. This committee is well aware of the age of this triad's systems and the challenge that the department faces in sustaining these systems as we proceed with modernization, modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after decades of deferred recapitalization.
Last fiscal year, Congress funded 98 percent of DOD budget requests for nuclear force modernization, operations, and sustainment. We appreciate the support and request continued support. The FY 21 budget request for nuclear forces is $28.9 billion or roughly 4.1 percent of the total DOD budget request. Modernization, recapitalization nuclear forces is about 1.7 percent of the total DOD budget request. Funding these critical requirements ensures that modern replacements will be available before the nation's legacy systems reach the end of their extended service lives and lose them altogether.
Turning to space systems, they underpin virtually every weapon system in our arsenal. But many of them were designed in an era when there were few threats in space. This is not the case today. The PRC in the Russian Federation both seem to be able to deny the United States and our allies the advantages of space. The United States is responding to this thread by transforming our space enterprise, fielding Brazilian architectures, developing space for fighting expertise, and working closely with allies in combined operations. I want to acknowledge and recognize the bipartisan leadership role that this subcommittee played over several years to establish the United States space force as a sixth branch of the armed forces and to make this historic step possible.
The president FY 21 budget request provides $18 billion for space programs, including $111 million to support stand up of the new service. In addition to the space force, the president's budget also provides for funding of the new space combatant command, U.S. space command, and the space development agency which will accelerate the development and fielding of military space capabilities.
Turning to missile defense, as adversary missile technology advances, the threat United States homeland, allies and partners, and our forces in the field has become increasingly dynamic and difficult to predict. While traditional fix and mobile ballistic threats continue to grow, adversaries are also investing in the ground, air, and sea lunch cruise missiles, as well as hypersonic weapons with diverse ranges. Adversaries are incorporating these missile technologies into their strategies to coerce and intimidate the United States and its allies by threatening critical homeland targets, our ability to reinforce allies in crisis or conflict, and our ability to project power.
To address these challenges, the United States is focused on a layered defense with adaptable systems. U.S. policy is to stay ahead of rogue state missile threats while relying on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and PRC ICBMs. Within this framework, the 2019 missile defense review centers our policy on one, defending her homeland, military forces abroad, allies and partners, two, mitigating against adversary coercive threats and attacks, three, assuring allies and partners reserving the freedom of action, and four, hedging against future unanticipated threats.
In conclusion, I want to thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify and to support its--its support to our strategic forces. Along with our allies and partners, we must ensure that we have the capabilities needed both now and in the future to protect our people and the freedoms we cherish. And to be able to engage potential adversaries diplomatically from a position of strength. To do so, I urge you to support the important capabilities funded and the president FY 21 budget request. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

COOPER:
I thank the witness. General Raymond.

RAYMOND:
General Cooper, ranking member Turner, members of the subcommittee, it's an honor to appear before you today. I've had the privilege of testifying in front of the subcommittee on many occasions, however, this is my first opportunity to appear since taking command of the United States space command in August 2019, and being appointed the chief of space operations for the United States space forces December. I'm truly honored and humbled by this responsibility. On behalf of the joint space professionals that I'm privileged to leave, I would like to thank you for your leadership--personally thank you for your leadership in helping elevate space to a level commensurate with its importance for national security and the security of our allies.
We are the best in the world of space today, and with this historic establishment of a new arms service and combatant command, we're even better, and we need to be as we're laser focused on meeting the requirements of the national defense strategy. Both China and Russia continue to build and modernize their space capabilities. They are building capabilities for their own benefit while also building capabilities to deny us the military and economic advantages that the United States and is--and its allies have enjoyed for decades, an advantage that is eroding. As I have testified to in the past, the scope, scale, complexity of the threat space is real. It's growing and it's concerning. We can no longer assume that our space superiority is given. If deterrence fails, we must be ready to fight for space superior--superiority. We are today, and with the establishment of the United States space command and the states force, we will be tomorrow.
To this end, U.S. space command will deter aggression from conflict and do it so from a position of strength. Accordingly, we will remain ready to defend U.S. and allied freedom of action in space. We will deliver space ca--combat power for the joint and coalition force. And we're going to develop joint war fighters to serve in, from, and through the space center.
Since the establishment of the United States space command, we have strengthened our integration with our combatant command war fighting partners, and formed the global integration needed to carry out the national defense strategy, advanced our partnership with our allies, and have strengthened our voice and requirements. I am proud of the joint space for fighters that I am privileged to lead. I assure you these professionals are approaching our mission with an eager and innovative boldness that will ensure America remains the world leader in the space domain. It's an honor also to be here today and testify with Admiral Richard and Dr. Anderson. I look forward to your questions.

COOPER:
Thank you, General. Before I introduce Admiral Richard, I want to note that this is the second Alabaman in a row to head STRATCOM, so congratulations and long may that tradition continue.
(LAUGHTER)
Admiral Richard.

RICHARD:
Good afternoon, Chairman Cooper, ranking member Turner, and as to which members of the committee. It is an honor to be here today alongside General Raymond and Dr. Anderson, and it's a privilege to represent the 150,000 men and women performing United States strategic command's missions every day. I'd like to start by thanking Congress for your support in ensuring that the department and STRATCOM have the required resources to execute our mission to deter strategic attack and guarantee the security of our nation and our allies. Continued congressional support, budget stability, on-time appropriations are fundamental assumptions for a long view approach to defense and allow our command to realize presidential and department guidance.
The proposed FY 21 budget supports irreversible implementation of the national defense strategy, meets our current operational requirements, and outpaces the growing existential threats we face. I want to come back to that point. I--I want to note that the commitments are necessary because this nation faces an existential threat. Today's security environment is the most challenging we have seen since the Cold War, both Russia and China are investing considerable resources to advance and expand their arsenals of nuclear and conventional forces while adopting an increasingly assertive posture at the expense of accepted international norms and rules and at the expense of our nation and our allies. Although North Korea and Iran continue to conduct malign activity, fostering regional instability, defying international norms, and threatening the United States, our allies and our partners.
I want you to know as global war fighters, the forces under my command are ready to respond decisively should deterrence fail. A powerful ready triad, survivable nuclear command control and communication systems, and the supporting infrastructure are the foundation for strategic deterrence and assurance. These capabilities are fundamental to our survival as a nation and underpins the department strategy to conduct global all domain operations and communicate the strength of our alliances, the credibility of our forces, and a willingness to act decisively to protect our vital interests in a time and place of our choosing. Strategic deterrence is an active mission and I do operations every day to ensure we have a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
Nevertheless, our nation is at a critical juncture regarding the future of our nuclear forces. Over 40 years ago, our leaders made wise decisions to recapitalize our strategic capabilities that we have benefited from to this day. Since the end of the Cold War, we have led the world in reducing the numbers and types of nuclear weapons in our arsenal, while at the same time, our adversaries went the other direction and expanded their capabilities. It's now our generations turn to make the same wise investments required to deter nuclear use in future great power war for the next two generations. If we do not invest smartly in our nuclear enterprise now, we may begin to reach point of no return, and I predict they'll start in the nuclear weapons complex, next into the nuclear command and control, and then finally, in the triad delivery systems. It may result in our need to rebuild, nearly from scratch, over one or more decades our enterprise talent and infrastructure required to be a nuclear power. We must continue the departments number one priority to recapitalize our nuclear forces and strengthen homeland defense.
Know that our departments proposals do not pursue parity with our adversaries' arsenals or seek a new arms race but provide a qualitative and comprehensive approach towards a viable deterrent for the future at a time of increasing threats. Our command is focused on maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent in providing tailored strategies in coordination with my fellow combatant commanders to meet our responsibilities to the nation. We're ready to be tested and continue to look for solutions to strengthen military readiness and increase lethality. And this includes continuing the seamless transition of space operations with General Raymond and the United States space command. I'm grateful your--for your continued which will aid in developing the future force necessary to execute the department's highest priority mission. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I also look forward to your questions.

