HASC-SF Fiscal Year 2026 Strategic Forces Posture Hearing

DESJARLAIS:  Today's hearing will come into order.

Pursuant to Rule 4B(3), Members of the House Armed Services Committee who are not Members of the Subcommittee are allowed to participate in today's hearing and will be recognized after all Subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.

Good afternoon, and welcome to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee's first hearing of the 119th Congress. And of course, we're probably going to be interrupted by votes, but we're going to power on as much as we can and pick up as soon as they conclude.

First, I want to recognize the new Majority Members of our Subcommittee; Mr. Van Orden from Wisconsin, who is not here yet; Mr. Messmer from Indiana; Mr. Crank from Colorado; and Mr. Hamadeh from Arizona; and also, we have Mr. Bell from Missouri; and Mr. Whitesides from California. So, welcome to the best and most important Subcommittee. We look forward to working with all you as we prepare for Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act.

Next, I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. With us, we have General Anthony Cotton, Commander of Strategic Command; General Stephen Whiting, Commander of U.S. Space Command; General Gregory Guillot, Commander of U.S. North Command; and Mr. John Hill, who is currently performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While the President's budget request for the upcoming fiscal year continues to be finalized, we look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses on your areas of responsibility and changes you are seeing to the threat environment.

I think it's worth noting that the three officers in front of us today represent different combat and commands with different missions and different priorities, but they each face a common problem. All of you are responsible for mission areas where the United States once enjoyed superiority, but we are now increasingly confronted by adversaries. Space and Homeland were once sanctuaries for the United States, beyond the reach of our adversaries, and from which our nation could project decisive power. That is no longer the case.

Nuclear competition, thought by many in this country to be a relic of the Cold War is back, with adversaries expanding their nuclear arsenals and developing new and destabilizing nuclear systems designed to hold our nation at risk. Our adversaries recognize the foundational role that each of these missions and areas plays in our defense strategy. They cannot compete with our conventional forces, so they have chosen to target our homeland, hold our space systems at risk and expand their nuclear arsenals to challenge our deterrent.

These threats have been building for some time, but the pace is accelerating. I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how we are responding to these developments. I'm concerned we have taken too long to come to terms with the new competitive environment. I'm afraid that our response thus far has been inadequate. These growing threats and how we as a nation choose to respond to them, is why I really do believe this is the most important Subcommittee in Congress.

Before turning to Ranking Member Moulton for his remarks, I want to recognize General Cotton, as this will likely be his last appearance before the Subcommittee. Thank you for your 39 years of service to our nation. We have particularly appreciated your leadership of STRATCOM and the candor you have had in your interactions with this Subcommittee over the last three years. You've certainly earned some peace and quiet, but you've got one last hearing to get through first.

With that, I'll turn it over to my good friend and Ranking Member, Seth Moulton, for any remarks he would like to make.

MOULTON:  Thank you very much, Chairman DesJarlais, and congratulations on your first Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing as Chairman. I also want to thank you for beginning this session with a very bipartisan series of briefings, to bring us all up to speed on some of the most consequential issues before our Congress today. I completely agree with your assessment of the role of this Subcommittee in Congress. Let me also echo your welcome to representatives; Bell from Missouri; Crank from Colorado; Hamadeh from Arizona; Messmer from Indiana; Van Orden from Wisconsin; and Whitesides from California. Lastly, welcome to our witnesses and thank you for your continued service to our country during this difficult time when many general officers are under attack.

General Cotton, thank you for your dedicated service to our nation for the last 39 years. Your particular focus on helping us understand the strategic dynamics of deterring two near-peer adversaries will have lasting impact. As we sit here today, I cannot ignore the fact that this administration has put our national security at risk. The Secretary of Defense broke the law when he put operational details classified top secret according to DOD guidelines that could not be more clear on an unclassified platform specifically targeted by China and Russia. What a boon it would have been to either adversary had they gotten those time on target details to the Houthis and time to use their extensive antiaircraft missile arsenal against our American pilots.

When Pete Hegseth left "Fox & Friends" to become the most unqualified Secretary of Defense in history by the narrowest vote margin in history, he said, "Accountability is back." Any of us who have served know that there is nobody more despised in the military than those who lead by the opposite of example, of forcing rules they don't follow themselves and having zero accountability for their own actions and behavior.

When Secretary Austin made a mistake far, far less serious by not properly notifying the top of his chain of command about his surgery. I did not hesitate in saying publicly that President Biden should fire him. It's worth noting that Secretary Austin's transgression, while serious, did not put any of our troops in immediate danger. While improper, did not violate the law, and he didn't lie about it. He told the truth, he answered questions before Congress, and he put new procedures in place to ensure it would never happen again.

Secretary Hegseth has done none of that, and to be clear about what Democrats are saying publicly and many Republicans are saying privately, he should be fired. Of course, rather than fire a criminal, the President has fired the Head of the NSA, who's received tremendous bipartisan praise from this very Committee. Don't think for a second, Mr. Chairman that our witnesses aren't sitting here today trying hard to do their jobs, wondering if they will be next. While U.S. stocks are cratering. I'm sorry, I wrote that 20 minutes ago, and now they're back up. President can make up his mind. But while U.S. stocks are all over the place, our adversary stocks of nuclear weapons are increasing at an alarming rate.

The Chinese Communist Party's ICBM fleet has exceeded U.S. intelligence estimates, and they have deployed several hypersonic weapons that can carry nuclear warheads. Russia is developing a treaty violating space-based nuclear weapon that would destroy nearly all of the satellites we rely on for GPS and communications every day. And despite Trump's promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, war criminal Putin continues his criminal war, using nuclear brinkmanship on the offense for the first time in history. North Korea and Iran are comparative sideshows in the nuclear realm, yet they still have the potential to kill millions of people we know their leaders would like to be Americans.

All that is to say, the mission of this Subcommittee is growing in scope, importance and urgency. I sometimes ask my Democratic colleagues, what is the greatest existential threat to America, because they often say, climate change. I'm no denier of science, but let's be clear, our greatest, most existential threat is nuclear war. Yet it's been a long time since most Americans gave it a second thought, Trump's Golden Dome for America is the most significant change to the strategic landscape the U.S. has proposed since the Cold War, and it merits careful consideration. If he wants to replace the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, he and his team need to propose an alternative, otherwise his Golden Dome could instigate a further a nuclear arms race, bankrupt DOD and be about as strong as the gold leaf glittering atop various Capitol Domes, which flakes off regularly at great expense.

Missile Defense has a mixed legacy. President Bush's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Trump thoughtlessly touts in his order, actually helps disprove his case. As a result of that decision, Russia and China began an arms race to get around our interceptors, which is why we are struggling to catch up on hypersonic and other novel delivery methods today, all of which make us strategically less safe. Perhaps a better time-proven approach is to follow in the footsteps of Reagan and Kennedy and use our economic power to drive negotiations to reduce nukes on all sides. Although it's far in the future, and only achieve through mutual agreement, the day when nobody has active nuclear weapons is the day that it is least likely they will be used against us.

