SASC Fiscal Year 2026 U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command Posture Hearing

FISCHER: The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of the United States Strategic Command and the United States Space Command.

I want to begin by thanking our witnesses, General Cotton from STRATCOM and General Whiting from SPACECOM.

General Cotton, this is likely one of the last times you'll be speaking before our Committee. You have always been open and forthright with this Committee. And I want to thank you for your service and dedication as you approach your final year as commander of STRATCOM.

Today, we face a threat environment more dangerous than we've seen since the Second World War. For the first time in history, the United States faces two adversary nuclear powers in Russia and China. Russia has nearly completed modernizing its nuclear triad and continues to expand and improve their tactical nuclear forces.

China, meanwhile, which used to be considered a lesser included case, is expanding its own arsenal at a breathtaking pace. China now has more ICBM launchers than the United States and is expected at least to triple its stockpile by 2035. I would also note that China has outpaced every previous estimate that we've made.

General Cotton, as you well know, this is an extremely important time for STRATCOM. Each leg of our triad is undergoing a generational modernization. This includes the Columbia class submarine to replace the Ohio class, the B21 bomber to replace the B1 and B2 bombers, and the Sentinel ICBM to replace the Minuteman III.

Given the ages of the legacy programs, it is essential that these modernization efforts be prioritized and properly resourced to ensure we have capabilities fielded in time to meet the growing threat.

While it is the responsibility of the services to get these programs back on schedule, it is STRATCOM who must mitigate risk associated with any delays. I look forward to hearing more in the closed session about your plans to do so.

Additionally, the Nuclear Armed Sea-Launched Cruised Missile, or SLCM, remains a critical program to deter our adversaries from believing they can use tactical nuclear weapons.

I look forward to hearing from you, General Cotton, on your work with the Navy on SLCM. I would be remiss if I did not also underscore the importance of NC3, what Senator King and I refer to as the fourth leg of the triad.

NC3 underpins all aspects of nuclear deterrence. General Cotton, I appreciate the focus that you have given NC3 modernization during your time in command. And I will be eager to receive an update on the implementation of the NC3 roadmap.

General Whiting, the space domain is now, as you point out in your opening statement, a highly contested strategic environment. China and Russia possess growing counterspace capabilities that hold U.S. space assets at risk. Russia is developing the capability to place a nuclear weapon on orbit while China is investing in maneuverable satellites that could target our satellites. And these are just the threats that we can discuss in this open setting.

While I look forward to a more robust discussion on how we need to address these threats in a classified session, I am eager to hear from you during this open session on your priority years for -- your priorities for fiscal year 2026, and how we can leverage emerging technologies to field more dynamic space-based systems.

I am also eager to hear an update on how SPACECOM is working with the other combatant commands, the services, and the intelligence community to ensure that we are developing the right capabilities, sharing information with war fighters in real time, and that the services and interagency partners are integrated appropriately.

I will make one final point before I turn it over to Senator King for his opening statement. Both of your combatant commands rely on access to critical electromagnetic spectrum to carry out your missions. As we know, there are efforts underway to force DoD to vacate portions of those spectrum bans. Such an outcome would be detrimental to U.S. national security and result in significant costs as various DoD equities are forced to invest the resources to redesign, procurement, and field new system s to operate in different spectrum bands, if that is even feasible.

General Whiting and General Cotton, I look forward to hearing from both of you on the importance of spectrum to your missions. Before any decisions are made on whether to auction off DoD spectrum, the American people deserve to understand the risks there would be to national security.

Again, thank you both for appearing before us today. I look forward to hearing your testimony. Senator King, you are recognized.

KING: Thank you, Senator Fischer. I want to first thank both of you for your service and for the incredible work that you've done, both in managing the assets that are in your purview, but also in thinking about how to move forward. This is a posture hearing. It's really a status report. It's a combination of a status report, where are we now? But where do we need to be? And what do we need in the way of resources in order to get there?

General Cotton, deterrence is the keystone of our entire defense strategy. We often forget that we get lost in counting tanks or airplanes or Navy ships. But the whole idea of all of these resources is that they never be used, that they'd be such a terrifying prospect for a potential adversary that they will never be used. And in fact, that deterrence has worked in the nuclear area for 75, 80 years. So that's really what we need to talk about today. And modernizing the triad, which we're in the middle of right now, is an expensive proposition.

But to shortchange that process, in my view, would be disastrously short-sighted. So I hope to hear where we are on modernization with the various -- with the parts of the triad, but also where we need to be, what necessary authorities there are that we need to be talking about, and also necessary funding.

I refer to nuclear modernization as the pig in the budgetary python. It is a -- unfortunately, just by history, we're having to do all three legs at once. And that is a very expensive proposition. But it's something that we have to do in order to maintain the deterrent strategy that's protected this country for so long.

In terms of the space assets, of course, it's no news to anybody that space was an uncontested domain 20 years ago. 10 years ago, it began to be contested. And today, it's highly contested. So General, we've really got to be understanding the status where we are, particularly when we're talking about a potential conflict with China, which would involve the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and naval power, and how that would be subject to space assets, and how we can protect ourselves in a time of potential conflict. Of course, we all hope that conflict can be avoided. That brings me back to deterrence.

So I think the important message that I have is that decisions we make here today and over the next six months will have profound impacts in the future. And that's what's so important about what we're talking about today. I can think of no two more important people right now in thinking about how to posture this country in order to maintain deterrence and the security of the American people. So I thank you for being here. I look forward to your questions.

And now, I think it's time to turn it over to the Chair.

FISCHER: OK. Thank you, Senator King. We are joined today by Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed. And I would ask each of them to give an opening statement if they so desire at this time. Chairman Wicker?

WICKER: Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to thank the Chair and Senator King for working together as a team for years on this topic. And I think it should be clear to people listening that there's no space between them. They are approaching this in a bipartisan manner. They understand how important it is. And yes, Senator King is correct, we're talking about preventing, we're talking about being strong enough to prevent a nuclear war, and nothing could be more important.