COOPER:
Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, , gentlemen. I'm going to withhold most of my questions for the classified session which will be held immediately afterwards in 2337. I yield now to the ranking member, Mr. Turner.

TURNER:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Richard, we've been able to have some discussion of the activities that Russia has undertaken for its nuclear arsenal that go well beyond modernization. We use the term modernization frequently when we talk about what has done but, in fact, they're fielding absolutely new weapons with new and complete unforeseen capabilities. The avant-garde, with its hypersonic capabilities which is deployed, the--the weapon that's been deployed in violation of the--of the INF Treaty, their development of sky fall where recently we just saw an accident where they have developed a missile that is itself not just a nuclear weapon, but also nuclear powered, and Poseidon, where they're looking at a weapon that would go under the ocean un--unmanned.
Before we going to classified session, I wanted to give you an opportunity in the public session because we're going to have a significant debate of our investment into the NNSA, there's been a significant increase in the NNSA's funding which has been needed a necessary. If we're going to modernize ours, and we're not trying to do what Russia has done, we're not going to create new nuclear weapons, we're only undertaking the modernization of our current capabilities. We have to invest in the infrastructure to be able to do that, otherwise, our deterrent won't remain credible. Could you take a moment in a very public session, give us that picture of what our adversaries are doing and to why that's a real threat. And then, secondly, why there is a must in our current efforts to modernize our nuclear enterprises, our triad. And--and what you see as to the importance of why Congress needs to step up now to ensure you have, in the future, the capabilities that--that you currently have? Admiral?

RICHARD:
Thank you, ranking member Turner. To summarize, and I will go into more detail in a classified session--

TURNER:
-- General, I just want to make it clear, you know, telling us in classified session does not help Congress have a debate to be able to conclude budgetary issues. It informs us as to what you know, but the debate on the budget happened in public and--and it will be contested. So, your statement in public are as much is important as the ones that you're going to make in private. In private, you will inform us and make certain that we understand the capabilities and issues, but in public, that's where your language and your words will be entered into our debate.

RICHARD:
Thank you, sir. And so, let me summarize, right? I would characterize what Russia is doing with their strategic and nuclear forces as an explosion and capability, right. They started long ago. They started in 2006, and it goes beyond a mere, if you will, recapitalization and renewal of their triad. It is--it is everything that Russia has. It is an enormous number of non-treaty accountable weapons. These are sometimes referred to nonstrategic. It's--it's actually--and it's not only the weapons themselves, it is the delivery systems that they use. It is actually probably easier to list the ones Russia has that are not duo capable, i.e. conventional and nuclear, then the list the ones that are because they almost all are.
On top of that, you mentioned the new capabilities that they're developing, hypersonic glide, nuclear powered cruise, undersea unmanned nuclear power. But--but, Sir, goes beyond that, right. They have new command-and-control, they have new warning systems, they have new doctrine. They are exercising the level that we hadn't seen before. They even do civil defense, right. That is a concept the United States abandoned back in the early 60s. So, this is a very comprehensive approach that Russia's undertaking. And in many cases with Russia, you've got to look at what they do, not necessarily what they say.
I'll draw you an equivalent picture on China. It's just that China doesn't tell you about it. Russia will tell you exactly what they're doing and why, China does not. But they are also rapidly expanding their capabilities and a particular concern to me is the fact that what they are doing is inconsistent with their stated no first use policy and a more general minimum deterrence strategy. And while they're very opaque, and they don't speak about it very frequently, they will have all the same capabilities that Russia has giving them all the same options.
And then your final point is, why now? When we talk about the modernization of the triad, what we leave out is the or else. And--and the other choice that we have is not to keep what we have. The entire triad is reaching the end of its useful life, and so, either we replace what we have now, or we start to divest almost on a path to disarmament in the face of this growing threat.

TURNER:
Admiral, Russia has publicly announced that it has deployed hypersonic capable weapons named I think the avant-garde is the certainly the name we've given it. Why does that weapon concern you?

RICHARD:
Well, it concerns me for a couple of reasons. One, it is a--they have, you're correct--stated that they have a hypersonic glide vehicle that challenges are warning capability and we not only base are active defenses on that, but I base our posture and response on that as well. And I, ranking member, what I backup is that, things to remember, Russia didn't have to do that, right? That was a choice by their part. China is right behind them in terms of those capabilities so, in the face of our restraint, in the face of our delaying our recapitalization to the last possible moment, that's a great example of going in the exact opposite direction.

TURNER:
Would you consider these weapons provocative?

RICHARD:
They are certainly unhelpful to me in terms of my mission set. It is an additional threat that I'm required to work through the strategic deterrence equation in order to defend this nation.

TURNER:
So, while they deploy these weapons that have new capabilities, brand-new weapons, what is the danger we allow our current capabilities then to decay or degrade?

RICHARD:
We went through a nuclear posture review and determined that we needed tailored strategies for each of our adversaries, and I think that was a wise stack of decisions. The triad is what gives me the capabilities, it's the inherent capabilities in the triad that enables me to execute those strategies. If we don't modernize, I don't have those capabilities anymore. I am at the part where I will have to take the triad apart if we don't do that. Thankfully, we had wise leaders in the past that gave me a triad to be able to take apart but that means, fundamentally, I can't execute the strategy. There's a number of aspects to that, one important one dimension is the extended deterrence and assurance commitments that this nation provides. Without those capabilities, I am concerned about the pressure on nonproliferation that will occur.

TURNER:
There are some that say the W93 is a new nuclear weapon. It's not a new sys--weapon. Admiral, to answer the question as to--to a critic that would say that the undertaking the W93 is a new weapon, why it's not.

RICHARD:
The W93, I think that is one of those things that makes me proud to be an American, right. That we can come up with a program of record like the W93, uses existing designs, it will use existing stockpiled components--

TURNER:
--Okay, so, that means that there is no new pit, right? There's not--there's not a new nuclear weapon inside this?

RICHARD:
The--it will use existing--right now, I need an ability in general to be able to--the--we need to get to 30 and regenerate the ability to have pits for any of the weapons, that's its own constraint right now. But the W93--and remember, that's my requirement for the reason that I'm very pleased to see that the department is taking these steps. This will enable me to address the simultaneous age out of both weapons inside the submarine launched ballistic missile lag, it will enable me to address the imbalance that we currently have inside that lag. It has a--it will be parallel developed with the United Kingdom's efforts in using existing partnership arrangements, and it'll be vital to their maintenance and continuation of their continuous at sea deterrence.

TURNER:
Thank you. General Raymond, Secretary Esper, yesterday, spoke of the national air and space intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base which he had just toured, and the importance of its contribution overall to our national security. I know you, too, are very familiar with their operations, and as we go to stand up space force, there's obviously throughout the entire DOD enterprise, individuals who wonder whether or not their job is moving or whether or not they're moving, or whether or not they'll have a job. The--the secretary has said that he wants to ensure that we don't duplicate efforts, that we don't diminish our current capabilities and capacities. I wonder if you might speak for a moment about the importance of NASIC's overall contributions to national security and our intelligence community.