General Cotton and General Guillot, we have discussed privately and publicly of how we should think about a world with two near-peer nuclear adversaries, and how that might adjust your requirements. We might be strategically stronger by building more new sentinels than interceptors, while the administration is proposing the opposite. But the underlying point, is that we should only spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars based on serious, strategic doctrine, not the whims of someone who always wants the golden version of things his friends already have.

Our Subcommittees' other major concern is space, and while we can't say much publicly, I will continue to press the department to make sure that we can explain to our constituents why we must invest billions in space, because it could not be more critical. America's strategic defense, the bedrock of our national security, must remain a top priority despite everything else going on in Washington these days. Even the right weapons with the wrong policy can be destabilizing, weakening our national security. I look forward to working closely with the Members of the Subcommittee and our witnesses to make America stronger and more secure. We often say that our nuclear arsenal must be safe, secure and reliable. Our country should be the same. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  I thank the Ranking Member. We'll now move into opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record, and because of respect for your time and votes, we're going to reduce the time to two minutes to make your opening remarks. And we'll start with Mr. Hill, and then we'll just move down the line from there. Mr. Hill, you're recognized.

HILL:  Thank you, Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, thank you for inviting me to testify before you on the Department of Defense's strategic posture. I will omit my threat portion of my opening statement. It's in the record. Moving straight to the nation's strategic posture is the foundation of deterrence and defense against these growing threats to the homeland that you have described in the opening statements and to our enduring interests abroad.

Nuclear forces and our Nuclear Command, Control and Communication Systems remain the center pieces of strategic posture, while missile defenses make ever more crucial contributions, both as compliments to nuclear forces and as indispensable denial elements of our conventional defense posture. No less important, Space Systems and Spectrum enable our nuclear forces, our Nuclear Command, Control and Communications, our strategic warning, our missile defenses and indeed the entire joint force.

This makes assured access to space and spectrum, the ability to establish superiority in space when needed in the domain and the means to deny hostile uses of space crucial components of our strategic posture. Increasingly, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons adds to this complexity, making our ability to counter such weapons of mass destruction an additional element of strategic posture.

The Department is firmly committed to making the necessary investments in our strategic posture to deter our adversaries and if deterrence fails, prevail in conflict. This mission requires sufficient and consistent funding and support uniquely within the Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy has oversight responsibility for all these interconnected and mutually supporting elements of strategic posture. It has been my privilege and honor to oversee this office since August 2024 and to work with this Committee on these matters of strategic importance to the nation. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

DESJARLAIS:  Thank you, Mr. Hill, for your testimony. General Cotton, you're recognized.

COTTON:  Good afternoon, Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton and the distinguished Members of this Committee. It's an honor for Sergeant Major Kreamer and me to appear before you today with Mr. Hill, General Whiting; and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons; General Guillot; and Chief Master Sergeant Storms. In my third and final year as Commander, representing the men and women of United States Strategic Command, it continues to be an absolute privilege, and I have submitted my final posture statement for the record.

First, let me be clear, America's nuclear forces, the bedrock of our national security is and continues to be, safe, secure, effective, incredible. In today's deteriorating security environment, our mission has never been more critical. To effectively deter in this complex environment, we must maintain both our existing capabilities and accelerate the ongoing modernization of our nuclear deterrent. All three legs of the triad and its critical Nuclear Command, Control and Communication Systems. Investing in modernization will ensure that U.S. strategic weapons continue to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners and allow us to achieve national objectives if deterrence fails. Thank you again for your support, leadership and attention to this mission, and I welcome your questions.

DESJARLAIS:  Thank you General. General Whiting, you're recognized.

WHITING:  Chairman DesJarlais and Ranking Member Moulton and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your support and the opportunity to represent the War Fighters of U.S. Space Command. At U.S. Space Command, our guiding principle is clear, to secure peace, we must be well prepared for conflict in space, and if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. U.S. Space Command is upholding this principle in the face of operational threats which continue to expand at a breathtaking pace, and which are being fielded deliberately and specifically to challenge the United States, the American way of life, and to hold the joint force at risk.

Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains advantages in space, thanks to the unified mission focus of our superb, joined war fighters, our unmatched commercial space sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and partnerships. That said, these advantages and our ability to deter potential adversaries cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence in space is consistent with other domains. It requires a keen understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring against, credible, acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on those who attack us, and resilient architectures to dissuade attack by making any effort futile.

U.S. Space Command requires stable funding as well as effective and efficient acquisition programs, delivering advanced space capabilities to enable a balanced space deterrence force structure. Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires, enhanced battle space awareness and integrated command and control capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the homeland and protect and enable the joint force. By investing in space superiority capabilities, we send a clear message, the U.S. has the advantage, and we remain committed that space will be safe, secure and stable. We are ready to repel all challengers, and any attempt to defeat the U.S. in space will fail. Mr. Chairman, I've submitted my posture statement for the record, and I look forward to your and the Committee's questions.

DESJARLAIS:  Thank you, General. General Guillot, you're recognized.

GUILLOT:  Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it's a tremendous honor to command and represent the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command. I'm also pleased to appear alongside General Cotton; General Whiting; and ASD John Hill. The global security environment is growing increasingly volatile, characterized by intensifying competition among major powers and mounting threats to U.S. national interests. Cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea remain significantly concerning to NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

To counter such adversary cooperation, the commands rely on realistic planning, targeted investments and forward-looking policies that ensure the command's ability to detect, track and defeat potential threats in all domains, establishing a layer domain awareness network to detect and track threats approaching North America from seabed to space is critical to immediate and future mission requirements, because we can't defeat what we can't see. Specific to this Subcommittee, I appreciate the department and congressional support for fielding all domain capabilities, such as airborne moving target indicator satellites, over the horizon radars, the E-7 Wedgetail, and excuse me, an integrated undersea surveillance system.

These capabilities support longstanding NORAD and NORTHCOM requirements and will serve as a foundation for the Golden Dome construct. The challenges facing our nation are real, but there should be no doubt about, NORAD and NORTHCOM resolve to deter aggression and, if necessary, defeat threats to our nations and our citizens. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear this afternoon, and I look forward to your questions. We have the watch.

DESJARLAIS:  OK. Thank you all. And votes were called, so I think we'll forgo questions for now. We'll recess till approximately 4:10 to 4:15.

 (RECESS)

DESJARLAIS:  OK. The committee will come back to order. I'll now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning and start with our outgoing General Cotton.

As you know, the FY 24 Defense Authorization bill required the Department of Defense to establish a program of record to develop the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile or SLCM-N. I noticed in your written open statement, you referred to this as, "Much needed capability." Can you elaborate on the importance of this system and its relevance to some of the theater deterrence challenges we're concerned about today?

COTTON:  Chairman, thank you for the question. And as it is in my written statement, the reason I say and it's two pieces to that, because I think it has a strategic capability, but even more so, there is an opportunity for regional capability. Geographic Combatant Commanders are all in support of being able to hold folks at risk from a regional level as well. That's why I think that SLCM-N is something that can fill that void.