And yes, it is going to be expensive, but there's no question about it. We're going to have to spend the money as wisely and efficiently as we can to get the job done. I want to thank Senator Cotton for his service and wish him well as he prepares to transition into private life. And thank you, General Whiting, for being here.

I'm going to put my statement in the record and just say that today, I hope to understand how you're managing the risk of critical military capabilities that are both too old and too few to truly meet the threats of today, much less those of tomorrow.

Secondly, how to understand better the roles of your commands evolving as the new administration develops updated strategies and guidance, and then hear your thoughts on areas where you believe this committee can help improve the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent and space posture.

With that, I will ask unanimous consent to include my statement in the record. And yield back.

FISCHER: Without object.

WICKER: Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam Chair.

FISCHER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member Reed?

REED: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. I want to commend General Cotton for his 39 years of service to the country and to the Air Force. And I wish you and your wife, Marsha, the very best in your retirement. General Whiting, thank you for joining us this morning, also.

General Cotton, there are reports that indicate that the administration is considering removing the dual hatted role the commander of U.S. European Command currently holds as the NATO Supreme Allied Command of Europe or SACEUR. The SACEUR position was created in part to ensure that our nuclear weapons and hence our nuclear umbrella provided to our NATO allies under Article 5 was always kept under the control of the United States.

Indeed, the release codes for our nuclear weapons which are carried by NATO plans (ph) come from the President through SACEUR to unlock the weapons. If the U.S. walks away from this position, we are lessening the protection of our extended nuclear deterrent to our allies. And I believe we're harming U.S. national security and global security.

For over six decades, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has provided an ironclad guarantee to deter the Soviet Union and now Russia. And it has been successful. I'm also concerned about the signal it may send to our Asian allies, especially South Korea, who also relies on the credibility of our nuclear umbrella. These are difficult issues and I hope in the course of the questioning we can get more details from you about that.

And then thank you, Madam Chairman.

FISCHER: Thank you, Senator Reed. And now, I'd like to have our opening statements from the panel. General Cotton, would you go first, please?

A. COTTON: Good morning Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member King, Chairman Wicker, and Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of this Committee. It is an honor for Sergeant Major Kreamer and I to be here alongside General Whiting and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons and a privilege to continue representing the service members, civilians, and families of United States Strategic Command.

I would like to thank this Committee and Congress for its continued support in providing us with the resources required to execute our assigned missions. Above all else, I extend my gratitude to the American people for their enduring support of the military.

In my third and final year serving as STRATCOM Commander, it has been the most rewarding experience of my 39-year career. I have submitted my 2025 posture statement for the record. I'll begin by assuring you that the nation's nuclear forces which are foundational to our national security are safe, secure, effective and credible. As I speak, STRATCOM and its components are deterring our adversaries and stand ready to respond decisively whether underground, in the air or beneath the seas, should deterrence fail. And our mission has never been more important.

Today, the United States, its allies and partners are confronted with a deteriorating security environment. The Chinese Communist Party is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces into a fully functional triad with more than 600 nuclear warheads and counting. Russia has modernized the majority of its nuclear arsenal.

North Korea continues with its unlawful and destabilizing programs in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. And Iran continues to pursue uranium enrichment. Additionally, the tools of war are changing, from novel missile systems, to counter U.S. space capabilities, from cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, to competition in the electromagnetic spectrum. These are rapidly developing threat vectors across multiple domains and regions to include the Arctic.

To effectively deter adversaries across the spectrum of threats requires sustained legacy triad systems and urgently completing the multigenerational decades-long modernization of all three legs of the nuclear deterrent and its critical NC3 systems. No portfolio is in need of recapitalization more than a nuclear portfolio. And a modernization I'm advocating for requires continued uninterrupted funding and an industrial base capable of steady and continuous production.

Commitment to modernization will ensure that U.S. Strategic weapons continue to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, and allow us to achieve national objectives if deterrence fails.

Thank you again for your support and focus on our mission. And I look forward to answering your questions.

FISCHER: Thank you. General Cotton, General Whiting.

WHITING: Chairwoman Fischer and Ranking Member King, Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your support and the opportunity to represent the warfighters of U.S. space Command. It's truly an honor to testify alongside my friend, General Cotton, once again and to discuss our vital role in achieving peace through strength.

At U.S. Space Command, our guiding principle is clear. To secure peace, we must be well prepared for conflict in space. And if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. U.S. Space Command is upholding this principle in the face of operational threats, which continue to expand at a breathtaking pace, and which are being fielded deliberately to challenge the United States, the American way of life, and hold the Joint Force at risk.

These novel and unprecedented developments include China's robust counter space weapons and space enabled kill chains, Russia's reported pursuit of an on orbit nuclear anti-satellite weapon, and wide ranging ballistic cruise and hypersonic missile threats.

Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains advantages in space. Thanks to the unified mission focus of our superb joint warfighters, our unmatched commercial space sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and partnerships. Our foremost advantage and the cornerstone of U.S. Space Command are our officer, enlisted and civilian personnel. No other nation can match our team's understanding of the complexities of space and the requirements to effectively operate in the most challenging area of responsibility. Our military has the best trained, most capable space warfighting force in the world, and they stand dedicated to fight for America.

Since my last testimony, U.S. Space Command published our new campaign plan integrating and synchronizing the command's operations, activities and investments with the Joint Force and the interagency, leaving no doubts to our opponents that we are stronger, more capable, and ready to counter any threat.

Over the past year, U.S. Space Command's Commercial Integration Cell grew to 17 commercial mission partners, enhancing our threat information sharing at classified levels and improving our crisis action planning. We also expanded Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender to seven nations with the addition of Germany, France, and New Zealand. This growth further strengthens partnerships and enables our allies to share the burden of collective space security.

That said, these advantages and our ability to deter potential adversaries cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence in space is consistent with other domains. It requires a keen understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring against, credible, acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on those who attack us, and resilient architectures to dissuade attack by making any effort futile.