RAYMOND:
Yes, Sir. Thank you for the opportunity. Yeah, NASIC has provided excellent technical intelligence for the space domain for years. We rely on them very, very heavily. I will tell you the current strategic environment some--that was outlined by Admiral Richard applies to space as well, and the need for increased intelligence across the board, foundational, technical, acquisition intelligence has--is increasing. And so, as we build the space force and U.S. space command, I don't think anybody should be worried about a job. We are a growth industry. And I would suggest that we don't want to break something, we went to build on something to enhance it.

TURNER:
General, thank you very much. I yield back.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.

GARAMENDI:
Admiral Richards, did you say our current policy is one of disarmament unless we do all the new things you want done? Is that what I heard you say?

RICHARD:
I didn't say that that was our current policy. What I will give you is the operational implications of our decisions, yes.

GARAMENDI:
I don't understand what that means. If we continue as we are with the safe, secure, reliable, the development of the B2--B21 LSRO and other delivery systems, is that disarmament?

RICHARD:
My que--I was answering the question if we don't choose to do that. The existing systems we have only have finite lifetimes and they require replacements which will require a commitment by this nation to resources and leadership to replace them. That's my point, Sir.

GARAMENDI:
Are--are we in the process of replacing and developing--

RICHARD:
--We are just at the beginnings of the programs that will be the replacement for the current systems inside the delivery triad.

GARAMENDI:
I see. You said that the W93 is or is not a new weapon?

RICHARD:
The W93 is a new program of record that uses existing designs and existing components--

GARAMENDI:
--Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait--

RICHARD:
--to address a need that I have.

GARAMENDI:
Yeah, let's answer the question. Is it a new weapon? It is a new program of record, is it a new weapon?

RICHARD:
it is a--it is a new program of record, Sir.

GARAMENDI:
I see. Is it a new weapon then?

RICHARD:
It--I'm going to go back to it's a new program of record. We're just now starting the program.

GARAMENDI:
Okay, this dance is getting us nowhere. Does it use a new pit?

RICHARD:
The--it hasn't been designed yet, sir. So, we have to go do the designs to answer the question.

GARAMENDI:
Of the 80 pits--

RICHARD:
--You know we have to ask first to start the program before we can answer some of these questions.

GARAMENDI:
Why then are we going to build 80 pits a year beginning in 10 years?

RICHARD:
The--that is necessary overall inside the weapons complex to refurbish the--the entire stockpile.

GARAMENDI:
Those will only be used for the existing weapons, and the leap of existing weapons?

RICHARD:
The--I'm sorry, your question again, sir?

GARAMENDI:
My question is, what do you intend to do with the 80 pits a year that are supposed to be--the 30, then 80 pits a year that are to be produced in the next 15 years?

RICHARD:
So, actually, this is a very good point. They are used overall in the refurbishment of the weapons that we have. And this is a good example of one of the point of no return that I'm talking about in terms of NNSA's funding is right at the minimum to maintain. All the nation has is an ability right now to refurbish existing weapons. If we drop funding, we push the front of a pipeline back that then spills back into the back of the pipeline showing up and you get to a point--my point here is, you can't recover and you can't get a bigger pipe in less than 10 years no matter how much money you spend--

GARAMENDI:
--But my question is--

RICHARD:
--that's the basis of the 80 pit per year requirement.

GARAMENDI:
So, what do you--what you intend to use them for?

RICHARD:
Refurbishment of our existing weapons, Sir.

GARAMENDI:
Which weapons?

RICHARD:
The whole stockpile, Sir, it's all of them.

GARAMENDI:
That's new news. That is new news. So, you're saying that the new pits that are being--that are to be produced will be used to replace the existing pits in existing weapons, is that what I heard you say?

RICHARD:
Sir, that is NNSA's stockpile modernization plan.

GARAMENDI:
Okay. Well, we'll have a meeting with the NNSA and we'll ask them a question too. So, the W93 is a new program of record, but is not a new weapon?

RICHARD:
Again, the W93 is a new program of record, it is dying to address an imbalance in the strategic lag. It doesn't require new testing, it's not a new design.

GARAMENDI:
I'm going to yield back my time.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Bishop.

BISHOP:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Your answers to Mr. Turner, I thought, were direct and sobering answers so, thank you for that. You know, the Minuteman 3 is already 47 years old and in the devil where the maintenance work is done on them, some of the engineers are actually going to eBay to find spare parts which is not actually a joke. It's unfortunately--it happens. So, let me ask some really simple questions, basic questions about GBSD if I possibly could. There are--let me--I guess, Admiral, let me start with you. There are some people who--analysts that are saying the dyad is enough, that we can do this with bombers and submarines. If you were to maintain the same level of readiness and deterrence, and you only had a dyad, would you be forced to buy new bombers, new submarines?

RICHARD:
Congressman, maybe if I could, two points. One, that depot you're talking about where the Minuteman 3, I--I think that is a credit to the department of the defense and the Air Force and shows you the links we have gone to to maintain these systems. That weapon system wasn't designed to have a depot. That weapon system was designed to be in service for 10 years. And the fact that the Air Force figured out how to retrofit in a depot maintenance process into that is an extraordinary engineering accomplishment and shows you that it is a credit to what the service is trying to do. To your answer, look, I could give you a specific thing on attributes you lose, but if you take the triad apart, I can't execute tailored deterrence strategies. That's it in a nutshell. And I have to come back with a--a different way to go do what the president and the secretary of told me to do.

BISHOP:
So, it wouldn't necessarily be cost-efficient to do that?

RICHARD:
Certainly, wouldn't be cost-efficient.

BISHOP:
Or, if you were to say, let--when people are saying, let's wait for this until we have let's--less strife that we're put on, less pressure put on the Air Force budget. If we were to wait three to five years, that would not be necessarily more cost effective?

RICHARD:
Sir, it certainly wouldn't be more cost effective. And--and the bottom line is I wouldn't have the capabilities necessary to execute the tailored strategies the nuclear posture review calls for.

BISHOP:
Okay, let's--let's assume then that since these are old weapon systems where--I'm still talking about the missile system, there is a--there is natural deterioration attrition that comes along with that. If we were not to go forward with the GBSD program, if we were to delay it in any way, shape, or form, how would our adversaries perceive that force reduction?

RICHARD:
It certainly works to their advantage, right? It, again, takes away a capability. You are quite correct. The--the systems will age out and start to attrite. It's true for Minuteman III, it's true for all the missile systems in the Triad.

BISHOP:
And--and would it make it easier or more difficult to do any kind of arms reduction treaties in the future?

RICHARD:
We would--we would be doing an arms reduction ourselves.

BISHOP:
Unilateral?

RICHARD:
Yes, sir.

BISHOP:
Well, we'd probably win that one, then. Let me also go--like, I'm making the assumption that we have had 45 years--we--there are people talking about just doing a life extension for these 45-year-old missions. I'm assuming that in the 10 years you have been working on this--this issue that all those criteria, all these factors have been factored into the system before you made your decision.

RICHARD:
Congressman, that's absolutely correct. We are well past the point of diminishing returns and cost-effectiveness to not replace the Minuteman III.