DESJARLAIS:  Yeah, thank you. General Whiting, General Saltzman testified last week that our policy framework hasn't kept pace with the rising threats in space, specifically from China, saying "We have to go to very high levels of approval for testing and training. We do all training and simulation. We don't do live training due to policies." As the Combatant Commander, how important is it for you to have people and systems that are supported by accurate training?

WHITING:  Thank you, Chairman. It's incredibly important that we have well-tested capabilities so that we have confidence on how they will perform under various scenarios and conditions. And then it's important that the guardians and the war fighters who operate those systems are very well-trained on how to use them in those same scenarios and conditions. So investment in the training and test infrastructure, as well as having the right policies are vital for us.

DESJARLAIS:  Thank you. And, Mr. Hill, how are you and your team working to change these policies?

HILL:  Thank you, Chairman. Most of the training does not have to go to high levels. There are a few things that still do, and so we're looking to see, as space has become more normalized as part of the joint force, what are those remaining things that really require because of the sensitivity that they might require something high, but for the most part, we're trying to move things out of that requirement.

DESJARLAIS:  Yeah, thank you. And General Guillot, you discussed the importance of the spectrum with the Chairman and you appeared before the Full Committee last month, but I like to revisit this issue. Specifically in the President's vision of the Golden Dome for America, is it achievable without access to lower three and portions of 7 and 8 gigahertz bands the department currently utilizes?

GUILLOT:  Chairman, I don't see how we can have an effective Homeland Defense System without full use of the 3 to 3.5 spectrum and the higher numbers you mentioned will be challenging as well.

DESJARLAIS:  OK. And General Cotton and Whiting, if the department was forced to vacate from these spectrum bands, how would this impact your missions?

COTTON:  Well, sir, from our perspective, missile defense determination and missile warning determination would be something that would close a decision space for the President of the United States in which I'm supposed to protect.

WHITING:  And Mr. Chairman, in the Lower 3, we have several important tracking radars that we use for space domain awareness and missile defense. And then in the 7, 8 bands, we have important SATCOM communications links that we use in those bands. So those are again vital for our successful mission accomplishment.

DESJARLAIS:  And again, thank you all for your testimony today and setting a good precedence, I'm yielding back a minute and 20 seconds and recognizing Ranking Member Moulton for five minutes.

MOULTON:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your leadership by example. And without re-asking the question, I just want to echo my concerns about the spectrum. So, thank you very much for raising that. It's important that the rest of Congress hears these concerns as well. Mr. Hill, based on my math, the Secretary of Defense owed a response on options to implement what the executive order term to the Iron Dome for America program is on March 28th, what can you share about what that 60-day study period accomplished, and what the recommendations to the President were?

HILL:  Well in terms of what the recommendation recommendations were, that will be for the Secretary and the President to when the updates. The executive order said is provide the President a reference architecture that the President could incorporate into the President's budget. So when that budget is presented, that's when the specifics would come out. This stage, it's a discussion at the level between the Secretary and the President.

MOULTON:  OK, so has the Secretary provided a response yet, do you know?

HILL:  As I say, that's between the Secretary and the President. I'm not going to get into the specifics of what they're discussing.

MOULTON:  Do you know if the study will explore the question of how this will affect strategic stability or what our peer adversaries (inaudible)?

HILL:  Certainly, it, as it said in the executive order, we looked at the issues related to the surety of our nuclear second-strike response, for example, we looked at the protection of the American homeland. We looked at the regional aspects. So, it's the architecture and has the broader implications for strategic stability, all part of that.

MOULTON:  Thank you, General Guillot, what guidance have you received with regards to the overall goal of this proposed system and what threats are you writing those requirements to?

GUILLOT:  Congressman, we've -- the direct responsibilities I have are to provide my estimate recommended way to approach defending the homeland from ballistic missile threats, hypersonic threats, as well as cruise missile and air threats. And in doing so, I provided our commands recommendation of a three-dome approach with the first dome being a Domain Awareness dome, the second to handle ICBMs, and the third to handle the air threat to include cruise missiles, knowing that, depending on what part of the profile, hypersonics would be addressed either in the ICBM dome or in the air dome.

MOULTON:  Thank you. And General Cotton, in your role as the Commander of Strategic Command, you spent all day thinking about maintaining nuclear deterrence and strategic stability around the world. Have you been involved in thinking through the potential impacts a golden dome could have on the strategic stability that is increasingly precarious because of Russia and China's novel delivery systems?

COTTON:  Thank you, Ranking Member Moulton. At this time, STRATCOM actually is looking as we had in our office call. We're looking at some of the things that came from the SDI initiative, some of the talking points, some of the op-eds and analysis, the theories that happened then, just to kind of capture what that looks like. And we're still in the middle of doing that.

MOULTON:  OK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Turner for five minutes.

TURNER:  Good, thank you. General Whiting, I, in reading your testimony, on the issue of the Russian Space anti-satellite nuclear weapon, I got to tell you, I was very disappointed in the language that you used, and the impression I think that people would get in reading it, especially in light of in contrast to your recent remarks at a recent Space Symposium, where you noted the importance of the United States deploying offensive space weapons, orbital interceptors in space, specifically, your testimony says, "Most concerning with you there, Russia is pursuing the possible placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit, detonating a nuclear weapon on orbit would have indiscriminate effects potentially disrupting the global use of space for security, economic and scientific purposes. USSPACECOM has prepared our vital national security satellites for such a threat."

First off, let's dissect what you've just said. There's no statement in your statement that this is a treaty violation. It's not potentially disrupting the global use of space. In this Committee, Assistant Secretary John Plumb testified, "The detonation of a nuclear weapon in space would render low earth orbit unusable for up to a year."

General Saltzman testified and has stated that "The placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit in space as an anti-satellite nuclear weapon would be day zero, because the very next day we would not be able to count on the use of space for national security, economic or scientific purposes. The very next day, we would have to assume that the use of space is no longer secure. So, trillions of dollars and technology that we don't have would have to be expended assuming that space is no longer available to us." Now, do you disagree with Assistant Secretary John Plumb's testimony that the detonation would render low earth orbit unusable for up to a year?

WHITING:  No, sir, I do not.

TURNER:  Then why did you say potentially disrupting the global use of space. What is this potentially mean?

WHITING:  Sir, I...

TURNER:  Here I mean he says, render.

WHITING:  Sir, I do agree this is the single most threatening potential weapon to our space architecture.

TURNER:  Right, because my belief, and I think the belief of this Committee, and I mean the entire Armed Services Committee, not Subcommittee, is that, this cannot be permitted to go into space, that our position as a Committee, bipartisan, has to be that this is the Cuban Missile Crisis in space, and this cannot be permitted to be going in space. So, the next portion of your testimony, which is the next part that is most disturbing, is that, you give people the impression that USSPACECOM has prepared our vital national security satellites for such a threat. No, you haven't. It's not possible.

WHITING:  Sir, I think my language...

TURNER:  Not only have you not by giving people the impression that you have, you've given people the impression that supposedly economic and for scientific purposes, that if this should occur, that this detonation should happen, that apparently rendering low earth orbit indiscriminately unavailable for up to a year isn't going to mean that the use economically, communications and national security that we expect from space on this planet is going to be, as General Saltzman has indicated, significantly different the next day.