Accordingly, U.S. Space Command is fully integrated into and contributing to the Department of Defense's implementation of the President's Executive Order to establish a golden dome for American missile or pardon me, a golden dome for American missile defense shield. U.S. space Command appreciates Congress's significant support of numerous critical space superiority programs and the recent FY25 appropriations law.

Looking forward to FY26 and beyond. U.S. Space Command requires stable funding as well as effective and efficient acquisition programs delivering advanced space capabilities to enable a balanced space deterrence force structure. Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires, enhanced battlespace awareness, and integrated command and control capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the homeland and protect and enable the Joint Force.

The Unified Command Plan directs U.S. Space Command to protect and defend us and as directed, allied and commercial space capabilities through necessary offensive and defensive space operations. Like other combatant commands, we require combat credible kinetic and non-kinetic means to deter and counter adversary actions.

By investing in space security capabilities, we send a clear, the United States has the advantage and we remain committed that space will be safe, secure, and stable. We are ready to repel all challengers and any attempt to turn space into a battlefield will fail. Although many challenges lie ahead, the future of space holds tremendous promise for America if we actively and thoughtfully protect it. I am grateful for Congress's support to U.S. Space Command and continued investment to advance America's strength in space. Your continued backing not only ensures that U.S. Space Command protects our interests in space today, but also protects that future, which is coming.

Madam Chairwoman, I've submitted my posture statement for the record. And I look forward to your and the Subcommittee's questions.

FISCHER: Thank you, General Whiting. We'll begin with five-minute rounds of questions. I strongly believe that the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission's 2023 report, court should be required reading for everybody in the Department of Defense. It clearly articulates the threats that we face, and it concludes, rightfully concludes, that we are woefully underprepared.

Based on the recommendations of that report, last year's NDAA directed the Department to develop a deterrent strategy that would pace this projected threat. This strategy must also include an assessment of the amount and type of nuclear weapons and delivery systems necessary to implement that strategy.

General Cotton, can you tell me how the development of this strategy is coming along?

A. COTTON: Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. If you recall, when I first took over as a commander of U.S. Strategic Command, one of the first things we did was we instituted a nuclear recapitalization and transition cross functional team to do exactly that. Because one of the things we wanted to assure ourselves was did we have the capacity and capability and posture correct. That was in alignment with the study and the Commission's report. And it pretty much mirrored everything that was said in the Commission.

Since that time, what we have done is looked at the options that are available on all three legs of the triad. We're currently sufficient, currently. But in order to maintain sufficiency as we continue to have legacy systems online before the new systems come on board, there are some options within all three legs of the triad to increase capacity and capability.

FISCHER: General Cotton, you recently said that the Air Force should procure at least 145 B-21 bombers. From your position as STRATCOM commander, can you share with us why you assess that that should be the new procurement floor?

A. COTTON: Yes, Senator. When we first looked at the numbers of what would be required for the next generation of bombers to replace the B-1 and the B-2 that was a different geopolitical environment. We actually started a study in 2020 to ensure that our numbers were correct in regards to what we wanted to see the B-21 fleet look like.

At that point, the conversation from the department would be a minimum of 100 B-21s should be procured as we looked to see what the environment brought to bear. The other number that we would always talk about would be the 145 number, which would bring the total of the bomber force for the United States and allies because the bomber force represents all the bombers for the Western world would be about 220. And that would include the B-1s or excuse me, the B-21s as well as the modified B-52J mode ls that would come out.

FISCHER: Thank you. General, as you know, this Committee on a bipartisan basis strongly supports SLCM the nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile. And it was included. A program of record was included in our FY24 NDAA. In your view, as STRATCOM commander, will SLCMN address a capability gap?

A. COTTON: It will, ma'am. And what it does for us is twofold. It gives the President a broader range of options. And I think that is my role and my job as a combatant command is to present a broad range of capability and options for the President.

It also provides not only as it's a regional tool that can be used as well. So we can actually benefit from our geographic combatant commanders, which they support the idea of SLCMN as well, because from a regional perspective, it can hold adversaries at risk.

FISCHER: And yes or no, do you see opportunities to speed up that program?

A. COTTON: I would hope so, Madam Chairwoman. And the reason is I know that there's a program record that has been established in the Department of the Navy. I would love to see some acceleration from that team to see what we can do to get the assets a little quicker and move to the left.

FISCHER: Thank you.

General Whiting, I want to get one question in for you at this point as well. Every service relies on your assets that are based in space. I don't think that gets enough attention. Are you coordinating with the other combatant commands and also with services with the intelligence community to make sure that these assets under your command are going to be integrated appropriately?

WHITING: Madam Chairwoman, absolutely. In fact, I have a liaison element that I have assigned to each of the other combatant commands. So there's a liaison element from U.S. Space Command that sits inside of U.S. STRATCOM, as well as all the other combatant commands to persistently do that type of coordination to make sure that our operational plans are advancing together, that our real time operations are considering each other's capabilities.

We do that with our intelligence community as well, primarily through the National Reconnaissance Office. Again, we have an exchange of liaison officers and operational centers that work together. And then with the services as a joint headquarters, I have not only components from each of the services assigned to me, but I have personnel from all of those services, which keep us tightly linked with their future plans as well.

FISCHER: Thank you. Senator King?

KING: Thank you, Madam Chair. A couple of preliminary questions about staff. Both of you mentioned in your testimony that you rely upon not only military personnel, but civilians. My question to each of you is, have you -- are you under any orders or have orders come down, or are you -- have you already started to implement, or has somebody started to implement reductions in force firings, people who have taken the -- I call it the early retirement option?

General Cotton, where does your -- what's the status of your civilian workforce?

A. COTTON: Well, our civilian workforce, we're about 65 percent civilian in the headquarters, but that doesn't account for the 41,000 that make up the [components] that work under my charge.

Right now, Senator, very small amount of folks that took the early retirement activities. But the option for them to do so still exists. But right now, we're not seeing an effect. The numbers are pretty small.

KING: And no firings?

A. COTTON: We have not fired anyone.

KING: Are you under any orders to reduce that staff by a certain percentage?