BISHOP:
So in 30 seconds, could you just remind me of the purpose for the new system in the first place?

RICHARD:
The purpose for the GBSD, right, is it provides a land based portion of the strategic triad. It presents the enemy an intractable targeting problem and it gives you the most responsive leg of the triad and it provides capabilities that complement the other two legs.

BISHOP:
I certainly hope we move forward with that for a whole bunch of reasons. I don't know to whom ask this next question, whether it's you or the general. Can you get a better name than GBSD? I'm sorry. In all the respect, GBSD sounds like a disease were trying to solve. It's coronavirus. GBSD is the new form of it. Can you please come up with a nicer name? Minuteman III is cute.

RICHARD:
Congressman, I will. That is an Air Force decision, but Navy had the same thing. We used to call it the sea-based strategic deterrent and now we call it Columbia. We'll do the same thing I'm sure with GBSD.

BISHOP:
General, you want to--you want to take a stab at that one?

RAYMOND:
Sir, I'm in the Space Force.
(LAUGHTER)

BISHOP:
Well, there's a Star Wars term coming up here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yelled back.

RAYMOND:
Trust me, I've heard them all.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Carbajal.

CARBAJAL:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Admiral Richard, as commander of STRATCOM, you generate the requirements for our nuclear forces. STRATCOM requirements then drive which warheads the in NSA life extends maintains and in what quantities, correct?

RICHARD:
I originate the requirement. I don't have the authority to approve them. That's done up inside the Department of Defense. But basically, yes.

CARBAJAL:
Thank you. In the case of the submarine leg, we just completed the life extension of the W-761 and the development of the W-762. We are only a couple of years away from finishing that refresh of the W-88. Both are expected to last into the late 2030s. Why is starting development of the W-93 necessary in 2021 and why was it moved up two years?

RICHARD:
So Congressman, kind of two points on that, and this is what happens when you work in a resource constrained environment. Both of those life extensions that you're referring to that not life extend that nuclear explosive package inside those weapons, right? We simply didn't have the resources and the pit capacity to be able to do that, so we had to make a choice. And so those life extensions were modest.
So if you want to replace those weapons or life extended them in the 30s based on historical timelines, we need to start now, and that's why the W-93 is in the program this year. So you're asking a--your second question really gets into NNSA's budget submission, which I don't have complete visibility on. But what I'll note on the FY 21 is that's the first time where we have synchronize to the Department of Defense's budget request along with the NNSA. So they do a piece of it and then maybe, or I'm sorry, the DOD has to marry that up so we have synchronized them in this budget submission and it is also designed to give us time so that we don't simultaneously have all three programs starting at the same point in the late 30s.

CARBAJAL:
Thank you. To that end, what is the plan regarding the other warheads in the submarine force and will one of them be retired?

RICHARD:
See, I think this is the best part about the W-93. Again, it's another thing that just makes me proud to be an American, right? One, it's going to wind up initially being a third warhead and we do have to get through the design piece of it. But it gives us an opportunity. Remember, part of where my requirement is coming from is that the ballistic submarines missile submarines that we have today have 20 tubes. Columbia has 16, right? And so I will need capabilities that will address the fact that we don't have as many tubes in the new class of submarines and the overall number of warheads is going down.
So we have an opportunity here to address the imbalance between the 761s and the W-88's. It will not race the stockpile numbers. Let us finish the design. We might even be able to lower it and then either do that and leave it as a third weapon or potentially make it a replacement for one of the two that we have. We just need to get through the work.

CARBAJAL:
Thank you. Let me continue. Secretary Esper told us yesterday in the full committee hearing that he--he hopes to engage soon on the New Start extension. I have a couple of questions. Do you share general heightens view which he testified to last year that insight into Russian forces gained from New Start is "Unbelievably important?" If New Start expired on February 5, 2021 with no follow-on agreements. Would your job be easier or harder?

RICHARD:
So in general, Congressman, I--and I testified to this before, I support any arms control agreement that enhances the security of this nation. General Hyten was correct, right, that new start does provide a level of insight and it's a confidence building measure. Russia has largely been compliant with it. It does set a limit on the number of strategic weapons they have. All are benefits.
But what it doesn't do is account at all for a class of thousands of weapons that Russia has. They are developing new weapon systems that are not covered by the treaty that are also threats to us and it's a bilateral treaty. My best military advice would be I'd like to have all of that. That would make my job the easiest.

CARBAJAL:
Thank you. And lastly, General Raymond, being that I have Vandenberg Air Force Base in my district, what are the challenges and opportunities in standing up the Space Development Agency?

RAYMOND:
The space development agency actually today works for OSD and RNE. And what it--what it's designed to do is to go fast. I get asked frequently what keeps you awake at night, and there's not a lot, but the thing that does is our ability to go fast. And SDA is designed to be able to go fast, to stay ahead of that--that threat, and largely looking at disaggregated architectures in space, which would be more resilient.

CARBAJAL:
Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Rogers.

ROGERS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Raymond, General Hyten has talked about the old domains operations being that biggest key to our entire budget in the future and our ability to--to compete with a global competitor in the near future at all levels. What roll does Space Command play in working that problem and, just to the point you just now made, how are we going to balance advocating for to deal with emerging threats while we all--at the same time try to deal with present threats?

RAYMOND:
First of all, Congressman Rogers, Space Command plays a critical role in it. The J is joint and we are part of that joint team and all domain is a space. What--what you will hear referred to as JADC2, Joint All Domain Command and Control, it's the connective tissue. It's the DNA that brings the full weight of the joint force together to provide advantage for our nation against--against any adversary.
A lot of work that we have done in--and I know we testified in front of you before on enterprise space battle management was built with this in mind and so we use an open--open standards, open architectures, unified data libraries to--to have data more easily dispersed not just among us but also our allies. So we are playing a critical role on that. On the balancing near term and far term, it's a unique position that I'm in.
As a combatant commander I have kind of a three-year look, if you will. As a service chief I'm looking long. And as you look at the budget that we've submitted in my space force hat, it's this balance of--of making sure were not taking too much near-term risk by getting to the future faster.

ROGERS:
Admiral Richard, first, roll tide.

RICHARD:
Roll Tide, sir.

RAYMOND:
Sir, can I--can I interrupt?

ROGERS:
We want to--we wants to get that on the record for the benefit of General Raymond and Chairman Cooper.

RAYMOND:
Could I get something on the record?
(LAUGHTER)

COOPER:
We'd hoped to avoid that.

RAYMOND:
Go Tigers.

ROGERS:
Admiral Richard, in your opening statement, you referred to the increase in the Russian and Chinese stock--nuclear stockpiles. China, you expected to double their stockpile within the next decade and Russia is--you expect a sizable increase in the near future. Does our current program of record modernization expand our nuclear forces?

RICHARD:
Congressman, no.

ROGERS:
Okay. A few weeks ago, the New York Times column or a New York Times column summed up that budgets investment in nuclear modernization by saying "The president's spending proposal request money for a new arms race with Russia and with China and restores nuclear weapons as a central to military possible policy." The truth is the budget does actually the opposite, doesn't it?

RICHARD:
Congressman, that is correct.

ROGERS:
In your testimony, you speak a lot about the age of our current systems and that we have no margin as we move forward with these programs. Do you have enough funding in this year's budget request for nuclear modernization programs and does the NNSA?