WHITING:  Sir, I absolutely agree with you. The two architects are the most important space systems I was talking about were our Nuclear Command and Control Systems that support General Cotton and General Guillot, those have been hardened against an on orbit nuclear detonation, and they were specifically designed for what could potentially be the worst day in American history. So those were the specific systems I was referring to.

TURNER:  Are they in low earth orbit?

WHITING:  No, sir, they are not.

TURNER:  So, when you're saying that you prepared them for that, they're not in low earth orbit?

WHITING:  No, sir.

TURNER:  So, I just want to be clear. You have not taken actions for the vital national security satellites to be prepared for such a threat, and we still have to be working so that this never happens.

WHITING:  OK.

TURNER:  I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentleman's time is expired. Would you like to respond?

WHITING:  I agree with the Congressman's last statement that we need to continue to take actions. Yes, sir.

TURNER:  Thank you, Chairman and gentlemen.

DESJARLAIS:  Thank you. And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for five minutes.

GARAMENDI:  Mr. Chairman, you and I had a conversation on the floor that was really one of the more purposeful that I've had on the issue of the Sentinel. And you suggested that since General Cotton, maybe not -- is retiring, that his retirement gift ought to be my termination of my opposition to the Sentinel. Would that make you happy, General Cotton?

COTTON:  Congressman, Garamendi.

GARAMENDI:  What kind of a going away present do you really want?

COTTON:  That would be an incredible going away present.

GARAMENDI:  Well, ain't going to happen. We really do value your extraordinary service and your tenacity on making sure that we're prepared in every possible way. In a more, maybe important way, I terminated my conversation on the floor with the Chairman saying, you know, we really need to have a full review of our nuclear deterrence, all of the pieces of it. The things have changed.

You just heard from Mr. Turner about some of the ongoing -- new, actually not new, we looked at nuclear weapons in space almost 35 years ago. Decided it wasn't particularly useful at that time, things have changed. So, what I'm really looking at here is that some in the very near future, we take the commission and say, "Guys, don't just tell us what we've done for the last 60 years. But where are we today?" Many, many things have changed. They've all been talked about here, and so I'm going to push for that along with the removal of your going away present. So, in any case, we're going to have to get on with it.

There's a whole series of things. I'm just going to let those questions go and we'll come back to them. In your testimony, Mr. Hill, and thank you, I hope you're sticking around for a while, because you do have a lot of experience here. There's much more to this issue than the nuclear weapons themselves. And this Committee has talked from time to time about arms control strategies. It may be, it's not maybe, it's definitely in our interest that we employ greater attention to arms control. Very, very difficult international situation right now, but nonetheless, we need to power through. And could you tell me or tell all of us where we are with arms control efforts in your domain?

HILL:  So, my domain (inaudible) nuclear and space and the missile defense pieces, certainly the legacy arms control, the New START expires next year. Don't see anything on the horizon. The actual verification activities have been suspended under that. The real challenge with arms control now, as we -- has been noted in many cases, is you really have to deal with three countries in this environment. China is a key part of that. And they've not shown interest in this. Their trend seems to be achieved parity before even considering the idea.

So, the environment for putting together successful talks is not good. It doesn't mean you don't try. The talks themselves can be valuable from a strategic stability perspective, even if they don't produce. So that is definitely part of the considerations of what are the things we can do to create more of an incentive for Russia and China to at least want to have a constructive conversation.

GARAMENDI:  The President Trump, earlier in, I guess, a couple of months ago, said, "There's no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons. We have so many, we're all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are actually, hopefully much more productive." Statements like that generally cause the, in this case, Russia and China go, "What is he talking about?"

I would take that as an opening to start, not at the top, but some things that are mutually beneficial to us and to China, and then just begin the process, start at probably the lowest possible level, and then go from there. I don't know how long you're going to be around in your job. I would hope for some time, but I would recommend that we spend a great deal of our effort on the arms control piece of this, otherwise, we're going to continue to build, and Cotton will have his Sentinel, and question is whether we are safer? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DESJARLAIS: (inaudible). Gentlemen's time has expired, The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.

BACON:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate all four of you being here. We appreciate your leadership. Had the honor of working with two of you, and I look forward to working with all four of you in the months and years ahead. Our first question, I got two questions for General Cotton brighten (ph) them out. I did have General Guillot here last week, so I've already post a few questions to you, but I would like to start off with the Looking Glass mission. I was one of the guys who flew on it, back in the day I think a couple of you have done that, done the same. I first want to ask, because it's still a viable need. And I'm just going to tag on to this.

Most people may not know what here on the Committee that we used to have this mission for 29 years, it was airborne 24/7 Air Force aircraft, 1991, I think it was, we took it to a ground alert for 15 minutes, eventually turned it over to the Navy for the aircraft and flight crew, saw the STRATCOM battle crew. I've been concerned that we don't have a 24/7 capability, number one, concern. But the number two, now the Navy is walking away from using their aircraft. And I think this is a concern for the Air Force. The Air Force needs to look at this. Do we need to pick this mission back up? So, my question to General Cotton is, is this still a viable need to the Looking Glass mission? And what do you see as the future here?

COTTON:  Thanks for the question. Congressman Bacon. So, there is a need. And in the middle of as we look through our NC3 roadmap, there's an active trade space study that's underway right now, and the conclusions are to be released in the June timeframe. One of the options is, what is the follow-on to the airborne piece? Because as you also know, part of that mission set is the air launch capability for the ground-based leg for the ICBMs with the air launch capability. That being said, there the E-6B of what you're referring to, that's TACOMO.

That should be around, and it's supposed to be around to the 2036 timeframe as the Navy replaces that aircraft with their EJJ or EXX or C-130 variant. You are correct, right now that will not have the ABNCP platform on it. So, we're under discussions right now on what does that look like moving forward. But right now, one of the options is to still continue to have an airborne leg, whether or not it belongs to the Air Force, to the Navy, as the services they have to fight that one out.

BACON:  If I could say it with a subliminal suggestion, I think it's Air Force handed off it. Just throw that out there. I got a hypersonic question for you, and then I'll go to our other two Generals. We could detect a hypersonic launch. We don't know where it's going, and we don't know exactly when it's going to hit. How does it make your mission more hard for Nuclear Command and Control?

COTTON:  Well, two things, because what I'm supposed to do is, I'm supposed to maximize the decision space for the President to make a decision, so it tightens up the ability to be able to let the President know when the strike is inbound and when it like might hit, which then really kind of closes the timelines in regards of having decisions space for the President.

BACON:  General Whiting and General Guillot, what is the one or two things you need to track hypersonic weapons? We're repeating this question from last week, but I think it's important.

WHITING:  Congressman, thank you for the question. In the Golden Dome executive order talks about accelerating the tracking layer from space, and those layers are being built today, and that investments have begun, and those are vital for us to track hypersonic weapons. And then we also want to modernize our ground-based radars that were built really for the traditional ballistic missile threat and you know, we've identified what those requirements are to improve those radars to be able to track hypersonics as well.

