Understanding and anticipating change in the environment and impacts to deterrence strategies:

• What are useful new models for understanding the relationships among multiple nuclear-armed actors?
• What are strategies for deterring two nuclear-armed peer/near-peer competitors simultaneously?
• What impact does two nuclear-armed peer/near-peer competitors have on extended deterrence and assurance?
• How can deterrence be restored? Is a nation’s first response its best opportunity to do so?

Understanding the changing deterrence mission and how to accelerate adaptation:

• What are ways to operationalize integrated deterrence across the whole of government?
• How can we shape deterrence of non-nuclear attacks that employ multi-domain and simultaneous effects rising to the strategic level?
• How might the methods by which we deter nuclear use need to be adapted after nuclear use by an adversary?
• How do non-state entities taking actions in a crisis or conflict impact escalation and deterrence?
• What is the risk (probability and consequence) that strategic deterrence will fail given a set of relevant independent variables? 

Understanding the requirements of strategic competition and improving the competitive posture of the U.S. and its allies:

• Is strategic stability possible in a tripolar long term competition?
• How does strategic competition, crises, and/or conflict impact extended deterrence? Conversely, how can extending deterrence impact great power competition?      
• How has the use of economic warfare and sharp power impacted great power competition?
• How might the U.S. enhance its resilience to counter nuclear coercion? What policies, postures, and/or capabilities could prevent us from being deterred?
• What integrated deterrence lessons learned can be drawn from the Ukraine crisis?