RICHARD:
Congressman, the short answer is yes. I was pleased with the priority that the department placed on it. You heard our secretary and Chairman testify to that yesterday, so yes, in the main, they are fully funded.

ROGERS:
Great. And if you take the warhead modernization program from the NNSA on one hand and you take that Triad modernization of the delivery systems on the other hand, are these numbers satisfactory to keep those two things integrated over the next several years?

RICHARD:
Congressman, for this budget, yes.

ROGERS:
Excellent. And finally, are these investments we're making right now, do they plan for the future threat?

RICHARD:
Absolutely, sir.

ROGERS:
Excellent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Larsen.

LARSEN:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had the chair moved because it was the--it was the tallest chair in front of me. And I don't know why it ended up in front of me, but I think Garamendi put it there. So thanks for coming. I have a couple of questions for all of you but I want to start with Mr. Anderson--Dr. Anderson. On the 25th, General Walters testified to SASC, the Senate Armed Services Committee saying he was in favor for it--of a flexible first use policy. Does it the department have a definition of flexible first--first use policy and is that U.S. policy for nuclear use?

ANDERSON:
So the--the question of whether to adopt a no first use policy has come up periodically over quite some period time and our approach has been not to adapt a no first use policy and there are essentially several reasons for that. One is if we were to adapt--adopt a no first use policy, we think it would undermine the credibility of our nuclear deterrence, it would undermine our security guarantees. We've extended--

LARSEN:
--I understand all those arguments we all understand all those arguments. What's a flexible first use policy if not a first use policy or a no first use policy?

ANDERSON:
So as outlined in our nuclear posture review, we--we reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances as--as a first use.

LARSEN:
All right. Okay. I wanted to get that clear. I--that's not the first use policy not a flexible one and not--I just--the language just didn't sound right. So I wanted to talk to Admiral Richard and General Raymond. Now that we stood up Space Com, and maybe you can give us some--and lightness here and maybe talk a little bit later, are there seams between your commands? Have you found them yet? How are you working to close those--to tighten up those seams?

RICHARD:
Congressman, let me start by the proud parents of U.S. Space Command given that all of General Raymond's responsibilities came from U.S. Strategic Command. I am pleased in that not only do we not have seams, we're actually serving the nation better, right? General Raymond can get into detail about his sensor manager responsibilities, but he's actually serving missile warning better than we used to do by bringing in his other responsibilities in missile defense and space situational awareness. So it is anything but seems. We're actually performing better as a result of what I think was a wise decision by the nation in the department.

LARSEN:
General Raymond?

RAYMOND:
I would agree. We've been very reliant on STRATCOM. When we stood up, we took part of space command initial core. It was about 120 folks that came from U.S. Strategic Command and we have a team embedded in the command today to make sure that--that if there were any seams that they're glossed over. I'm not aware of any seams. I think we've actually--our ability to work together has been enhanced.

LARSEN:
Admiral Richard, if you're the parent, I would note that Mr. Cooper and Mr. Rogers may be the grandparents of this. Well, I had to put you somewhere in the family tree. I'm giving you credit. General Raymond and Dr. Anderson, have you thought through the role and the increasing reliance on commercial capabilities as well as partnering and are you looking at any differently than we looked at it before--before Space Command?

RAYMOND:
We are absolutely reliant on commercial space capabilities today and I think we're going to be more reliant on it in the future. If you looked, there is a terrible word they used in the space business, but there's an explosion in commercial space and we need to be able to leverage that. They are developing--there's they have a business model that goes faster, they have operational capabilities--capabilities that are relevant and--and we are eager to--to develop an architecture that capitalizes on that. So I would suggest that we will be doing way--a lot more commercial work than we've done in the past.

LARSEN:
Where does that sit in your priorities of life?

RAYMOND:
Partnerships is one of the top priorities of--of both U.S. Space Command and the Space Force and I'd say there's several--there are several partnerships that are critical to us. Commercial being one, intelligence community being too, and allies being three.

LARSEN:
Yeah. Dr. Anderson?

ANDERSON:
So I would certainly second that. Commercial space activities are vitally important in that they will in fact grow going forward and into the future and I think this has been widely acknowledged not only with statements from the department of defense but also our--our national security strategy, which is signed by the president of the United States talks about the U.S. leadership role in space and also the--the need for the United States to consider unfettered access to and better operate in freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest.

LARSEN:
All right. Thank you.

COOPER:
Thank the gentleman. Ms. Cheney was going to be recognized next but it's my understanding she's withholding her questions for the closed session. I appreciate that. Ms. Davis.

DAVIS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of you and I think congratulations as well. You know, you probably know that we were having some concerns and questions in armed services committee over the last two days and I wonder if you could discuss with us the unplanned increase in the--in the NNSA. I understand that that's necessary for modernization. Is that correct? But what drove this increase and where--where did you all way in on that?

RICHARD:
Well ma'am, one, in terms of the--the history, I don't know if I--how to characterize it or not characterize it as an unplanned increase. The requirements that I have asked for in terms of for the--my needs for the nuclear delivery systems have not changed and so these--this is certainly what is necessary for us to recapitalize the weapon weapons that I have and the weapons complex.

DAVIS:
Did anybody else want to comment on that? And where--where is that funding as it exists prior to the increase?

RICHARD:
Ma'am, I'm not sure I understand your question.

DAVIS:
Just wondering whether there is unspent dollars in those accounts that--

RICHARD:
--Ma'am, I'd have to defer your question to NNSA.

DAVIS:
Okay. Okay, thank you. Talk a little bit about the strategic stability that hypersonic weapons brings. As you know, there are different points of view on this in terms of risk benefits, the messages that we send. Do you consider them strategic weapons?

RICHARD:
Hypersonics? Yes, ma'am.

DAVIS:
And they get us to the fight faster?

RICHARD:
No, again--

DAVIS:
--Or how would you--how would you talk about that?

RICHARD:
This is just another capability. And again, I think it is important to remember that our competitors chose on their own initiatives to add this, right? In the end, to do strategic deterrence, the fundamental equation has not changed, right? For whatever action the adversary considers can I either deny their aim or impose a cost greater than what they seek? This changes that calculus. And what I have to do is to make sure that I can make it whole such that the benefit of restraint still continues to outweigh the benefit of action.

DAVIS:
Can we integrate these technologies, hypersonic technologies with our NATO partners?

RICHARD:
The--ma'am, again, it depends on whether you're talking about defensive technologies or warning technologies and or our own use of those. In both cases though, the answer is yes, we can integrate those.

DAVIS:
Admiral Richard, as you know, China's arsenal of nuclear warheads is something on the order of one-tenth of what Russia's are. Is that correct?

RICHARD:
For this hearing, yes ma'am.

RICHARD:
So in terms of our priority over the next five years, what would that be than in terms of maintaining and pushing to expand limits on Russia's nuclear arsenal? How would you describe that?

RICHARD:
Well, I would describe it one, ma'am, is that where China is today is not the trajectory that there on, right, so we must make sure we understand where they are going. Their actions are inconsistent with their stated policy, both no first use and what you derive as a minimum deterrent strategy. And I guess what in the end what I do offer is I don't have the luxury of picking which threat to this nation I'm not going to defend. And so I have to look at the collective of what we face and make sure that for each of those individual competitors I can make that equation hold for all of them all the time.