A. COTTON: You know, we're looking for the efficiencies piece. But right now, it's all voluntary. And like I said from our perspective from STRATCOM, the numbers have been very, very low.

KING: And are you subject to a hiring freeze?

A. COTTON: I am.

KING: So those people who are leaving, you're not allowed to replace, is that correct?

A. COTTON: Well, we have an opportunity to get a waiver approved because of our mission set. And if there's a requirement for us to do a waiver to see if we can get someone through the hiring freeze, we can process that.

KING: General Whiting, same set of questions.

WHITING: Senator, my answers are almost identical to General Cotton's. About 60 percent of my headquarters staff is government civilians. We've had a small number who have volunteered for the deferred retirement program. We are under no orders to fire anyone. We are aware that we're looking at need to look for efficiencies as General Cotton discussed. We also are under a hiring freeze. And we have the opportunity for critical positions to ask for exemptions to that.

KING: Thank you, General Whiting, I was interested, you mentioned the -- I think it's called the Artemis Accord, which is clearly based upon allies. I'm concerned that we seem to be in a process of alienating our allies. Talk to me about the importance of the Artemis Accord in order to carry out your mission.

WHITING: Senator, the Artemis Accords are overseen by NASA and Department of State. And that's a civil exploratory set of agreements about shared principles in space between countries. On the military side, I have a named operation called Operation Olympic Defender, which includes seven countries, which is the United States, plus the Five Eyes nations, Germany and France, where we cooperate in space together to understand what's happening there. And again, we're showing --

KING: Those relationships with other countries are important to the execution of your mission, is that correct?

WHITING: They are, Senator.

KING: A question I haven't been able to get a clear answer on is what's the concept of the Golden Dome? In other words, would it be 1,000 THAAD batteries or is it conventional missile defense? Is it directed energy? What's the underlying concept of Golden Dome other than to protect the homeland, which is certainly a worthy goal?

WHITING: Senator, the Department right now has been going through a series of meetings and working groups to define what that architecture will look like. But in the executive order, it lays out that the President's asking the Department to develop a series of capabilities that will protect against these new modernized threats, like hypersonics, maneuvering vehicles that put the homeland at risk. So I think it'll be a layered system that will have to account for all of those threats at multiple phases of a -- of the life cycle of a missile.

KING: Well, that's the mission. I understand. So I take it we're some distance away from the operational concepts of what will actually --- what it will consist of. A very specific question. Both of you rely heavily on Kwajalein Atoll for training and testing purposes. My understanding is the infrastructure there is woefully inadequate. Can you speak to an effort to try to upgrade that infrastructure so that that Atoll can continue to be a part of our -- important part of our strategic deterrence initiative?

WHITING: Senator, Kwajalein Atoll is very important for our space mission. I visited there last summer. There's five sensors there that support our mission. We have advocated with the Department of the Army for investments there to make sure that the infrastructure can support those missions. And in fact, my Combatant Command is in the process right now of defining exactly what the support requirements are that we need there so we can put those into our next O-plan to make sure the army understands exactly what requirements we need. But that is a very important location for us.

KING: If you can just keep the Committee informed of that, of what the need is, whether it's authorities or funding, it could be an important part of our ongoing deliberations. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

FISCHER: Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds, you are recognized.

ROUNDS: Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, General Whiting and General Cotton, I want to thank you both for your service to our country and for the role that you play in keeping our country safe.

General Whiting, I'll begin with you and I'm going to have the same question for General Cotton as well. But how important is it that the use of the electromagnetic spectrum in particular areas of the lower 3 GHz band and the 7 to 8 GHz band of the spectrum be maintained by the Department of Defense? I've asked this of over 24 separate uniformed officers over the last two years and the answer has been consistent. But I wanted to hear it from both of you again today in terms of the need to have that access for the defense of our country. Would you, General Whiting, explain at least or confirm clearly the need for the Department of Defense to maintain its ability to use that unimpeded in that particular range of the spectrum, please?

WHITING: Senator, thank you for the question. I totally agree that those two bands are very important to our mission, in fact, vital. The lower three of that 3 GHz region is an area where we have radars and sensors which allow us to detect, track, and engage targets through all weather. And we have a number of capabilities there like the SPY-1 and SPY-6 radars, which are on navy ships that can support our mission, the long range detection radar in Alaska, which is critical for missile defense, the space fence and the future deep space advanced radar concept. And then in the higher bands that you discussed, the 7 and 8 gigahertz that's vital for SATCOM and special missions that we execute there. And we could not do our global wideband satellite communication mission without that spectrum, Sir.

ROUNDS: Thank you, General Whiting. General Cotton, Same questions.

A. COTTON: Senator, I would echo exactly what my dear friend said in regards to the lower bands. If we lose the ability for early detection, that takes away decision space for decision leaders and decision makers in regards to being able to execute operational plans.

So when we talk about what it affects in regards to ISR, it's going to be incredibly important. In the higher bands, you know, part of my UCP is global reach through global -- you know, through global strike. The bomber force, as an example, has the ability to traverse all over the world. SATCOM communications are going to be vital for those weapons systems today and in the future.

ROUNDS: Thank you, General. Also General Cotton, you've mentioned it a little bit already, but with the B-21, there's a discussion about, you know, we're acquiring 100 of them currently. The number has been debated. Should it be 145? Should it be more than that? And I've appreciated your indication that you've come around to approximately 145.

Can we talk a little bit about -- I mean this that -- this is the next gen. This is the sixth generation aircraft, this platform that's there. Can you talk a little bit in this open discussion? But I think the American public need to understand just what a platform this is and what it is capable of doing, and once again, in this unclassified environment?

A. COTTON: Yeah, thank you for that, Senator. You know, when we talk about stealth, there's actually only two platforms on the face of the earth that is -- that has all stealth capability. And that is the current B-2 Spirit and its next generation replacement, the B-21.

There is no other all aspect stealth aircraft on the face of the planet. The B-2 is the only one. And the B-21 just will dwarf its capabilities with advanced technologies that it has. It will be the predominant bomber for the United States Air Force moving forward as we move to a two bomber fleet, which will only be the B-21 and, you know, the B-52 and the modified version of that, the B-52J. So it's incredibly important --it's incredibly lethal with a stand in and stand out capability. So that's why I'm a big proponent on constant production that far exceeds 100 to the 145 number to get us about 220 with those two platforms.