GUILLOT:  Congressman, and in support of General Whiting, I agree the most crucial step I think, is to get the HBTSS robustly fielded that would allow us to detect and track in ways that we cannot right now.

BACON:  So, I got you on the record twice saying that that's good. Now I want to support you with these efforts. I want to work on funding and getting this done. This is critical to our national security, in my view. One more question for General Cotton. What would be your preferred number for the B-21 fielding?

COTTON:  I'm on a record to say a minimum of 100 which is the program of record, but I'm on a record saying about 145 that would give us about 220 total bombers once the modernization of the B-52s take place, as well as of the fly out of the B-21. So, a 145 is what I'm thinking.

BACON:  Thank you. It sounds like a good number, and I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentlemen yields. So, the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal.

CARBAJAL:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wasn't kidding earlier when I made that flippant remark that, not all panels are created equal, and certainly having such a panel of such qualified individuals is really confidence-building. So, I'm really glad you're here. General Cotton, thank you for your distinguished service to our country. I hope you will also continue to find a way to contribute in your retirement, and I don't want you to hold your breath about Mr. Garamendi. And you might get some elements if you hold your breath, waiting for Mr. Garamendi to change his position.

We need to fully embrace the commercial space industry to maintain space superiority. Space commands, commercial integration strategy is certainly a step in the right direction and sends a strong demand signal to the industry. But the military needs to really put its money where its mouth is with these commercial integration strategies. To me, this seems easier to do from the service perspective, since they own procurement and acquisitions. General Whiting, can you speak to how you have been implementing your commercial integration strategy, and what more specific areas do you want the Space Force to focus on when it comes to leveraging commercial capabilities?

WHITING:  Thank you for the question, Congressman. In our commercial integration strategy, we identified three lines of effort that align to our responsibilities as a Combatant Command. And the first was to identify and advocate for commercial solutions. So, we're out scanning what those capabilities are and then trying to elevate those for the Space Forces and others consideration.

Secondly, we want to incorporate and operationalize those commercial capabilities as they come online. And then, third, to inform and protect our commercial partners. And as you're aware, Congressman at Vandenberg in the Commercial Integration Cell, we have 17 commercial companies there that we share classified information with to help them protect their constellations as well.

So the area I think I'd like to continue to make progress and I think we're going to see that this year, is in the Space Forces, Commercial Augmented Space Reserve, the CASR, as they now are starting to initiate the first pilot contracts of being able to leverage capability faster in a conflict or crisis, and we now are beginning to write what those triggers are for when those contracts would be initiated. And that's modeled on a TRANSCOM effort called the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and that's an area I want to make progress in this year.

CARBAJAL:  Thank you. Our entire military, every Combatant Command relies on space to carry out their functions. Our nation's launch range infrastructure is fragile, expensive and aging. General Whiting, as a Combatant Commander, how are you working with the entire Department of Defense to ensure we will have the ability to have responsive launch in the future?

WHITING:  Yeah. Thank you, Congressman for that question. We think this is one of the elements of victory of how the United States continues to be ultimately successful in space, as we have to have the ability to rapidly regenerate and reconstitute our space capabilities. So, we are identifying those requirements with the Space Force and with commercial industry, and to look at our capacity on our launch ranges to make sure that is commercial industry ramps and this is an area we have a massive lead over our competitors, that the launch ranges themselves never become the choke point and limit the United States in that regard.

CARBAJAL:  Thank you. General Cotton, I want to extract some wisdom from you before you leave us. As you know, Minuteman III tests happen out of Vandenberg Space Force Base in my district. As this system continues to age, you can discuss the role that test launches play in establishing confidence in Minuteman III systems, and what is the calculation you make in continuing test launches versus conserving the supply of test bodies?

COTTON:  Thank you for the question, Congressman, and you're absolutely right. So, the Western Range is incredibly important for us, especially when we're talking about legacy systems with the Minuteman III. That test, the results and analysis of that test is for STRATCOM, for us to understand the reliability of that weapon system. We are in the midst of trying to figure out, how do we balance continuing, since we know that there is a delay of Sentinel of how we can balance making sure we have enough missile bodies to still have testing in the future until we find Sentinel sitting in the holes as a replacement for the Minuteman.

CARBAJAL:  Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentleman yields back. Gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank, is now recognized for five minutes.

CRANK:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate that. I want to start by asking each of our witnesses to quickly answer the following question, in your opinion, is the space-based threat from Russia and China greater, weaker or the same compared to four years ago? Mr. Hill?

HILL:  Greater.

CRANK:  General Cotton?

COTTON:  Greater.

CRANK:  General Whiting?

WHITING:  Sir, it's greater.

CRANK:  General?

GUILLOT:  Sir, it's greater.

CRANK:  Great. General Guillot and General Whiting, can you tell me how Northern Command, NORTHCOM and Space Command, work together to defend the homeland?

GUILLOT:  Congressman, in a wide variety of ways every day, probably the most relevant for this Subcommittee would be the fact that U.S. Space Command operates and manages the systems that give us the earliest and first detection of intercontinental ballistic threats to the United States that we use to assess and determine, one, if it's a threat to the United States, and two, to predict where it will go. And three, they have systems that help us guide our ground-based interceptors to defeat these threats if it comes from North Korea or potentially Iran.

CRANK:  OK, and quickly, General Whiting?

WHITING:  That was a great answer from General Guillot. Congressman, I just would add that, in addition, our satellite communications and the GPS signal we provide to provide positioning, navigation and timing are also foundational to many of the efforts that we know Northern Command's executing every day to defend the homeland.

CRANK:  And do you both feel like you have clear and efficient lines of communication between the two commands to fulfill the mission and defend the homeland?

GUILLOT:  I absolutely think so, sir.

WHITING:  And I agree, Congressman.

CRANK:  And do you believe that this will -- collaboration helps you ensure that Golden Dome will be successfully deployed?

WHITING:  We are partnering with Northern Command, Congressman, to write the requirements document, and we have a very close partnership on that.

CRANK:  Thank you. You know, honestly I'm perplexed by discussions of Combatant Command realignment of any kind. This week, as HASC, we've had the Combatant Commanders for Europe, the Indo-Pacific, North America, our Strategic Forces and our Space Forces all testify that the space-based threat from Russia and China are more dangerous after four years of President Biden's weak rule, and we know that the China 2027 date is rapidly approaching. We've also heard how important it is that NORTHCOM and Space Command have maximum collaboration and communication with each other to make Golden Dome successful. President Trump very boldly proposed Golden Dome, and we must do as a Congress and as a nation, we must do everything we can to make it successful.

This maximum collaboration is only possible, and it is currently occurring at Peterson Space Force Base, where Northern Command and Space Command literally share a parking lot together. We need to give the President the most capable and lethal military to meet the Chinese threat. Space Command has achieved full operational capability at Peterson. We cannot afford to weaken the President's hand and to risk delaying Golden Dome while our adversaries are moving at full speed. This is a matter of great national security and importance. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentleman yields. The Chair now recognize the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Vasquez.