DAVIS:
Anybody else want to weigh in on that? Do you agree? Okay, thank you. And our--our European allies, how are they perceiving that New Start Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty now? Do we need to--what are--how are you assessing what they have to say about that and what if we withdraw from the treaty? Do we have other appropriating agreements in place to ensure that we will be notified of flights over our assets?

RICHARD:
Ma'am, one, if we withdraw from the treaty, they wouldn't be able to do flights over our assets. In terms of what the--the New Start itself has not entered in very much into my conversation. So I'm strictly referring to U.S. Strategic Command, and so I unconfident that under any circumstances right now, I can continue to provide extended deterrence and assurance commitments to our allies.
Open Skies, I'm probably not the best person to answer your question in terms of not having direct responsibility, but I will say that Open Skies provides benefit to our allies. It does not provide very much direct benefit to my command individually. And again, there is a confidence building aspect to it that is favorable.

DAVIS:
I think overall I think we could--we certainly would be very concerned and they would be very concerned if we do something different.

RICHARD:
Yes, ma'am. I think they would also be equally concerned if one party doesn't comply, and so that is the political decision that the nation will face.

DAVIS:
Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.

COOPER:
Mr. Wilson.

WILSON:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for your service and indeed, what a critical time of transitioning to great power competition but yet existential threats to American families. And as you are citing, decisions made decades ago that have had a positive impact. We look forward to working with you to have a positive impact. And indeed, Admiral, I'm grateful to be with you in that I'm very grateful Navy dad. My Navy doctor son served in Iraq and--but I'm also an Air Force uncle who is--with a nephew that served in Iraq. So thank all of you for your service.
And Admiral, modernizing our nuclear forces associated infrastructure is necessary to defend the homeland promoting peace through strength. How with the continued atrophy of our strategic nuclear forces impact STRATCOM's ability to deter against strategic attack?

RICHARD:
Well, it'll be harmful to it, Senator, in the short. And I think, I mean, a good example is the summary, right? Take the Ohio class submarine. Again, all of these things makes me be--proud to be an American. You thought you were going to get 30 years out of it from those wise decisions you talked about. We actually got 42, right?
What a credit to the people that designed it, built it, maintained it and took it to this point. But they'll start going away in 27, and that--there's nothing that can change that. And without that, I start to lose survivability in that leg of the triad.

WILSON:
And having grown up in the holy city of Charleston, I remember the Nautilus submarines going back and forth and the consequence of that, and that is peace through strength with the implosion of the Soviet Union. So what you've done is so important. And Dr. Anderson, the president requested that full funding for the plutonium sustainment through both this year and last year to accommodate 80 pits per year by 2030. I appreciate this initiative and want my colleagues to understand how important this is. If pit production is underfunded, how does this affect our national security over the next 10 to 15 years?

ANDERSON:
So as you suggest, the pit production is crucial to our national security, and this is something that we have sent the--set these targets intact 30 by 2026 and 80 by 2030. And this is absolutely essential to ensure that our nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and reliable for deterrent purposes. I've had the good fortune to visit both facilities, Savannah River and Los Alamos where these pits are going to be produced and I was very favorably impressed by the workforce bear and the professionalism and the great seriousness with which they take this task. And this is--this is absolutely crucial to maintain the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrence.

WILSON:
And additionally, Dr. Anderson, the nuclear modernization efforts are so important, and thank you again for visiting that Savannah River site firsthand. My constituents are very supportive in your activities. And in fact, on November 28 this year, we'll be celebrating the 70th anniversary of this Savannah River National laboratory and we are very, very grateful. And how important are that nuclear modernization efforts to the department of defense and what risk do we incur but not adequately funding these programs?

ANDERSON:
As Admiral Richard has emphasized earlier and--and I would certainly agree that these modernization programs, these recapitalization programs are absolutely essential to our national security. The--the legs of the triad, the existing legs are--are old and they are getting older and to avoid what would, in effect, be defective disarmament, they need to be recapitalized.
We are not, as stated before, we're not growing the overall nuclear arsenal, the number of warheads. These are one--one for one replacements with the warheads and the legs of the triad that are being modernized with the ground-based strategic deterrence, the Columbia submarine and the B21 radar or--will make these systems more reliable, more survivable, more resilient, and therefore more credible. So as--as Secretary Esper and the chairman and many other senior leaders have stated, this is--this is our highest priority in--in the department.

WILSON:
Again, thank each of you for your serving and we look forward in a bipartisan manner to work with you in the future. I yield back.

COOPER:
Thank you. Ms. Horn.

HORN:
Thank you, Chairman, and thank you all for being here today. I want to turn the conversation to national security space. So General Raymond, although I don't have a problem with the tall chair that--that Rick did, I do have a problem with being short, so hopefully you can see me.
Turning the conversation to space and the importance of the work you're doing, I have a few--a few things that I'd like to hear from you on. First, I think it's a clear that we cannot--we cannot do--you cannot you do your jobs. None of--none of you can do your jobs and protect our--our forces without our space assets, our national security space assets are absolutely integral. And as we have a growing number of--of adversaries that are coming in to this--this and making significant investments, I'd just like to start with your assessment, General Raymond, of what the actual threats look like to our national security space environment, and then I'll follow-up with some more specifics and--and following on that to the most direct ways that we are addressing this threat.

RAYMOND:
First of all, thanks for the question. It's clearly space is a contested domain. There's a full range of threats and, if you'll allow me, I'll lay out the full range at this level and I'll be happy to go into much more detail in a closed session.
But, as I mentioned in my opening comments, the scope, scale, and complexity of these threats are real today. Everything from reversible jamming of satellite communications and GPS satellites to directed energy to cyber threats to on orbit activity and including the one that I just talked about publicly where Russia has launched a satellite that released another satellite in close proximity to a U.S. satellite, which is concerning to directed--directed on (INAUDIBLE) where China shot down one of their own satellites in 2007, so that full scope and scale is why U.S. Space Command in the United States Space Force are both so important.

HORN:
I agree. And I think that the next question is, and there's a lot we can't get to in this session, but just establishing a foundation, I--I chair the space and aeronautic subcommittee and science, space, and technology. So with that--that view of both our national security space environment and our civil space environment, space situational awareness is another critical factor. And right now, that falls to the Air Force, essentially, for all--all of the different aspects of space situational awareness, which is something that we are--we need to address.
So, with that--that view of both our national security, space environment, and our civil space environment, space situational awareness is another critical factor. And right now that--the--that falls to the Air Force, essentially, for all--all of the different aspects of space situational awareness, which is something that we are--we need to address.
So, in--in terms of your capability, as you stand up Space Force, as--as you've been working with Space Command, is--is addressing and--and--and taking space situational awareness on a larger scale out of your domain, is that something that would be helpful, useful? Can you speak to that, if we were to move those responsibilities?

RAYMOND:
Move them to the Space Force?

HORN:
No, having another entity--

RAYMOND:
--Oh, I gotcha. I got it--

HORN:
--And/or group that would address non-national security space related--

RAYMOND:
--Yes, I--

HORN:
--Situational awareness.

RAYMOND:
I understand. So, space situational awareness is foundational to everything that we do in space. And in fact, I've changed the terminology that we're using in it, and I'm talking about space domain awareness rather than space situational awareness because we have to have a deeper understanding.
It is critical that our national security space experts are focused on that deeper understanding. Today, we serve as the air--the space traffic control for the world, the Space Force does, and I don't need to do that, in my opinion. You have better things for me to do than that.
We would really like to transfer that over to the Department of Commerce. We're working very closely with the Department of Commerce to do that. We're still going to maintain all of our systems to have that situational awareness and space domain awareness, but I don't need to be--our folks don't need to be the--the people that open up the Rolodex and make notifications.