ROUNDS: I noted that you've had a view that indicated the need to accelerate the B-21 production. Can you explain just a little bit about why we need to accelerate that production?

A. COTTON: Sir, as we start to see the legacy systems start to divest that the fleet has with the Air Force fleet, the B-1s and the B-2s in particular. I want to make sure that we don't see a large bathtub and the ability of operational platforms that are available to be used.

ROUNDS: We've worn our current weapons platforms out.

A. COTTON: We do.

ROUNDS: Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

FISCHER: Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Reed, you are recognized.

REED: Thank you, Madam Chairman. General Cotton, as I indicated in my opening remarks, there is an issue regarding the separation of dual hatting of the U.S. European commander and SACEUR. What's your military opinion of the effects this could have, possibly weakening the extended deterrence of your force -- affecting your force structure in other ways, and also the potential to accelerate nuclear proliferation?

I would note that the front page of the Wall Street Journal has an article titled Wary Europe Eyes Own Nuclear Force. Could you comment, please?

A. COTTON: Thank you, Ranking Member Reed. I think -- now, the relationship that I have as far as my operational plans with General Cavoli, both as the EUCOM commander and as SACEUR. Now, to your point in your opening is incredibly important in the execution of operational plans for me, even in STRATCOM.

As you know, I have a relationship with the United Kingdom. I have a relationship with SACEUR in the relationship of what the DCA aircraft bring to bear to be able to hold the adversary at risk. And that is done through the lens of currently General Cavoli with his SACEUR hat. That would change a little bit if that commander was not a U.S. Commander in the relationship that I would have.

Now, the relationship that I have with my allies and partners, especially my European allies and partners, is still steadfast, whether it'd be with the United Kingdom, whether it'd be with France, or whether it'd be with the other NATO nations.

REED: Thank you. General Cotton, one other question. The Air Force has proposed a reorganization, which I understand has been put on hold until the new Secretary is confirmed. That would cede much of the operational control of heavy bombers away from Air Force Global Strike Command to new composite wings out of Air Combat Command in response to this, Section 1631 of the 2025 NDAA, stop this until a report is submitted, it's not yet been received. How concerned are you about this reorganization impacting your nuclear deterrence mission?

A. COTTON: Well, Senator Reed, today I have one belly button in the Department of the Air Force that presents two legs of the triad and 68 percent of the NC3 capability to me as my component. And that is the Commander Air Force Global Strike Command. So as a four star, the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command has oversight and has the subject matter experts in the nuclear deterrent field. And he owns the bomber leg, as well as the ICBM leg.

You know, all I ask the United States Air Force is to ensure that when I have force presentation that I can still look to one person that can give me the answers to readiness, give me the answers to where we are on acquisition strategies, gives me the answers to where we are on, you know, manpower and help that they might need. Today, I only have to look to Barksdale Air Force Base and talk to the commander of Global Strike to get that answer.

REED: Thank you. General Whiting, are you concerned about becoming overly reliant upon commercial providers for too many of the department's missions into space? Do we draw a line? Do we ensure that this is a competitive situation?

WHITING: Senator Reed, I think the principle we need to apply is balance. For those things that we can go to commercial industry for, we should absolutely leverage that. U.S. Commercial space industry is a massive advantage for this nation. And it's an advantage that's widened over the last several years, and I think will continue to widen. But there are certain missions where we absolutely need to design and build for ourselves, our own capabilities. For example, the space capabilities, we provided support General Cotton for nuclear command and control for SATCOM.

Those are not capabilities that are easily replicable in the commercial market. So we need to design those for purpose-built reasons so we can assure to General Cotton, to the Secretary and to the President that they can talk to their nuclear forces when required. So I think it's a matter of balance. And we need to apply that lens to each mission, Sir.

REED: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you for your service. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

FISCHER: Thank you. Senator Reed. Senator Tuberville, you are recognized.

TUBERVILLE: Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning, man. General Cotton, thanks for your service, 39 years. I retired after 40 years of coaching. After the first week, I was sitting around the house reading the paper, drinking coffee. And my wife said, you ain't been here in 40 years. Get you a damn job. So here I am today. So don't think you're going to go home and fish and play golf. But thank you for your service.

Gentlemen, 2024, the Navy eliminated the lead Columbia cast submarine. Said it couldn't be delivered from 12 to 16 months late. GOA also reported that late delivery of the lead submarine could jeopardize its planned availability for operation in 2030. And delays the class could impact planned transition from Ohio class submarines. If Columbia class submarines are not available, General, what plans have we taken, you know, in that regard to fill the gap?

A. COTTON: Thank you for that question, Senator Tuberville. And you're right, right now, we're anticipating a 12 to 16-month delay for the first Columbia class. What's going to be incredibly important, and I say this constantly, is how do we continue to fortify our legacy systems until we do that?

So what the Navy is doing is a project called PIRA. And that's the Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availability. That's what that acronym stands for, in which they will look at up to five boats and figure out which of the five boats they might be able to modernize or do some extended life work to make it so we don't lose anything from our legacy systems to counter the delay and create a bathtub in our capabilities on the submarine force.

TUBERVILLE: What's the cost? That cost has got to be astronomical though, right? If we're running late and we have to fill in a gap with that, I mean, have we looked at that? And do we have the funding?

A. COTTON: Well, you know, I would, you know, I can -- I don't have the numbers before me in regards to what the Navy is doing for the cost of PIRA. I can get that to you. We can probably talk about that and I'll have it by closed session.

TUBERVILLE: Yeah.

A. COTTON: But I think bottom line, in that regard, we need to ensure that we keep that capability alive and well, right? I need to make sure that the tubes that are available on the SSBNs remain the tubes that are available on SSBNs, even if there's a slip to the new system that's supposed to replace it. So I'm trying to make it so we prevent a catastrophic failure in regards of creating a bathtub in all three legs of the triad to ensure that doesn't happen.