VASQUEZ:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to the witnesses for your service and your time today. General Cotton, thank you for your legacy of honorable service to our country. I represent New Mexico's Second District, home to White Sands Missile Range, the Department of Defense's premier research development test and evaluation facility and the department's largest open-air test range.

I also have the privilege of representing Holloman Air Force Base, home to the Holloman High Speed Test Track, the world's longest test track of its kind. From birthing the Atomic Age in World War II to cutting-edge testing for hypersonic weapons today, our state has been an integral part of the department's test and evaluation capabilities. I can confidently say that without New Mexico, our military strength would be nowhere to where it is today.

General Cotton and General Guillot, for the past 80 years, the department has made significant investments in New Mexico's test and evaluation infrastructure. Would you agree that those investments have paid dividends and have paid critical returns for national security?

GUILLOT:  Yes, Congressman, I would agree.

COTTON:  And I second that, absolutely.

VASQUEZ:  Thank you. General Cotton and General Guillot, given the unique and advanced testing capabilities that are located in my district, what would be the strategic risk to STRATCOM and NORTHCOM if those resources were diminished or lost?

GUILLOT:  Congressman, the first thing that would concern me would be the lack of development and confidence in systems that we're trying to employ to defend the homeland.

WHITING:  It would absolutely stall research and development on trying to figure out what we're trying to do as far as new capabilities moving forward.

VASQUEZ:  Thank you so much. And for General Whiting and Mr. Hill, beyond our invaluable testing capacity, New Mexico hosts some of the most advanced and innovative small businesses that today are leading the charge on the next-generation of space technology. New Mexican businesses can be credited providing power for a significant portion of satellites currently deployed in space and for designing the next-generation of space-based assets to ensure that we have the best strategic advantage over our adversaries for decades to come. Would you agree that the Department of Defense depends on innovations of small businesses to advance U.S. space capabilities at the rate necessary to compete with our adversaries like China and Russia?

WHITING:  Congressman Vasquez, we depend on that and more and more.

HILL:  And Congressman, I agree. I think U.S. commercial space industry is one of our nation's most massive advantages, and we need to continue to foster that innovation.

VASQUEZ:  Thank you. And I highlight that because of the importance of making sure that small businesses are included in our defense industrial base, I think at much higher levels that we've seen them in the past. And so, Mr. Hill, how does the department plan to more effectively tap into the innovative ideas of small businesses like those in New Mexico?

HILL:  Congressman, I think one of the ways that's been most emblematic has been through the defense innovation university, they reach out with many companies that are doing many innovative things. That's probably the most well-known example. There are others the acquisition system, but yes.

VASQUEZ:  Thank you. We would like to count on you as advocates to make sure that those small businesses get a chance to both commercialize their technology and, of course, support our national security efforts of the modern age. Like everything in the 21st century, military and space technology is advancing exponentially. No state is better equipped to support that technological advancement than New Mexico. We're innovative and always said it that if we can design it and test it in New Mexico, we can also build it in New Mexico.

And so, as we discussed today, every dollar the department spends and invests in our state, pays off dividends to strengthen American security. So, I remain committed to supporting the integral work being done by our brave service members at White Sands Missile Range and at Holloman Air Force Base. And I implore the department to harness the full potential of New Mexico small businesses that are working to ensure that we remain the premier military power in the world. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentlemen yields back. Chair now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

WILSON:  No, no...

DESJARLAIS:  South Carolina, I did that just to pick...

WILSON:  No, but I'm going to say something nice about General Cotton, so you're right, OK. But hey, I'd like to begin by thanking the Chairman also, thanking each of you for your service. It's so important, and it's so important at this time in history. And I am very grateful to represent the Second Congressional District of South Carolina, which is the home of the Savannah River Site and the future Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility. We're looking forward to supporting, contributing to the congressionally mandate goal to produce 80 plutonium pits per year in 2030.

And General Cotton, indeed, we appreciate your service from our sister state of North Carolina, and your ROTC background and 39 years of service. How meaningful that is to our country. Thank you for that. In your testimony, you mentioned that reestablishing a credible plutonium pit manufacturing capability remains the top stockpile priority. As we look at to say, sustain our long-term strategic deterrence. With that in mind, what is your assessment of the importance of a two-site strategy for plutonium pit production, and how does it provide for resilience to mitigate the impact of possible production outages at either Los Alamos National Laboratory or the Savannah River Site?

COTTON:  Congressman Wilson, first of all, thank you for the compliment. Incredibly important, as you know. So, I look at Savannah River as being kind of the cornerstone of pit production moving forward. It's going to be the cornerstone for NNSA, and we're as well as what we're seeing at the lab on their on their diamond-stamp pit that they've were able to accomplish last year. But being able to have two sites as opposed to one just that is the opportunity for us to get to the numbers that we need. And it also provides an ability to have different locations where you know, we're not yielding to one, if something was to happen to one location, and we can still produce.

WILSON:  And I'm really grateful that I just last week was meeting with so many other site personnel, and they are so enthusiastic about the progress they're making on plutonium pit production. And it's important to me, because I'm the only Member of Congress who's ever actually worked there, so I know of the capabilities of the personnel. Additionally, the American people need to know why it's so important to fund nuclear modernization and recapitalization efforts to all components to the U.S. nuclear enterprise. And so, General Cotton, why is this so important?

COTTON:  Because nuclear deterrence for us is foundational to national security. It's foundational to everything that every other Combatant Commander that would be before you in a Committee would actually have a conversation. Being able to be able to continue to hold our adversaries at risk, I think is paramount. The only way we do that is, one, we sustain the legacy systems that we currently have. What's even more important is to be able to modernize the three legs of the triad to ensure that we can continue to do that in the future, especially with two nuclear peer adversaries.

WILSON:  And indeed, we appreciate your success. And General Whiting, in your testimony, you mentioned that Russia's use of electromagnetic warfare systems to disrupt services to the Baltic and Black Sea and Mediterranean regions, also Russia is desirous of developing a capability of a nuclear weapon in orbit. With that in mind, what we're into is a conflict we didn't choose between dictators, as a rule of gun invading democracy, rule of law, and Russia, in particular, war criminal Putin is trying so hard to recreate the failed Soviet Union. And so, with that in mind, does the United States possess or do we currently have an ability to mitigate such threats as we have seen with electromagnetic warfare?

WHITING:  Congressman, thank you for the question. There's been a lot of work to develop tactics, techniques and procedures to mitigate those threats, and indeed, we work to execute those each and every day.

WILSON:  And then, additionally, what about the potential of a nuclear weapon in orbit?

WHITING:  It's the most concerning threat we potentially face. And so absolutely, Congressman, we are looking at all options on the table to how to make sure that such a device would not threaten our space capabilities.

WILSON:  And indeed, it's so serious because war criminal Putin is trying so hard to recreate his nuclear, excuse me, Soviet Union back again as we see the invasion of Ukraine, as we see fixing the elections in Georgia, the legitimate election, President Salome Zourabichvili, sadly, the Putin rigged that election. And so over and over again, we see the threat. And so, thank you for what you're doing. I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides.