HORN:
This is a longer conversation but I think important to establish. And finally, more in--in the closed session, I know, but I'd like to know what--the biggest challenges that you're facing in standing up Space Force and understanding all of these varying threats--

RAYMOND:
--We have--

HORN:
--Right now.

RAYMOND:
We have a great opportunity in setting up the Space Force. We have challenges, but I think the--the opportunities are--are even greater. And I appreciate, as I said up front, the--the work that this committee did. That law--the law gives us a lot of flexibility to build this with a clean sheet of paper.
This is a startup company, and we have an opportunity to not be tied to the past and build a service that is purpose built for this domain. Two--two challenges that I see; one, we have to be bold and we need to make sure that we are thinking bold enough; and two, as we are bold, we're going to need support to--to get those initiatives through.

HORN:
Thank you. I yield back.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Moulton?

MOULTON:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much for--for being here today. We appreciate it.
Admiral Richard, you testified two weeks ago that the New START Treaty provides STRATCOM with a vital threat assessment of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal, and that it provides transparency and confidence building measures that are good for deterrence. So, do you support an extension of the New START Treaty?

RICHARD:
So, Congressman, that is exactly what I said, and it is that it gives us insight in terms of the threat levels, right? It puts a limit on the--the threat levels. That's--

MOULTON:
--And do you think it's a good idea, a realistic idea, to include China in some sort of trilateral agreement in place of START?

RICHARD:
What China needs--

MOULTON:
--In place of New START, rather--

RICHARD:
--What I would love to be able to convince China of is the benefits of arms control in general, right? I--forget the numbers, right? The idea--

MOULTON:
--Right. But just to be clear, the numbers right now are that China has about a tenth the number of weapons as Russia, or thereabouts, maybe around somewhere--300. So, we don't exactly want a treaty that equalizes numbers and therefore encourages China to bring its numbers up.

RICHARD:
Right. I would like to encourage China to understand the mutual benefit of arms control, the benefit to China of arms control, confidence building measures, transparency, avoiding miscalculation. That's what I would like to see added to the--to the table.

MOULTON:
Great. Thank you, Admiral. I want to move on to some questions about hypersonics, because I think it's incredibly important that we counter the emerging technologies from Russia and China, but we also just have to be careful about how we're doing that.
One of the things that Russia and China are doing very smartly is they're not countering all our technologies. They're trying to leapfrog us in certain areas. And fundamentally--you know, we'll have a closed session to ask some more detailed questions. But in this open session so that people understand, are hypersonic weapons faster than our existing ballistic missiles?

RICHARD:
In--Congressman, to--to your point, actually a hypersonic weapon is slower than--

MOULTON:
--It's actually slower--

RICHARD:
--It's slower than a ballistic--

MOULTON:
--Right--

RICHARD:
--Missile.

MOULTON:
So, another question. Is our existing missile defense program designed to protect us from an ICBM attack from Russia?

RICHARD:
By policy, our existing missile defense systems are designed to protect us from rogue nations and intentionally not designed to interfere with either Russia or China's strategic deterrent.

MOULTON:
Right, because the point is we just don't have enough interceptors to counter the type--the numbers that have--

RICHARD:
--It is not only a technically infeasible cost imposing piece, but there are significant strategic stability concerns if you were to go down those lines.

MOULTON:
Right. So, essentially what does protect us is this--this doctrine of mutually assured destruction.

RICHARD:
I wouldn't call it mutually assured destruction, sir. That's what it was back in the Cold War. I have an ability to impose a cost on them that is greater than--than that which they seek.

MOULTON:
Okay. So, our terminology has become more polite since the term--since the Cold War. But essentially what--

RICHARD:
--I will be--I will be--

MOULTON:
--What they can expect is that we will respond in kind. If they shoot 100 missiles our way, we're going to be able to shoot 100 missiles back at them.

RICHARD:
Oh, I might not necessarily recommend that at all, sir. I will simply recommend options that will provide a cost that they will find unacceptable relative to what they're trying to gain.

MOULTON:
Fair enough. So, what do we do if Russia or China launches a hypersonic missile?

RICHARD:
I do the same--and I should be very clear. I don't have direct operational responsibility for the missile defense system over North America or in any other theater. I do have worldwide advocacy responsibilities for that.
We do the same thing that we do for any other threat to North America, which is to--step one is I have to characterize it. I have to understand what it is, how big is it, what is threatened.

MOULTON:
And how you characterize that? Because when a hypersonic missile is launched--I mean, look, if--if Russia launches a whole bunch of ICBMs, we know exactly what's coming at us. We know where they're going and when they're going to land. If they launch one singular--single hypersonic weapon, Russia or China, we don't know what warhead it's carrying. We don't know where it's going to land because we can see it launched but we don't know where it's going to go.

RICHARD:
--Congressman, I'm not trying--

MOULTON:
--So--

RICHARD:
--To argue with you because you're--

MOULTON:
--Right--

RICHARD:
--Absolutely correct. We--certain HGV systems today, because our systems were not designed against them, do challenge us. It's not that we have no ability to characterize the threat to this nation. The size of the raid alone starts to give you information as to what--

MOULTON:
--Sure--

RICHARD:
--It might be able to do. We already don't have the ability to characterize the payload on any inbound weapon system to the U.S., hypersonic or not. And--

MOULTON:
--Well, we have a pretty darn good idea of what's coming at us if--if we get an ICBM attack.
And--and this is my point, is just to get--we don't have--we only have a few seconds left. But I'm very concerned that these weapons are strategically destabilizing. And I think that we need to carefully consider that as we--as we determine what our appropriate response to China and Russia's development of hypersonics is. And--

RICHARD:
--Congressman, I would agree with you 100 percent. But what I want to assure you is is that I can still today, with the threats that we face, make sure that there is adequate deterrence to defend this--

MOULTON:
--I understand that, and I appreciate you emphasizing that point. Thank you, Admiral.

COOPER:
Thank you. Mr. Brooks?

BROOKS:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Raymond, you've previously highlighted to this committee the importance of modernizing our nation's fleet of national security launch vehicles in a timely manner. As the Air Force has outlined, the goals of the National Security Space Launch phase two launch procurement are to encourage competition, assure our access to space, and end our reliance on Russian engines.
You also outline that two providers is the right number of providers, based on the Air Force's past experience. So, two quick questions. Can you please provide this committee with an update on the program? And second, are you still on track to make awards this year?

RAYMOND:
All three of those fundamental tenets, assured access to space, increased competition, get off the RD-180 engine, are on track. And we're on track to make an award this summer.

BROOKS:
All right. Thank you.
Admiral Richard, in your written testimony, you highlight the need for a concerted effort to expand and improve existing capabilities for both homeland and regional missile defense. Aside from technology development efforts to field new capabilities 10 years down the road as part of the Next Generation Interceptor program, what invest--excuse me, what investments to improve the current homeland missile defense system are being made?

RICHARD:
So, Congressman, one, I'm responsible for the requirements, right? And I--the requirements that we have asked to provide I think are very sound in terms of our ability to defend against a rogue nation threat. And I think you'd be pleased in the budget submission in terms of the additional things that we're asking for.
My biggest priority, as the commander of STRATCOM, gets after improved warning capability that provides me the ability to posture my forces. And I would look to where we're going with our space-based sensing layer, and then defer to General Raymond to give you more details on that.