TUBERVILLE: Thank you. And again, thank you for your service. General Whiting, U.S. space Command's role in missile defense planning and operational support for Guam, how critical is that? And obviously, you've been given that task. And where do we stand on that?

WHITING: Senator, Guam is a vital location for many of our national defense needs, including for space. And through our Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, we do provide that planning and operational support that you highlight. And we are regularly working with INDOPACOM, as well as the Missile Defense Agency, the Army and the Nuclear Navy, to develop that architecture that is being delivered to defend Guam against the missile threats we now see primarily from China.

TUBERVILLE: Yeah, thank you. We're doing a lot of work in Guam. Obviously, Aegis system being put on the island. It's first Line of defense. Let me ask you too about the Golden Dome. President gave us obviously that referendum that he wants to protect our country with some kind of Golden Dome. Do you have a certain group that works with that -- within Space Command or is the entire Space Command working on this together? How does that work.

WHITING: Sir, it's a whole of command effort supporting a whole of Department of Defense effort. And so certainly within my command that -- that subordinate command, the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense has a leading role, as well as my J-8 resourcing and requirements division. In fact, that J-8 division, we have partnered with NORTHCOM and General Guillot there to co-write requirements document for the Golden Dome for America. And we will be delivering that over the next few months to the Department of Defense.

TUBERVILLE: Thank you. Just recently, President Trump put me on the Board of Visitors for Air Force Academy. I look forward to coming out and visiting with you all and possibly seeing some of your work. So thank both of you for your service. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

FISCHER: Thank you. Senator Tuberville. Senator Cotton, you are recognized.

T. COTTON: General Whiting, I want to return to Senator Reed's line of questioning about commercial space launch and any kind of risk it might pose us. You called the commercial space industry a quote, massive advantage. I assume you're saying it's a massive advantage against our chief adversaries in this domain, China and Russia?

WHITING: That's correct. Senator.

T. COTTON: Can you give us a sense of scale of how big the -- well, first off, commercial space launch. To be precise here, we're talking about ULA, the United Launch Alliance and SpaceX, correct?

WHITING: That has been the providers. And now Blue Origin has recently demonstrated New Glenn, yes, Sir.

T. COTTON: So can you give us a sense of scale of just how massive an advantage we have over say China because of ULA and SpaceX?

WHITING: Yes, Senator. And while I don't have the numbers, I can qualitatively describe those. If you go back probably 5 to 10 years, the number of launches we were executing compared to those in China or Russia looked very similar. But over time, the U.S. has massively increased the number of launches. And that equates to what we call mass to orbit. So that means, we're able to put more satellites on orbit, whether for commercial or government purposes. And those are getting cheaper and cheaper per pound, which also gives us more opportunities to leverage space for various missions.

T. COTTON: So you said 5 to 10 years ago, we had roughly equal space launch capacity as China and Russia. But now, we've substantially exceeded them, right?

WHITING: Correct. Yes, Senator.

T. COTTON: And what's been the driver over the last 5 to 10 years of that substantial increase? Is it ULA or is it SpaceX?

WHITING: Predominantly SpaceX, yes, Sir.

T. COTTON: So if it wasn't for SpaceX, we might be in this position where we still are at near equivalence to China and Russia in space launch? They certainly have been innovative and rapidly changed that market. Yes, Sir.

T. COTTON: Thank you. General Cotton, you've testified in the past, as have your predecessors, that China has undertaken a breathtaking buildup of its nuclear arsenal. It used to have what is called minimal deterrence, something a nuclear arsenal just sufficient for a second strike. Obviously now, it's moving on to first strike capabilities, whatever its rhetoric is. I think the department estimates that it's doubled its nuclear arsenal since Xi Jinping took power. It projects it's to double again by the end of this decade and maybe even double again by the middle of the next decade. Could you explain the kind of advantage this might provide China, not just in the nuclear balance of power, but also in a conventional conflict, say, if China decided to go for the jugular in Taiwan?

A. COTTON: Thank you, Senator Cotton. Nice seeing you. I think, you know, when we put in perspective where we were just, you know, left of probably 2018 and we saw it as a nascent threat and the breakout that my predecessor announced, you're right. What it does in changing the calculus in our strategy is now, we must be prepared for two nuclear peers instead of one. I would garner to say, Senator, included in that is two nuclear peers that have a transactional relationship that has blossomed over the last couple of years as well.

So as we look at the capabilities that we're seeing on all three legs, you're absolutely right. You know, having an H6N with long range strike capability is not a regional hegemon weapon system. You know, having land-based ICBMs is not a regional hegemon weapon system. Building out their submarine forces and having hypersonic weapons that are dual use capable and fobbed is not necessarily seen as a regional hegemon weapon system. So it makes us look at things a little differently. And our strategy has changed to compensate for that.

T. COTTON: Thank you. I'll close on a couple points. I made them before. You've agreed with them before. I'd love to hear your agreement one more time. Some people say about our nuclear weapons that we spend way too much money on weapons we never use. I respond to them that we actually don't spend that much money on them. We may be spending some money modernizing them now compared to our total defense expenditures. But more importantly, we have used our nuclear weapons every single day going back 80 years, this August, to prevent the kind of war that the world saw twice in 20 years. Do you agree with that, General Cotton?

A. COTTON: I absolutely agree with that, Senator.

T. COTTON: Thank you. I want to finally add my note of agreement with our fantastic chairwoman, Senator Fischer, on what she said about the Nuclear Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, also known as SLMCN, the program held on by a thread throughout the Biden era. Thanks to congressional support. And I'm glad that you acknowledge how important it is and that if anything, we need to do everything possible to accelerate that capability. Thank you, gentlemen.

FISCHER: Thank you. Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly, you are recognized.

KELLY: Thank you, Madam Chair. General Cotton, General Whiting, thank you for being here. I want to first touch on Golden Dome, and then I want to save some time for SLCM, and agree nuclear deterrence keeps us safe.