WHITESIDES:  Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you Generals for being here today. General Cotton, I'm glad to have you here for many reasons, not least because it gives me a bit of an opportunity to brag about my district. As you probably know, I'm extremely proud to represent Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, home of the B-21 Raider in something that is perhaps rare for some DOD programs and their development, the Raider program is currently meeting expected cost, schedule and performance criteria.

That puts me in the welcome position to credibly argue that we could actually move faster and save money on the program without sacrificing quality or lethality, by potentially investing at the front end in an increased production capacity. Sir, can you describe the ways in which the ability to more quickly produce the necessary 100 aircraft, and potentially more, as you state, in the fleet, could act as an effective deterrent to our adversaries?

COTTON:  Sir, thank you for that question, because you're absolutely right. Plant 42 is building the world's only six generation aircraft at this moment. And the things that Northrop Grumman is doing with that aircraft is absolutely remarkable. So, to your point, and how I have stated to be able to have more than 100 in the fleet is my desire, moving that to the left to increase production rates as a Combatant Commander is only goodness for me.

WHITESIDES:  Yeah, thank you, sir. General Guillot, it's good to see you again. I've really appreciated your candor with me and the Committee. Last week, we discussed the necessity of a layered approach for Domain Awareness, combining robust earth air and space-based sensing capabilities, and I couldn't agree with you more on this point, robust and comprehensive Domain Awareness is absolutely critical if we're going to maintain projection force capabilities lethality and cover our war fighters' backs. Sir, could you discuss why that layered approach is essential to the national security of our nation, and what do we gain by tackling that program or that problem first?

GUILLOT:  Congressman, thank you, and I think the domain, what I call the Domain Awareness dome, is the most important, because no matter how capable our interceptors or defeat mechanisms are, they can't defeat what they can't see. And so, they have to have a Domain Awareness layer that detects, tracks, cues and feeds the defeat systems and that Domain Awareness layer dome is a series of layers, starting with the undersea, with undersea detection to ensure that we can detect submarines that are becoming more and more quiet each day.

As they approach our continent, to a land-based layer with probably over the horizon radars to give us long, deep looks, an air layer with aircraft like the E-7 that can take targets like a cruise missile and feed that information directly to a fighter or a defeat mechanism, And then into space with space-based AMTI, for example, the HBTSS that we previously discussed, as well as the warning systems, all of those need to feed the defeat mechanisms to defeat ICBMs, cruise missiles and aircraft.

WHITESIDES:  Thank you, sir. And, General Whiting, I don't have too much time, but last week, it was reported publicly that the three Russian Kosmos satellites launched earlier this year released an object into orbit. In March, it looked like satellites were conducting proximity operations. We have a bunch of different things going on, and the PRC is doing stuff as well. Can you discuss in brief, as much as you're able to in this setting, the threats posed by our adversary space capabilities to our Space Domain Awareness and the ways in which the department can better leverage commercial capabilities to overcome that threat?

WHITING:  Yeah, thank you for the question, Congressman. We continue to see Russia invest in their counter space capabilities despite the challenges that they've had in Ukraine, and you identified some on orbit testing that we have found problematic and that we're, you know, making sure that we understand as carefully as possible. We do think Commercial Space Domain Awareness data is a key part of us understanding what is happening on orbit. And through an initiative we have called the Joint Commercial Office, we take data from 17 different companies and infuse that in a way that we can tip and cue even our government systems to help understand those unique events and circumstances that are happening on orbit. So we think those commercial systems are vital for us, sir.

WHITESIDES:  Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orden.

VAN ORDEN:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to recognize the (inaudible) in the back there. So, thanks for coming out. You, you and you, simplifying and aim high -- what your aim high? What do you guys do? What?

 (UNKNOWN): (inaudible).

VAN ORDEN:  OK, we'll do that. Thanks for coming. Appreciate it. Hey, so we have to remember a couple things. We got to use knowledge here, right about stuff to make these very critically important decisions. I'm going to read my headline to you, Senate Dem rips Space Force. No Republican is willing to tell Trump. It's a dumb idea. Democrats file a bill to abolish flagrantly wasteful Trump-formed Space Force. Now, Sir, I don't think you're wasteful. I don't think you're dump. I think you are the cutting-edge of defense, and we've clearly identified that.

Your service and the fact that President Donald J. Trump established it and was openly mocked by the Democrats in the House and the Senate. Needs to be remembered by people in the House and the Senate and people wearing uniforms, because I've found that when people make such incredibly grievous errors, maybe we shouldn't weigh their opinions as high as others. I'm just saying that. At Star Wars program, that shutdown the Soviet Union, right. And it didn't work. We didn't have the technologies to do it, it didn't work. And so, this can work.

I've been to Israel several times, and they have the Iron Dome, and I think it's incredibly important that we work for the Golden Dome. I don't share some of my colleagues concerned that this will start a nuclear war. I think they will prevent it and also help bring down, as my friend Mr. Wilson calls the war criminal, Vladimir Putin. He's absolutely right. I would like to say one thing. So, being in Israel, they have these Iron Dome batteries all over the place. At one point, if you remove the golden heights, Israel is like eight miles across the entire country. Obviously, the continentally United States is much bigger.

So, I would like to tell you right now, when you're working on this Golden Dome, and I trust that you will, I have Volk Field, and I also have Fort McCoy in the State of Wisconsin. And if we're going to be talking about putting these batteries, which are going to have to be around the country, I would like to encourage you to come look at that Volk field is amazing, as is Fort McCoy. So, I'm offering, probably should ask that first. But if we're going to put these around, I'd like them there, OK. What in your opinion, sir, General Cotton, is the most effective leg of the nuclear triad?

COTTON:  All three.

VAN ORDEN:  Which one has the greatest potential to get more heads-on foreheads without being detected?

COTTON:  Well, that would be either the SLBM leg or the ICBM leg.

VAN ORDEN:  OK.

COTTON:  And not the air leg.

VAN ORDEN:  Correct. And so, the Ohio class is supposed to be replaced by the Columbia class, correct?

COTTON:  That is correct.

VAN ORDEN:  All right. So that's what I'm talking about. That is the most stealthy leg of the nuclear triad, and I think has the greatest chance of survivability of a first strike against us and then a retaliatory strike, which is how this should go down. I don't think we should be doing preemptive nuclear strikes. So, what is the status of our Ohio fleet? And the Columbia is replaced? Where are we at?

COTTON:  So right now, we have 14 SSBN Ohio-class votes still that are commissioned. We we're about 16 months delayed on the Columbia-class.

VAN ORDEN:  OK.

COTTON:  So right now, what the Navy owes me is a project in which they will take what is known as PYRA (ph), and that is an acronym that basically what we're really talking about is, how do you do a slip or a life extension program on the five you know best holes to extend out, to cover down the shortfalls of...

VAN ORDEN:  I want to come (inaudible) offer you or your replacement, by the way, thank you for your service. Have fun retiring. It's going to take you two years to figure out your retirement. It took me that long. I'd like to offer you my letterhead and my loud mouth to talk to the Navy if they're not getting those responses back here immediately, because this is critical. And then what is the status of the AUKUS agreement right now?