RAYMOND:
Yeah, it's going to be absolutely critical that we develop a missile defense layer in space to--to be able to get after that warning challenge that he articulated.

BROOKS:
This question is for General Raymond, but if Dr. Anderson or Admiral Richard want to chime in, feel--please feel free to do so. There is great interest around the country as to where the Space Force is going to be located. There is also great interest with respect to the battle command portion of the Space Force. What are the criteria for the location of the battle command and, in particular, how much focus is there on whether that ultimate site ought to be hardened in order to best stay functional when the missiles fly and the nuclear bombs go off?

RAYMOND:
So, there's actually--let me--two parts, as you said. There's a Space Force and a Space Command. Space Force, like the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, is going to be headquartered in the Pentagon. That's where all the services are.

BROOKS:
All the top brass will be in the Pentagon?

RAYMOND:
That's--

BROOKS:
--That makes sense--

RAYMOND:
--That's where the--so, the--the--the question that is being analyzed right now is where does U.S. Space Command reside. Today that U.S. Space Command resides in Colorado Springs, so that's where the Joint Force Space Component Command was when we stood up.
The Air Force is responsible to do that basing decision. They're going through the analysis as we speak. And sometime later this year or early next year, they'll make a decision on where that should be. There's a whole list of criteria. The Air Force just announced everything from schools to licensing for spouses, all the way up through mission workforce. I mean, there's a whole laundry list, and I'd be happy to come back to you and share that list with you.

BROOKS:
How much weight is given to how hardened the site can be for the location of the battle command?

RAYMOND:
Yeah. So, that would be linked into--under the mission to make sure that you can--you have a--have a--ability to conduct a mission. And we do that in a variety of ways. And again, in a--in the closed session, I could give you more details.

BROOKS:
All right. Thank you, sir. Anyone else wish to add anything, Dr. Anderson, Admiral Richard?

ANDERSON:
No.

RICHARD:
No, sir.

BROOKS:
All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COOPER:
Thank you. Now the patient Mr. Lamborn.

LAMBORN:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. Thank the three of you for what you do to protect our country. General Raymond, I know establishing a new service must be a daunting task. In fact, I commiserate with you. You have to move from Colorado to Washington here any--any time now, so good luck with that move.
But I applaud you for your leadership so far in this endeavor. Among your challenges is to develop warfighting doctrine, build a force around that doctrine, and educate space professionals. So, on the education aspect, do you have plans to establish a space training center of excellence?

RAYMOND:
I think--thank you, Congressman Lamborn. I think one of the things--first of all, standing up a space force is--is really cool, and it's an exciting and--and I--I--I am honored and absolutely privileged to have--be a part of this. I've got a great team.
I think there's several things that are foundational to a separate service. One of them is you have to be able to develop your people and you have to be able to develop your doctrine. I think those two things are--are foundational to a separate service. So, we're doing the organization work as we speak to plan how we will do that. My expectation will be that we will have an organization that's focused on--on training and development and doctrine.

LAMBORN:
And as a parenthetical, I--I know that that's--that that technical training would be different from and build on the academic and scientific engineering training that peep--people in the Space Force would get at a place like the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs.

RAYMOND:
Yeah. So, where our expectation is, and this--you know, I'm--I've--I'm telling you the honest to goodness truth as I know it today. Where my expectation is as we--as we begin the development of this is that we--we have a great opportunity here.
We--we just--we just published 30--and advertised 30 jobs that were opened at the Pentagon for the Space Force. I think the number was, and don't quote me on this, like 5,000 people applied, a significant number. We have--this is generating interest across the nation. It's--it's generating interest in a--in our colleges and our recruiting things.
But I think what will end up happening is that the Air Force will bring in the human capital raw material, if you will. They'll recruit. We'll have a--a space focused part of that recruiting, but the recruiting machine will leverage the Air Force to keep this light, lean, and mission focused. We'll leverage the Air Force Academy to build officers. We'll leverage ROTC and OTS. And then once folks get commissioned or enlisted into the service, the Space Force will take them and develop them into the space warfighters that they need.

LAMBORN:
Excellent.

RAYMOND:
That's where our head is today.

LAMBORN:
Excellent. And will National Security Space Institute be a part of this?

RAYMOND:
Absolutely. They're a fundamental part of what we do today. They teach Space 100, 200, 300, the professional development course, and they'll be built into that.

LAMBORN:
Excellent. Do you need anything more from us that--we're--we're working on the NDAA as we speak, funding authorities, etc., etc.?

RAYMOND:
Yes, sir. So, we are--one of the--the tasks that came out of the last NDAA was to come back with a legislative proposal for the--for next years. One of the things that the law said today was that--that this started out by--by taking folks and missions and capabilities from the Air Force. The department's vision is that we will broaden this to the other services in the future.

LAMBORN:
Excellent. Changing gears a little bit, someone told me that there are elements of our nation's civil space program, which obviously includes manned space travel, that carry over into our national defense space program. These elements are said to add unnecessary paperwork and red tape to national space procurement. Are you aware of any spillover from civil to national space procurement of this nature?

RAYMOND:
No sir, I'm not. I can--I can do some digging and get back to you. We--we do have a partnership with NASA, a strong relationship with NASA. We support the--the--the launch operations when--and this year we'll start launching humans again. NASA will start launching humans again out of--out of Cape Canaveral. We work--we--in fact, we've developed an in--an internship program for some training opportunities. But I'm not aware of any spillover on--on acquisition things. But I'll--I'll come back to you.

LAMBORN:
Okay. Thank you. Please do. And I'll save the rest of my questions for the closed session, and I yield back.

COOPER:
Thank you. The open session of the subcommittee will adjourn and we'll reopen almost immediately into 2337 with the closed session. Thank you.
List of Panel Members and Witnesses
PANEL MEMBERS:
REP. JIM COOPER (D-TENN.), CHAIRMAN
REP. SUSAN A. DAVIS (D-CALIF.)
REP. RICK LARSEN (D-WASH.)
REP. JOHN GARAMENDI (D-CALIF.)
REP. JACKIE SPEIER (D-CALIF.)
REP. SETH MOULTON (D-MASS.)
REP. SALUD CARBAJAL (D-CALIF.)
REP. RO KHANNA (D-CALIF.)
REP. WILLIAM KEATING (D-MASS.)
REP. KENDRA HORN (D-OKLA.)
REP. ADAM SMITH (D-WASH.), EX-OFFICIO
REP. MICHAEL R. TURNER (R-OHIO), RANKING MEMBER
REP. JOE WILSON (R-S.C.)
REP. ROB BISHOP (R-UTAH)
REP. MIKE D. ROGERS (R-ALA.)
REP. MO BROOKS (R-ALA.)
REP. BRADLEY BYRNE (R-ALA.)
REP. SCOTT DESJARLAIS (R-TENN.)
REP. LIZ CHENEY (R-WYO.)
REP. MAC THORNBERRY (R-TEXAS), EX-OFFICIO
WITNESSES:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DR. JAMES ANDERSON
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND COMMANDER GENERAL JOHN RAYMOND
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND COMMANDER ADMIRAL CHARLES RICHARD
Source: CQ Transcripts