And General Cotton, you mentioned two nuclear peers. One of my biggest concerns is the third one, which is the DPRK. And I think it's fair to say that most of the time, we -- with our nuclear peers, we're dealing with rational actors. We hope that's the case. That's the thing that part of nuclear deterrence, that they will act rationally. Not so sure that's the case with the DPRK. And they are building more nuclear weapons. They're working on other systems to deliver them. And they can now range into the United States. I believe that's our view as a nation.

So can you talk a little bit about Golden Dome? And my concern with this is it could potentially -- even though I am not against the idea of a system that can protect the entire United States from incoming ballistic missiles nuclear armed. At the same time, this could accelerate a growing number. Our adversary's response to having a missile defense system could be to build more nuclear weapons.

And if one or two get through, that is too many. Right now, we do have a defensive system to protect us from a rogue actor in launching one ICBM. And my understanding is, and if you could share a little bit, General Cotton, about how effective that system is with the interceptors we have in Alaska and in California.

So could you provide an estimate of how much this would cost and what enhanced capability we would get out of this? And do you feel we can build a system that is not penetrable?

A. COTTON: Well, thank you, Senator Kelly. I don't want to get out of my lane because NORTHCOM. General Guillot is the one that's undertaking that role. My responsibility from Golden Dome is twofold in accordance to the EO. And mine is to make sure that I can assure that a second strike capability for the United States remains and how do we ensure that.

As far as the reliability of the ground-based interceptors piece, once again, I don't own that platform. That platform belongs to NORTHCOM. That's probably best for General Guillot to answer that. I do believe and we heard my colleague talk about the layered approach that is kind of the essence of Golden Dome for America. I think that's the answer and the key on how that system can be deliverable moving forward.

KELLY: All right. And thank you, General. I do agree. I think it's something we need to look into and we need to look at a cost benefit analysis of this, and also consider how it would potentially change the nuclear deterrence posture of not only us, but China and Russia.

On SLCM, and I know it was brought up here also. General, if -- one of my concerns here is -- one of the things that makes us stand out is our submarine force, especially the attack submarines, are incredibly effective. To integrate a tactical nuclear missile into a Virginia-class sub would take modifications that are significant. And you'd have to put the security system that we have in effect for nuclear weapons.

And my problem, I think, that I have with this is in the Western Pacific, this is a capability -- our attack submarine force is incredibly capable. And I think this would be somewhat disruptive. I think that needs to be a consideration before we go down the road of significant modifications to these systems. If you could just comment briefly on that?

A. COTTON: Well, Senator, I think from my perspective, a lot of those are TTPs that the Department of Navy had. And I think they need to pull those out of the cupboard and look to see what those TTPs were when we had TLAM ends. I don't know if it would be disruptive. Especially now that what we're seeing, especially in the INDOPACOM theater in regards to our allies and partners ability of letting us have dual use nuclear capable things arrive on their shores. The fact that, you know, I can now have B-52s fly into Japan where I didn't before, and on the Korean peninsula. I think there's work to be done, but I think it can be accomplished.

KELLY: All right. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

FISCHER: Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Banks, you were recognized.

BANKS: Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to both of you for being here today. General Cotton, thank you for your service. You're a hero. What you've done over the last three years is remarkable. And it's been an honor to work with you on the House Armed Services Committee. And now, again, on the Senate Armed Services Committee. As we talked about before, SLCMN is meant to deter China will be launched from attack submarines. SLCMN is needed to help address capability and escalation management gaps stemming from the rapid growth of China and Russia's theater range nuclear systems.

General, do you agree with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that validated the need for SLCMNs? And if so, what does this need to still stand?

A. COTTON: I do agree, Senator. And thank you for the comments that you made. What was said in 2018 still holds true today. I think even more so. It's what I had -- when I talk about being able to give a geographic combatant commander, the ability to also hold an adversary in their region at risk. You can now see that what you're seeing in this weapon system is more than just a strategic weapon. It is now can be a regional weapon and regional deterrence as well for my fellow combatant commander s that hold the regions of responsibility.

BANKS: And what do we need to do to (CROSSTALK) committed to it?

A. COTTON: The program of record has been established. We just need to make sure we continue to pump the well to ensure that they move out. And as the Chairwoman said, if we can get things to the left, I would gladly except being able to get the articles quicker than later.

BANKS: Got it. Fiscal Year 2024, NDAA directed the Navy and the NNSA to develop and deploy an operational SLCMN no later than 2034. Do you believe that we should still have SLCMN no later than 2034?

A. COTTON: I would love to move that to the left, Senator.

BANKS: Got it. General Whiting, the President's executive order to establish the Golden Dome for America's strategic the need for both weapons to shoot down enemy missiles and the satellites to track them. The EO called for the quote, "acceleration of the deployment of the hypersonic and ballistic tracking sensor layer." If we're going to have an effective Golden Dome for the U.S. homeland, how important is it that we expand our fleet of ballistic and hypersonic missile tracking satellites and space-based sensors?

WHITING: Thank you for the question, Senator. For the modern threats that we need to track, we will only be able to do that from space. And we need to be able to maintain custody of those threats not only when they're in the boost phase, when the rockets are burning very hot and we can track them with our infrared satellites, but then also when they're coasting so that we can, again, maintain custody to engage at the various layers. So it's absolutely vital, Senator.

BANKS: And do you agree with President Trump that we need to rapidly accelerate HPTSS so that we can have the sensors in space that we need to target incoming threats?

WHITING: I do, Senator. Those threats are real today, those more advanced threats and our current systems are optimized against traditional ballistic missiles, not against the variants that we're seeing fielded today.

BANKS: And General Cotton, China leads the world in hypersonics and has hundreds of long range hypersonic missiles. As you know, China shocked the world four years ago when it's hypersonic vehicle orbited the entire earth before landing. The U.S. has still not fielded a functional hypersonic weapon. Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane is a proven leader in hypersonics as you and I have talked about many times before. How important is increased investment in hypersonics if we're going to regain our military edge over China?