COTTON:  Well, I'm not part of the AUKUS agreement, though, sir.

VAN ORDEN:  Well, those so that is providing some nuclear submarines to Australia, right. We're pairing with UK and Australia. So, it it's in the same realm.

COTTON:  It's true, but it's not SSBN, those are SSNs.

VAN ORDEN:  Yeah, OK.

COTTON:  Virginia-class so that might be more relevant for Mr. Hill to answer that.

VAN ORDEN:  OK. So, Mr. Hill, my time has expired here, and I will get you after about that, because these are critically important weapon systems. So, thank you very much, gentlemen. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bell from Missouri.

BELL:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. Hello to the witnesses. Thank you for being here. General Whiting, Low Earth orbit hosts thousands of satellites offering benefits like reduced costs and easier access. However, the growing congestion and space debris in low Earth orbit increase the risk of satellite collisions. Additionally, the competition between the United States, Russia and China, exacerbates these problems. Can you outline the steps Space Command is taking to protect critical infrastructure and address these challenges?

WHITING:  Yeah, Congressman, thank you for the question. We think this issue is so significant that each and every day, we have a Space Force unit that's assigned to U.S. Space Command that looks at all active satellites from all countries, and we run predictions to see if we think it's going to run into any pieces of debris any of those satellites, and if we see that that is a potential, we notify the owners of those satellites, that includes satellites from Russia or China, because we don't want any satellite to hit a piece of debris and create more debris. So, we think it's vital that all countries act responsibly in space, not to generate additional debris.

BELL:  In your testimony, you specifically mentioned examples of China's use of international partnerships and advanced projects to challenge U.S. leadership in space, given recent concerns from our allies about a perceived retreat of U.S. global leadership under the current administration, what additional steps can the U.S. take internationally to counter China's expanding influence in space?

WHITING:  Congressman, thank you for the question. On the military side, I think we will continue to build enduring relationships with our closest partners in space. Yesterday, at a space conference, I announced that our Operation Olympic Defender, which is our named operation in space, that includes six other countries that we've achieved initial operational capability, and we will continue to look for those opportunities to bring other allies closer to us as they develop additional space capabilities.

BELL:  OK. And General Cotton, thank you again for your service. It was great meeting your team. I don't think Rep Garamendi is moving on that gift, so maybe a tie or something you can settle for. But, in your testimony, sir, you mentioned the importance of U.S. allies and partners being a critical component of deterrence, providing an advantage that our adversaries cannot match, given that our biggest adversaries, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have formed closer, more integrated relationships. What more can STRATCOM do to enhance combine force interoperability and promote U.S. global presence?

COTTON:  Congressman, thank you for the question. So, you know we're doing it right now. We have bomber task forces right now that are showing assurance and extended to certain submissions, bringing together our allies and partners that actually befuddle you know, the Russian Federation as well as the CCP. So, I think continuing those relations are incredibly healthy for us. There's opportunities for us to continue to have collaboration and joint exercises from a STRATCOM perspective that I think really does still show the commitment to assurance and extended deterrence.

BELL:  General Guillot, sir, can you expand on the threats posed by Iran in the cyber domain?

GUILLOT:  Congressman, at this time, North America, the United States is threatened in all domains from all avenue of approach, so the air domain, the sea, land, but the most present and persistent threat that we face every day is from in the cyber domain, where we have thousands upon thousands of attacks or attempted attacks on our networks across the entire Department of Defense. Iran is a big part of that. They have significant presence in cyber warfare, and very grateful that through Cyber Command and other efforts in the interagency, FBI, DOJ, have some great capability as well that keep them out of our networks.

BELL:  And additionally, given that many of their terrorist proxies have been significantly weakened in the past year and a half. Do they possess similar capabilities that might impact our cybersecurity?

GUILLOT:  Well, I think they have capability to threaten our cybersecurity, and it requires the utmost vigilance by all members.

BELL:  Thank you. I yield my time.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentlemen yields. The Chair now recognizes gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer.

MESSMER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank all the witnesses for your service and for being here today. General Cotton, it's good to see you again. It was nice to meet with you yesterday. I appreciate your support that you mentioned earlier about the support of the SLCM-N program. How are you approaching the various design options to meet STRATCOM requirements, specifically with respect to survivability versus time to field?

COTTON:  Congressman, thank you for the question. And it was great talking with you yesterday. I think part of that is some of the work that we're actually seeing in your state, and the work that's being done when it comes to SLCM-N, and the work that's being done by Crane, for example, is a good example of that. As far as being able to outline and continue to flush out TTPs for the Department of Navy is going to be incredibly important. I think that's part of the shortfalls that we've been facing so far in regards to having something move forward that's a little more than program of record. So that's what we're tackling this year for my last here is to make sure that we can get those moving along. As I mentioned to you yesterday, I really want to see that accelerate and not languish to the right.

MESSMER:  Do you think the Navy is moving fast enough to implement that program?

COTTON:  I would always love to see them move faster.

MESSMER:  OK, thank you. Also, General Cotton, I wanted to follow-up on our conversation about Conventional Prompt Strike, CPS. This program is currently planned to be deployed on the Zumwalt Destroyer and Virginia Submarines, given the rapidly deteriorating security environment that we face. Do you think we can afford any delays to CPS deployment on a Navy platform?

COTTON:  Absolutely not.

MESSMER:  OK. If the Navy were to decide not to deploy CPS on Zumwalt, how important would it be to get it deployed as quickly as possible on a Virginia-class sub?

COTTON:  It would be incredibly important.

MESSMER:  OK. Also, General Cotton, in my district, Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is the largest Navy installation in the world or in the country, third largest in the world, and a leader in hypersonics in order to combat our adversaries, specifically China, who has a functional hypersonic vehicle. How important is the investment production and eventually delivery to the war fighter of a hypersonic weapon?

COTTON:  I think it's incredibly important it can complement the weapon systems that we currently have.

MESSMER:  OK, thank you. As a follow-up with hypersonics. Crane is also a leader in microelectronic testing. Can you speak to the importance of microelectronic testing capabilities and how they're a key to enabling technology for missile defense, nuclear modernization and space missions?

COTTON:  Well, Crane, as you know, sir, are doing incredible work for us and my Navy component at this very moment when it comes to micro components. So as we see the modernization, to be frank, of all three legs of the triad, they're key to doing that work.

MESSMER:  OK, thank you. General Whiting, as a follow-up to the Golden Dome for America executive order, how important is it for the DOD to expand the number of space-based interceptors in our arsenal to effectively implement this executive order?

WHITING:  Thank you, Congressman. For a Global Dome or Golden Dome to truly be global, and if you're going to be able to hold at risk missiles in the boost phase in mid-course, you're really going to have to have a space-based interceptor capability to do that on the timelines that will be necessary. So, we think it's an important part of the layered approach of the Golden Dome.

MESSMER:  Thank you. That's all my questions. I yield back my time.

DESJARLAIS:  Gentlemen yields back. Thank you all for your testimony. And the open session will now move upstairs for the close session. The hearing is adjourned.

END