A. COTTON: Senator, it's very important in the work that I've seen done by Crane has been extraordinary for the Department of the Navy. I think investments, but actually production and getting them to the war fighters so they can be implemented and put in our arsenal.

BANKS: Got it. And finally, while we're replacing most of our nuclear arsenal in the next decade or two, we're keeping the B-52 bombers around well into midcentury. How critical is the B-52 program if we're going to keep those planes in the skies for decades to come?

A. COTTON: Incredible important for us, Sir. As I mentioned, Senator, you know, we're going to move to a two platform bomber force, you know, for the United States of America. It will be the B-21 and the B-52J. It is incredibly important that we get those 75 birds into modern, you know, and modified them with their replacement of their engines, their radars and their (CROSSTALK).

BANKS: I got 10 seconds. Can you talk about the advantages of the new B-52 engines over the old engines?

A. COTTON: Yes. The Rolls-Royce engines that are right there and that being worked in Indiana are going to be -- gives us about incredible increase in range, in speed and durability.

BANKS: Thank you. My time has expired.

FISCHER: Thank you. Senator Banks. Senator King and I would like a second round before we head to classified. And I'd like to follow up on some of Senator Banks's comments about Golden Dome and space-based sensors.

General Whiting, what would be the impacts to the mission effectiveness of SPACECOM were the government to auction off spectrum currently utilized by the department? Could Golden Dome even take place?

WHITING: Ma'am, we could not execute Golden Dome without full access to those two spectrums that we discussed earlier, the lower three and then the seven and eight gigahertz. We use that lower three-band again through so many of our radars to be able to track from the ground. And then the seven and eight gigahertz band is so important for our communications and other special missions. Can only see those requirements getting bigger for those spectrums as Golden Dome delivers.

FISCHER: And if it was auctioned off and if it was vacated by the Department, what's the time frame, not to mention the cost? What is the time frame in research development for those new sensors to be even located in another spectrum that wouldn't have the capability that the current spectrum has to even accomplish that?

WHITING: Madam Chair --

FISCHER: 10 years, 20 years?

WHITING: Madam Chair, I don't have a timeline because I think our focus has been not on vacating that, but figuring out if there's a way to share that spectrum through dynamic spectrum sharing. And I understand there's technologies there that may make that available. The department has done some studies on that and laid out a series of conditions that would need to be met if dynamic spectrum sharing can occur. And I endorse that those conditions must be met if we're going to figure out a way to share that spectrum with commercial industry.

FISCHER: Can dynamic sharing take place now?

WHITING: Ma'am, I am told the technology is close to being ready. I don't know if it is actually ready today, but we would want to verify that, certainly.

FISCHER: We would need to test.

WHITING: Yes, ma'am, absolutely.

FISCHER: And General Cotton, same question to you. If the government were to auction off spectrum currently utilized by the Department, how would STRATCOM'S mission effectiveness be impacted?

A. COTTON: It would be impacted, Madam Chair, because what would happen is to the point that was made by General Whiting. You know, we count on understanding what the threat looks like, being able to see that threat before it actually comes. We call that left of launch type of activities, as well as what we're talking about in the higher bands on what is the capacity and capability of my three legs to be able to utilize SATCOM, et cetera? It would absolutely affect us.

FISCHER: Thank you, Sir. Senator King?

KING: Two things. I just wanted to follow up on the discussion of hypersonics. I believe that we have missed two critical strategic technologies and are woefully behind hypersonics and directed energy. These are things that we should have seen coming and now we're playing catch up. I just want to emphasize, not only do we need hypersonic weapon for deterrent possibilities, but we need hypersonic defense. Those aircraft carriers in the Pacific are sitting ducks for hypersonic missiles coming at them 4,000 or 5,000 miles an hour, 100ft above the surface of the ocean. So hypersonic defense is something that I think we need to invest in, as well as the development of a hypersonic offensive capacity in order, again, to provide a deterrent. General Cotton, would you agree?

A. COTTON: I do agree with that statement, Senator.

KING: The other thing that I wanted to mention, it's sort of become conventional wisdom here that we're going from one near peer adversary to two. I believe we're going from one near peer adversary to three and a half because of the -- as I think you touched upon this, the growing cooperation between China and Russia. And then you put in Iran, which has also become a contributor to Russia's war machine, as well as North Korea, which is also contributing to Russia's efforts in Ukraine. So I thin k we need to think strategically, not two near peer adversaries, but the potential of two near peer adversaries who are working together. And that creates its own strategic challenges. General Cotton, what are your thoughts on that?

A. COTTON: Senator, you're absolutely right. And that's what we're actually doing at STRATCOM today. When we look at -- and you're right, I call them third party influencers. And what I mean by that, and, you know, to your point, I would add one that I think is a little different nuance. That is the new relationship that's being -- that we're seeing that's happening between Russia and the DPRK. So we're talking about DPRK. We're talking about Iran. We're talking about China, as well as the Russian Federation.

KING: And I think we have to assume that in a time of serious conflict, it wouldn't be just with one or the other. It could well and probably would involve all four of those powers that you've mentioned.

A. COTTON: That's why I call them the third-party influencers, because what they could do is they could be a distraction for the main effort, you know, that could be launched by any one of those that we had mentioned.

KING: General Whiting, your thoughts on that, new strategic reality?

WHITING: Senator, we watch those same four countries that General Cotton just mentioned and their bilateral relationships with each other. And we see increasingly that space is becoming an area where countries with more sophisticated space knowledge, like Russia or China, appear to be willing to trade-off that space knowledge for something that they want in return, whether that's armaments or some other political agreement. So we're very concerned with that and watching how they're cooperating on space.

KING: I just think that this new relationship needs to be part of our strategic thinking going forward to inform things like the Nuclear Posture Review and also the Fundamental Defense Strategy. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you again for your service. And I appreciate having been able to work with you. You're still at it. He's the guy that's leaving. We're going to miss you, General. Thank you.

FISCHER: We haven't for a while yet. With that, we will adjourn the open session of this hearing and reconvene down in classified in order to have our classified briefing from you, Gentlemen. Thank you very much. This section of the hearing is closed.

END